My opinion piece in the Deccan Herald on India’s quest for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), where I argue that the idea stands entangled in multiple constructs and contradictory debates. These largely pertain to conceptual interpretations of MDO, organisational primacy and control, resourcing constraints and inter-service priorities.
In the Indian context, this calls for a serious intellectual exercise that would have to go from a concept to a doable joint war-fighting doctrine, and on to official operating practices.
Link is below ….
https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/indias-complex-quest-for-multi-domain-operations-3992430
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Full text …
Military doctrines and concepts are flexible ideas. They change with the introduction of new technologies and ideas. The development of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) as a military construct is no different; as it stands entangled in multiple concepts and contradictory debates. These debates largely pertain to conceptual interpretations of MDO, organisational primacy and control, resourcing constraints and inter-service priorities; quite akin to the unyielding debate that has marred the theatre-isation of India’s armed forces.
In this context, Ran Samvad 2026, Indian armed forces’ recent conclave aimed at casting a blueprint on MDO, is significant. Barring a few useful articulations, the deliberations was marred by heavy jargon and lofty ideas, on which India is clearly not in a position to deliver. Not for lack of any good intent, but sheer paucity of technological and industrial capacity to produce the effects, that presumably constitute MDO.
This calls for a serious intellectual exercise that would have to go a long way from a concept to a “doable” joint war-fighting doctrine, and on to official operating practices.
Conceptual underpinnings …
Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 shocked the West, when it realised that ground invasions were still a reality. Military planners soon realised that operational manoeuvre – by land, air or sea – were proving to be difficult; as both sides could easily leverage multiple forms of disruptive ideas and technologies to hit, and destroy the conventional forces on a transparent battlefield.
MDO is an outcome of these ground realities, but more significantly as a result of the refashioning of earlier concepts to current expectations on the battlefield. Several experts argue that MDO represents an evolution of the erstwhile - combined arms concept - to now incorporate the newer space, cyber and cognitive domains. In that sense, it is essentially an intellectual approach to shape joint doctrines on land, in the air and at sea. Some even argue it is a cross-domain concept, where operational concepts of each service, are inter-mingled to produce the desired battle effects in a joint war-fighting environment.
While others contend that, it is a politico-strategic construct, and not an operational one, as several operational concepts within the realm of MDO – like targeting of adversaries’ economic, nuclear and other critical infrastructure – are strategically political decisions.
A few aspects stand-out ...
While at inception, the idea revolved around the concept of combined arms operations, it has transmuted – in the 1990s and 2000s - into a broader concept of delivering “higher-level” effects. These are primarily envisaged at three levels – of informational superiority, cognitive dominance and penetrative longer-range strikes.
Next, it assumes that technological superiority – in terms of battlefield transparency, accelerated kill-chains and penetrative strikes – is a sufficient condition to claim victory in war.
In that, it misses the importance of “lower-level” effects, in pursuit of the ground operations at the divisional, brigade and battalion level.
A doctrinal dilemma …
Since the 1990s, India’s operational thinking, its organisational structures and choices of technology have been overly influenced by its long decades of counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir. With the Chinese threat manifesting since the 2010s, it now gives rise to the question of how a conflict with China, might look like, and what might India do to reset itself for the next war.
Does MDO suit the accomplishment of India’s future roles and missions, when our wars would be rooted in disputes for territory? Ideally speaking, the territorial contexts must drive our doctrinal choices for the 2030s to 2040s. A few questions are pertinent ...
First, what does MDO mean to each military service – army, air force and navy? If it still means retaining primacy in respective realms of war-fighting – of land, air, or sea; then rooting for MDO is a fallacy.
Second, when integration between the three services is low-key, how do the armed forces envisage to operational-ise this idea? The United States had decades of integration behind it, before it embarked on the idea of MDO. PLA has its own version of MDO.
Third, spending too much time and resources on building a higher-level capability, will come at expense of the lower-level effects. Tanks, guns and aircraft will still be needed to shape a land conflict.
Additionally, with the MDO prioritising battle at the highest level, it leaves the lower-level formations – the divisions, brigades and battalions – with unclear roles and responsibilities. The question then is, what role would frontline commanders have in future MDO-driven wars, and would these lower-level formations that do most of the hard fighting be relevant?
These factors carry a serious significance in the Indian context.
Sub-scaling can be a choice …
For MDO to be a reality, the Indian armed forces will require a change in their priorities, and even abandon a few. Change of this magnitude is possible only if the leadership is willing to expend political capital, make hard decisions, find resources, and provide strong oversight.
While institutional reforms can set the stage for flourishing new ideas, it still needs to be established what MDO means in the Indian context. Why it is needed, what is needed, and how much of ? Whether it can be realised in a reasonable time, and if it takes too long, would it be swamped by newer technologies and concepts that prove to be superior to MDO by the 2040s?
Suffice to say, if resources are a constraint and time is not on our side, then India must “sub-scale” its idea of MDO to create the right, war-fighting layers – of C2, ISR, deep-strike, close-battle, logistic and infrastructure – which are affordable and timely, in context of our future border wars.
As a case in point, Ukraine and Iran have done well in fielding the right enabling layers critical to war, without subscribing to the idea of MDO.
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