Enabling Layers: The Key to India's Multi-Domain Deterrence Capabilities

My opinion piece in The Hindu where I argue that a strong defence-industrial base is vital to shape India’s multi-domain deterrence and resilience, especially against China.

—

Link on paywall …..

https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-key-to-indias-multi-domain-deterrence-capabilities/article70789040.ece

—

Gist is here …

—

China’s military poses a serious challenge to India. It has no choice but to pursue a robust industrial strategy to offset China’s military advantage. Otherwise, it risks the widening of the capability gap. Bridging this gap requires political expediency to make hard policy choices, with some urgency – of what to buy, or what to build, and the potential costs and benefits. The challenge is that, technology is evolving faster than doctrine, making precise choices even more difficult. The question is how should India re-conceptualise its doctrinal and technological choices, and adapt a credible defence-industrial strategy to deter the PLA.

Hard Choices

There could be three contrasting ways to approach the issue ...

• First, India could adopt a bold approach. It would imply betting on the right technological trends and investing in a completely new bundle of war-fighting technologies. The risk is, if implementation fails, it can create acute capability vulnerabilities and further weaken the margin of deterrence with our adversaries. Besides, India lacks the industrial heft to produce technologies at scale and speed, to neutralise China’s advantage. But if successful, it could help reduce the capability gap.

• Second, India could consider a more conservative strategy. This would entail integrating a wide range of emerging technologies with those in-service – to make the existing force more effective. It would also entail enhancing our cyber, space and electronic warfare capabilities to digitise the battle-space, to streamline and condense the kill-chains. This is entirely doable, but it would not alter the balance of power. Perhaps, this strategy is more suited to fight a short war, with Pakistan, not a protracted conflict.

• Third, India could explore the middle path. While it continues to rely on legacy platforms, it invests in the creation and deployment of enabling layers, to enhance its ability to deter China. While, multi-domain operations (MDO) should be the obvious choice; we are not there yet for a mix of reasons. Besides, MDO as a concept is difficult to define, and even more difficult to operationalise. The would entail fielding a set of crucial enabling layers - of C2, ISR, deep-strike, close-battle, infrastructure and logistics, which are critical to war outcomes. As these layers evolve, India’s military would shape into a syncretic, multi-domain force.

Systemic vulnerabilities

Historically military transformations have adopted well-known paths. It entails aligning – research, development and industrial capacity; doctrines and structures; and technology and tactics – across institutions, and over time, to deter threats. National security institutions, including the military, have to work together to develop a common picture of the deterrence, the state wishes to create. Since our margin of deterrence against China is uncertain, our endeavour should be to analyse the factors that explain the systemic challenges to building a robust posture.

Two aspects stand-out ...

• First, India’s industrial challenges are well known. Its ability to translate its military requirements into industrial targets is doubtful. The issue is not its technological competence, but its defence-industrial base, which is not structured to deliver at speed and scale. Missiles, munitions and drones are urgent industrial investments of the day; so are the ISR and C2 networks and shortfalls in legacy platforms. We need to expand the defence-industrial base in conjunction with private industry, otherwise, it might continue to frustrate us.

  While, there is no one-off solution to coordinating industrial capacity, technology and doctrine, but incremental steps can generate benefits in the long term. By removing red tape, ensuring budgetary stability and long-term contracts, especially for specialized platforms, could prove to be helpful. A mind-set change that private players can build military systems more efficiently than the government sector, is needed. It can never be too late to shore up the system, but the window for industrial reform is clearly shrinking.

• Second, India’s procurement system has to focus on evolving – and not constraining - the fighting force. The system has to adapt faster and rooted in an efficient defence-industrial base that can produce what an evolving force needs. We need to spend more, but spend smarter by making hard choices in prioritising the key deterrent capabilities. This will require the broadest possible debate and consensus on what needs to be done, and why. It is also the military’s job to explain its roles and tasks to the political leadership; the costs of inaction and possible trade-offs; and how they impact the deterrence that we wish to achieve.

Fixing the enabling layers

Strengthening India’s deterrence would mean altering China’s military confidence, while preventing it from assuming that any single capability could prove decisive. This is more so, when India has no single capability, which is as exquisite enough to alter the military balance. By creating and operationalising the enabling layers - C2, ISR, deep-strike, close-battle and others, India can aspire to field a capable multi-domain force, to deter the Chinese.

India must have two top priorities ...

• First, to identify those military vulnerabilities that present an advantage to China. Our fledgling C4ISR is one such concern. Dominating the C4ISR battle is the key; as the side that can see, can continue to fight. India needs cheap ISR platforms, in numbers which it can afford to lose, yet maintain ISR capacity. We even need superior cyber, space and electronic warfare capabilities to deceive and degrade the adversary’s ISR platforms. A layered C4ISR – one that enhances own ISR capacity, while limiting adversary’s ability – is vital.

  There are other layers, as well. For instance, the integration of missiles, aircraft and drones – as the strike layer - to dislocate the enemy in depth. The coordinated employment of land-based platforms - tanks, guns and infantry vehicles – as the layer, to fight the front-line battles. A robust logistic layer which integrates all rear-zone elements, including logistic installations, supply-chains and infrastructure, to fight a protracted war. Equally important, in India’s case, will be its nuclear deterrent, and how much nuclear capability it needs to compensate for a lack of conventional deterrence to dissuade a nuclear adversary like China.

• Second, we need to incentivise the right parts of the defence industrial base, by making one-off budgetary allocations in select capabilities. China has a sizeable missile inventory; it has the industrial capacity to produce thousands more, during conflict. If a conflict erupts, it can use these against us, with devastating effect. Even if India were to endure the initial PLA strikes, it will put severe pressure on our surge capacity. This inventory gap is a risky bet. We have to incentivise defence production, in the absence of which, China might be tempted to drag us into a protracted fight.

We should therefore be spending less time admiring the service-specific acquisitions, and rather fix the critical enabling layers in the deterrence system. Besides, theatre-isation alone might not help create these layers, unless it is rooted in deep doctrinal convergence.