The impact of Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb

Few moments will remain in military history like the day when flocks of small-sized Ukrainian drones, emerging from aptly positioned civilian vehicles, swarmed towards Long-Range Aviation airbases in the depths of the Russia, managing to inflict unprecedented damage on Putin’s strategic bomber fleet.

Until June 2025, Moscow’s heavy bomber force had taken part in the unrelenting, multi-year missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure - and, as we’ll see, with remarkable impunity. Despite, apparently, more than one thousand strike sorties flown since 2022,1 accidents had been the main cause of the few destroyed bombers, while Ukrainian air defence, which had been considerably effective in restricting the freedom of action of Putin’s tactical aviation, found itself almost completely unable to counteract the huge Tupolevs slinging missiles from hundreds of kilometres.2

Neither Ukraine’s Soviet-era S-300s, nor the famed NATO-supplied Patriots seemed up to the task: sure, they could, with variable efficacy, intercept some of the arrows, but they could hardly try to shoot the archers. Thus, Kiev was forced to adapt, ultimately coming up with an incredibly daunting operation, which struck hard but would prove difficult to repeat.

Now, one year after Operation Spiderweb - the name chosen for the drone assaults of 1 June 2025 - it is possibile to evaluate the long term effect of the spectacular offensive, particularly its impact on Putin’s strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructures.

In doing so, we will first recount the state of Russia’s bomber fleet at the eve of the operation; then, we will analyze the damage actually documented in the attacks - and what has been claimed, or admitted, by war propaganda from both sides. Finally, we will assess the impact of the strikes on the war, the Russian ability in replacing the losses, and the adaptations which have followed. This analysis relies largely, but not exclusively, on visual and satellite evidences.

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