The U.S. Doesn't Win Modern Wars

The U.S. has entered another war – together with Israel – anchored on the idea of regime change in Iran. Another county where Islam is the dominant religion. Israel recruited the U.S. because why should they risk the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) when a U.S. president will gladly defy the U.S. Constitution — and offer the weapons and troops needed to kickstart a war that could stretch years?

A point about modern wars is that the U.S. doesn’t fare well in them. By modern, the line is drawn to address major wars or military campaigns that occurred after World War II. Considering U.S. troop size and a varied armory, the U.S. often enters modern wars unprepared, overzealous, disrespectful of their opponent, juggling conflicting combat strategies once engaged, arrogant, and dismissive of the realities and challenges of the foreign terrain they’ll confront their adversary on, etc.

The wars that fit this designation include:

Korean War (1950–1953), Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961), Vietnam War (1961–1975), Persian Gulf War/Desert Storm (1990–1991), the War on Terror (2001–2021) which was divided over two branches: the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021) and the Iraq War/Second Gulf War (2003–2011).

Of these, the U.S. emerged with a win in Desert Storm. The others are losses. After politicians rally support in the media and within the government to prepare U.S. troops for war overseas, the results don’t produce victories. The U.S. faces defeat. Often.

Rehashing the foibles of Vietnam isn’t groundbreaking yet it can inform it the current war pitting Israel and the U.S. against Iran. U.S. troops opposed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units on their home turf clearly ignorant to every advantage that offered. The jungles, hills, valleys, tunnels, rivers, climate, winding and narrow roads, villages, open fields, etc., of Vietnam was a 180-degree turn from traditional warzones.

In the wars waged before this modern period it was seen as a victory to bring a force into an area, clear, capture, or kill enough of the enemy to move in more numbers and claim that piece of land, fort, installation, etc., and use the newly conquered territory as a forward operating base. Which could function as a safe haven for planning additional war tactics for the campaign, a resupply station, a post for training, a hospital facility, etc.

In Vietnam, the U.S. repeatedly found itself capturing a strip of land for days only to lose it to the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong fighters, regain it with human capital – and lose it again. The U.S. wasn’t prepared for such unpredictability. The conventions of war in which they thrived no longer applied. A beach in France or Berlin this wasn’t. Tactically, the U.S. didn’t evolve. The Vietnamese perfected persistently inconsistent barrages of hit-and-run attack patterns that flummoxed the U.S. who were used to paint-by-numbers, predictable, combat. This was a guerilla war.

U.S. air bombing raids altered little on the ground. The targets were elusive. Air support proved less effective than it had been to that point. Even when the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a vital supply route, was located and damaged from the air it was reborn. The North Vietnamese were determined to revive it.

The trail itself took on a mythical reputation. It sprouted new legs when the North Vietnamese rerouted it through the neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia. They couldn’t allow it to fall to the U.S. It didn’t.

Dealing With the Loss of U.S. Troops

It’s unimaginable to consider taking a battle to someone that isn’t afraid of the cost they’ll have to pay. In lives. The North Vietnamese were clear in their ultimate goal of reunifying the nation. The size of the U.S. didn’t matter. Nor did their bullets, missiles, grenades, or gunships.

There soon became a limit to the number of soldiers the U.S. military leadership was willing to lose. Especially once it was obvious they wouldn’t prevail quickly. That’s another critical factor. The North Vietnamese wouldn’t rack up the casualties the Americans did, however they could stomach any number of losses. Regardless of the tally. The U.S. would not.

The North Vietnamese-Viet Cong knew they could battle the U.S. to a draw or ultimately win because they would never yield. No matter the number of deaths that North Vietnam would be left to mourn. They were set to fight until the last man of the last unit was killed by the U.S.

It became a test of will. Not only on the battlefield but politically. The Vietnamese never wavered because they had one focus that every person involved was strident about. That’s why they won.

As it stands, Iran is projecting the same mindset to Israel and the U.S.

It’s impossible to predict the outcome of armed operations since objectives shift each hour. This war isn’t a direct comparison to Vietnam but there are points of overlap. History proves that if your country can survive the first stage of a U.S. offensive, defend yourself in dynamic and nonconventional ways to confuse them, and dedicate yourself to committing to a prolonged conflict, they’re beatable.

Small and large countries have achieved wins adopting this format. The U.S. is like a hulking heavyweight boxer that ignores the punching power of a middleweight. Overcoming the size disadvantage is impossible for the lighter fighter but they can outlast the brute with precision, technique, cunning, heart, and patience.

Israel and the U.S. chose to start this war when actively negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran. Other options existed; they ignored them.

To be continued…

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Mar 20

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