Does deferring decision-making to automated systems degrade our ability to understand our own organisations? This Weickian sensemaking theory article argues ‘Perhaps’ – what they call interpretive debt. E.g. a loan officer dets a ‘decline’ flag from an AI tool but accepts the recommendation without reviewing the applicant’s bank statements, or a manager relies on a… Continue reading Interpretive…
Does it matter who manages daily ‘safety’ in a business? According to a ~32-country study, maybe. When business owners take direct control of day-to-day safety decisions and responsibilities, workplace accident rates worsened. So who delivered better results: safety officers or employee reps? Check the video to find out. PS. I expect some will challenge the… Continue reading Does it matter who…
Does the absence of incidents tell you how well risks are managed? In part 1 of our chat, Marcin Nazaruk explores why traditional ‘safety approaches’ can miss things like: 1. The normal variability in how work is performed every day 2. Constraints that limit or shape workers’ available choices 3. And error traps that make… Continue reading Does the absence of incidents tell you how well risks are…
‘All useful systems are sociotechnical’ Part 2 extracts from Leveson’s ‘An introduction to Systems Engineering’. This is from a systems engineering & cybernetics perspective. PS. Check out my YouTube and recent Critical Control / barrier vid: https://youtube.com/@safe_as_pod?si=iUaDPJynPemQRZhY Shout a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson · Leveson argues that “All useful systems are…
What happens when operators misunderstand the design and designers misunderstand the operators? Couple of partial extracts from Busby & Hibberd’s 2002 article which explored accident report sources to construct mismatches between operator and designer assumptions. PS. Check out my YouTube and recent Critical Control / barrier vid: https://youtube.com/@safe_as_pod?si=iUaDPJynPemQRZhY Shout a…
Does construction rework act as a safety risk amplifier? This study from Peter E.D Love analysed data from 599 projects. PS. Check out my YouTube and recent Critical Control / barrier vid: https://youtube.com/@safe_as_pod?si=iUaDPJynPemQRZhY Shout a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson Extracts:· “Rework is not only a response to quality deviations but also an activity that alters task…
Today I chat with Dr Marcin Nazaruk, who shares his practical experience and research on learning from daily work and application on Safety-II and HOP principles to improve learning and risk management. The discussion also explores themes around risk controls, work constraints, risk assessments, and error traps. Check out Part 1 and please help like… Continue reading Dr Marcin Nazaruk Part 1: HOP,…
Ogres have layers. And apparently so too blame more than praise! This explored whether we judge negative behaviour differently from positive behaviour via blame & praise. PS. Check out my YouTube and recent Critical Control / barrier vid: https://youtube.com/@safe_as_pod?si=iUaDPJynPemQRZhY Shout a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson Tl;dr: blame and praise aren’t opposite versions of…
Does adding more checks and more people make work ‘safer’? I think it’s an easy assumption to make, but in Part 2 of my Critical Control / Barrier / Safeguard series, we explore why this may not be an ideal assumption. Two related ideas are: 1. The fallacy of independence: Several controls can share the… Continue reading Does adding more checks make work ‘safer’? Critical Controls part 2
Why do we blame people for failing to compensate for a poorly designed system? A cool extract from Baker & Haddon’s 1974 article about people and poor design (in my view, Haddon is among the GOATs). They argue that ‘traditionally’ (lolz those silly dark age people of yesteryear, not like us modern elites who stopped… Continue reading Haddon 1974: Why do we blame people instead of fixing a poorly…