Reading · The Rabbi Schneeweiss Substack

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Note: Although I appreciate feedback on all my content, I’m particularly interested in feedback on this one. Not because I think this is one of my better pieces, and not even because I’m unsure about it, but because this one was particularly vexing to write. I can never predict which pieces will be easy or difficult. For some reason, this one was fraught with problems. If I did it right, the seams shouldn’t show. That’s what I’m interested in.

I grew up in Yakima, WA in the nineties. Yakima was (and still is) a town renowned for its hops, its orchards, its vineyards, and its gang violence. At least, in the bad parts of town.

One of my best friends, who resided in the good part of town, lived next door to a family whose kids often came over to play. One day, he informed me that these kids’ parents were both judges and casually mentioned that they had received death threats in the past. Most likely from the thugs in these gangs.

That’s what I think of whenever I read one of the first mitzvos mentioned in Sefer Devarim: the Torah prohibition of lo saguru mipnei ish (“Do not fear any man”), which is directed specifically at judges. Here it is in context:

I commanded your judges at that time, saying, “Listen among your brothers and judge righteously between man and his brother or his sojourner. Do not show partiality in judgment; the small like the great you shall hear. Do not fear any man, for the mishpat (justice or judgment) is God’s. And the matter that is too difficult for you, bring to me and I will hear it.” (1:16-17)

I’d like to examine both clauses of the bolded phrase: (1) What is the prohibition of lo saguru, and what are its parameters? (2) What does it mean that the mishpat belongs to God, and how does it relate to lo saguru?

Rambam codifies the primary case of lo saguru in Hilchos Sanhedrin ve’ha’Onshin ha’Mesurin la’Hen 22:1:

[When] two who come before you for judgment, one gentle and one tough: before you hear their words, or once you hear their words and you do not [yet] know how the judgment leans, you are permitted to say to them, “I will not attend to you” – perhaps the strong one will become liable, and he will consequently chase after the judges.
But once you’ve heard their words and know how the judgment leans, you are not permitted to say, “I will not attend to you,” as it is stated, “do not fear any man” (Devarim 1:17). [This means] that you shouldn’t say, “So-and-so is wicked; maybe he’ll kill my son,” “maybe he’ll set fire to my grain-stack,” “maybe he’ll cut down my saplings.” And if he was appointed for the public, he is obligated to attend to them [in every case].

The Torah gives a dayan two outs: he can opt not to hear the case at all, or he can recuse himself even after hearing the claims as long as he hasn’t yet formed a judgment. But once he hears their words and is inclined toward a ruling, lo saguru kicks in, and he is obligated to judge the case no matter how afraid he is. And these outs only apply to dayanim who aren’t appointed for the public. A dayan who is memuneh la’rabbim (a public appointee) may not opt out of any case.

Upon hearing this halacha, one might wonder, “Really?! The dayan is required to endanger himself and his family? What about the paramount value of pikuach nefesh (the preservation of life)?” R. Nachum Rabinovitch zt”l (Yad Peshutah ad loc.) raises this question and tentatively offers an original answer:

The Acharonim discussed the question: if the case involves a powerful litigant, and the dayan fears that he may kill his [the dayan’s] son, why is he obligated to take up their case? Surely nothing stands in the way of sakanas nefashos (danger to life) except three transgressions, and the negative commandment of lo saguru is not one of them!
Were it not that I am afraid [to say so], I would say that the law of the king and the law of beis din (the court) differ from the din yachid (law of an individual). For the function of beis din is to pursue evildoers and to restrain them, even by force … And it is evident that if beis din applies force against evildoers, it is possible that they will meet with opposition from them, and consequently danger will be created for the dayan or the officer as well.
But it is on that understanding that they appointed him … If, God forbid, the dayanim will be afraid to judge the transgressors, there is no danger greater than this for the entire public, and the pikuach nefesh of the whole public depends on this. Compare 23:9: “Any dayan who takes money from this one and gives it to that one unlawfully, Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu exacts souls from him, as it is said: ‘And He will rob of life those who rob them’ (Mishlei 22:23).”
Since it is on that understanding that he was appointed, the dayan cannot exempt himself with a claim of concern for pikuach nefesh; rather, if he truly fears for his life on account of the wicked, he must resign and step down from his eminence and no longer be a dayan at all. But one who continues to be a dayan while betraying his office by showing favor to the wicked, he thereby forfeits his life.

R. Rabinovitch’s argument is that the dayan acting as the arm of beis din isn’t governed by the din yachid with regard to pikuach nefesh. The Torah’s response to a judge’s sakanas nefashos concern is: in your capacity as dayan, you are charged with the pikuach nefesh of the whole community; this is what you signed up for.

In many ways, this is akin to being a soldier: both the dayan and the soldier serve their roles knowing that they may very well endanger their lives, and both are aware that it is vital that some people take such roles for the preservation and wellbeing of society at large.

Now that we’ve answered our question about lo saguru, let us move on to our question about “ki ha’mishpat lelokim hu.” The Ramban cites a passage in II Divrei ha’Yamim 19:6-7. After the righteous King Yehoshafat appoints judges throughout the land, he gives these judges a charge similar to Moshe Rabbeinu’s:

[Yehoshafat] said to the judges: “See what you are doing, because it is not for man that you judge, but for Hashem, and [He is] with you in the matter of judgment. And now, let the dread of Hashem be upon you; take care and act, for with Hashem our God there is no injustice, nor favoritism, nor taking of bribes.”

The Ramban (Devarim 1:17) explains Moshe’s words based on that passage:

The meaning of “because the mishpat is God’s” is like the meaning of “because you do not judge for man, but for Hashem, and He is with you in the matter of mishpat,” [meaning] to say that it is for God to do justice among His creatures, for it is on account of this that He created them, that there be uprightness and righteousness among them, and to save the robbed from the hand of the oppressor, and He appointed you in His place, and if you are afraid and you commit robbery [through your perversion of justice,] behold! you have sinned against Hashem, for you have betrayed His shlichus (commission).

When I first read our verse, I assumed it was intended as divrei chizuk (words of encouragement) for the judges: “Do not fear any man, for the mishpat is God’s” and He will assist you in your task and protect you from the harm you fear. Indeed, this is one of the explanations of Yehoshafat’s words given by the Radak (ad loc.): “He will be with you and help you in the matter of judgment if you fear Him.”

This is not how the Ramban understands it. Rather, Moshe is reminding the judges that they are the shluchim (agents) through whom God enacts justice. Therefore, if they allow intimidation by litigants to affect their rulings, not only are they failing in their duties toward their fellow Jews, but they are also betraying their shlichus, thereby hindering God from carrying out His justice through His earthly representatives.

Whereas the Radak learns “ki ha’mishpat lelokim hu” as a statement of what God will do for the dayan, the Ramban learns it as a statement of what the dayan does for God (so to speak). And although this relates directly to lo saguru mipnei ish, it also serves as a fitting conclusion to the entire list of mitzvos, insofar as it reminds the judge of his role and its importance.

I don’t know how my friend’s judiciary neighbors handled the death threats they received, but if the Ramban were to address them, he might remind them that they, too, are the agents of Divine justice. “… it is for God to do justice among His creatures, for it is on account of this that He created them.” All human beings who enact justice are carrying out the will of the Creator, the “King Who loves righteousness and justice” (amidah).

Curious as to how you would answer the second question. I had to be selective in what to write about, but I’m sure there are other great answers out there!

Devarim: When Judges Are Threatened with Violence

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