Their wars, our lessons

My piece in the Deccan Herald, where I argue that the Russo-Ukrainian war and the West Asia conflict signal shifting battlefields, implying that modern militaries must adapt.

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Link is below ….

https://www.deccanherald.com/india/their-wars-our-lessons-3947363

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Full text is here ….

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Introduction

The history of warfare tells us that no two wars are similar.

Drawing comparisons can therefore be facile. Even then some inferences can be drawn. In Ukraine, the war of maneuver has been reduced to a war of attrition. In Iran, while the initial air-strikes were successful, they have not translated into decisive military victory. Instead, the war has horizontally expanded into other benign economies and geographies.

The question then is how States like India should deduce the changes in warfare, to develop useful military capacity.

New contexts in warfare

In this age of disruptive warfare, war fighting is no longer about military metrics and technological superiority, but how superior tactics can compensate for lack of capacity; how disruptive methods can stall a stronger adversary; how no single military service can be decisive in battle; how innovation and adaptation brings advantage on the battlefield; how national and societal resilience underpins combat power; and how faulty assumptions can deny victory to a stronger adversary in war. Therefore, caution must be exercised when debates on warfare become overly technology-centric.

A few aspects stand-out ...

• First, there are limits to the use of airpower. While air strikes can cause significant damage, they cannot deliver military victory. In Ukraine, the use of airpower has been rather muted. In Iran, the US strikes were possible only due to lack of any meaningful air defence. The May 2025 conflict inhibited the IAF from effectively using its air assets to constrain Pakistan. Clearly, air superiority, as a fundamental tenet of airpower, is under extreme stress. Whenever air superiority is achieved, the ground forces gain the freedom for manoeuvre. When absent, the character of war changes dramatically.

• Second, the defence of the airspace is not a reassuring concept. Flooding the skies with drones is the new tactic. Some estimates suggest that for every dollar spent on drones, the western allies are spending at least ten times to shoot them down. This high cost is spurring the hunt for interception alternatives. Making low-cost interceptors – based on laser and microwave technology, a re-useable capability could be the next big thing.

  Besides, radars have been foundational to air defence. Long-range, high-value radars have been the choice for long. But, the drone war has now spurred the need for shorter-range radars. With standard in-service radars unable to detect the small, low-flying drones, tech companies are struggling to produce short-range radars more cheaply to provide last mile protection.

• Third, the importance of mechanised warfare is coming under intense debate. With unmanned munitions inhibiting the use of tanks and ICVs, analysts are drawing divergent conclusions. In Ukraine, these platforms have rarely produced major breakthroughs. Does that make mechanised platforms obsolete, or dependent on a new set of operating conditions that could help exploit this force? Smaller modular units could be one way of re-thinking the mechanised force. In our context, these forces still matter, to secure our contested borders, or make quick gains on a static battlefield.

Some things don’t change …

• First, disruptive technologies can create a spectre of military success, but they cannot help win wars. They can cause intense death and destruction, but not destroy the will of a resilient military adversary. Most modern militaries still need the real tools of war – tanks, guns, ships and aircraft – to provide the staying power and prevail in war. In India’s case, these platforms matter more, where the external security threats are rooted in a troubled history of territorial contiguity with China and Pakistan.

• Second, modern wars can escalate in several unexpected ways. When the shooting match starts, all planning for decisive strikes, and escalation dominance or control can come to a naught. As strategic mistakes compound, the political leadership is left with no choice but to accept failure or escalate, by adding newer dimensions to war – the ground or naval forces. Then comes a stage, when efforts to reinforce this stalemate spiral out of control and the conflict expands. In Iran, the US has been pushed into this trap.

• Third, national resilience is the key to fighting a stronger adversary. A country is a resilient power, if it can yield sufficient, intrinsic capacities to meet the demands of its national security for indefinite periods of time. Resilience is both – the political and societal will and ability – to resist external pressure, protect the populace and infrastructure, while continuing to fight. It has to be an integral part of the national security planning process, and cannot be a secondary consideration, to prepare societies for protracted conflict, and maintain credulity of national narratives and societal cohesion. Both Ukraine and Iran have amply proved it.

Building a future force

What India can learn from these ongoing wars in Ukraine and Iran is important. What capabilities are useful what is not, is India’s military planning dilemma. This muddles the policy debate on its choice of future platforms – traditional or asymmetric. Traditional platforms – tanks, guns and aircraft – help defend the home country; while the asymmetric – cyber, space, electronic warfare, etc. – help disrupt an adversary’s war-fighting capacity. Finding the right balance between the two is the key that India needs to resolve.

India’s recent promulgation of the Defence Vision 2047 is a step in the right direction. The vision document aims at addressing the policy dissonance at three levels – in terms of technology, doctrine and structure - to build India’s future multi-domain force. However, while a multi-domain force looks good in theory and concept, it is not easy to resource, build and operationalise. More powerful nations like the US and China can indulge in it, but countries like India that lack the techno-industrial heft, and financial resources, can find it difficult to field such a capability.

For India, therefore, focusing on creating the right type of operating layers – of ISR, C2, long-range precision strikes, close-contact battle, logistics, infrastructure, etc. – can help optimise the limited resources, to build a useful deterrent. Understanding the new contexts in warfare can help decide, what suits us - a multi-domain force that takes years to build and optimise, or a multi-layered capability that is efficient, affordable and quick to field.

The latter seems to be a prudent choice, especially in light of India’s recurring border tensions with Pakistan and China. As a case in point, Ukraine and Iran have done well to build precise, and affordable layers of war-fighting, to stall a stronger adversary.