Part Two: Modernizing the Marine Corps Amphibious Reconnaissance Community - It is Time for Reinforcing Fires

This is Part Two of a three-part series on the current state of the Amphibious Reconnaissance Community in the Marine Corps. As discussed in Part One, the proposal to morph the current training pipeline of Amphibious Reconnaissance Marines during entry-level training has the potential to create positive changes. However, the service must examine whether the proposal’s effects will positively reinforce and modify the lethality of the Amphibious Reconnaissance Community for the better, and if not, what else can be done?

PART II: The Last Quarter Century of Amphib Recon – Consistent Challenge:

In the 88 years of its existence, considering the size of its elements, the Amphibious Reconnaissance community created an outsized impact. Across the conflict continuum, Marine Corps Reconnaissance represents a force capable of providing lethal and non-lethal effects, impacting or influencing both tactical and operational objectives. Although historically successful, the community has faced numerous challenges which prevented its advancement and modernization. The challenges listed below will focus on the same timeframe as Part One, the previous quarter-century.

Talent Management

The first historic challenge relevant to USMC Amphibious Reconnaissance directly ties to a practice the service espouses to conduct, but is impossible to achieve in totality. The phrase ‘Talent Management’ gained popularity and is now considered mainstream vernacular since codified service level guidance appeared in 2021. Inherent to the manning of any high-demand, low-density occupational specialty, the service seeks tools to ensure stability. However, in the case of the Reconnaissance community in the early 2000s, it is more appropriate to state that service level changes created an internal talent war.

Pre 9/11 and during the genesis of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), if a Marine possessed the desire to be a part of a high-caliber, specialized, lethal ground element, there was only one destination – an Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion. Missions were high risk, and operational units received dynamic and consistent tasking – similar to today. The challenge was the attraction. High-caliber talent longed for a home where they could test physical or operational limits and benefit from healthy competition when surrounded by like-minded Marines and Sailors. However, a history of solid reputation and operational impacts led to the community being a victim of its own success.

From 2003 to 2006, the experimental unit of Marine Corps SOCOM Detachment One (Det 1) represented the service’s solution for providing an element to USSOCOM. The specialized capabilities, individual and collective skills inherent, combined with the resident mindset and previous operational success, led service leadership to select Force Reconnaissance as the nucleus of Det 1. When Det 1 expanded and became Marine Corps Special Operations in 2007, Reconnaissance Marines were relied upon as the sourcing solution for MARSOC operators.

The operator elements were specifically pulled from the Force Reconnaissance companies of First and Second Reconnaissance Battalion. Although a valid option to accomplish the rapid task, the gutting of talent and manpower linkage has had ramifications for years. Beyond the initial pull of MCSOCOM Det 1 and subsequent stand-up of MARSOC, the Reconnaissance community continued to pay the manpower tax until the 0372 MOS (Critical Skills Operator) creation occurred in 2014.

For seven years, the operator billets at Marine Corps Special Operations Command were staffed as Billet MOS 0321, Amphibious Reconnaissance Marine. Without an appropriate structure and a pipeline for the creation of an operator, manpower flow bifurcated into both communities, diminishing Recon Battalion health. The continued trickle expanded as staff requirements existed to man elements such as the Marine Raider Training Center, while the SOCOM element grew. Because the 0372 MOS was designated as lateral move only, this meant MARSOC was pulling mid-grade talent, stymying progressive growth at critical levels for Reconnaissance elements. This at times equated to Marines from Reconnaissance Battalions receiving orders to MARSOC when they possessed little to no desire to serve within the newly minted formation.

Long-term, and potentially most damaging, the service created a war on talent for highly qualified, junior Marines. Those of both infantry-related backgrounds, and second-term non-infantry Marines who desired to laterally move now had a choice of which unit to join. Specific data is difficult to ascertain on the numerical impacts, but it is inarguable that the bifurcation led and continues to lead Marines to choose MARSOC instead of becoming a Reconnaissance Marine. Additionally, Reconnaissance Marines are posed a similar question: continue my career as a Reconnaissance Marine or laterally move to MARSOC.

To dispel the myth, the Reconnaissance Community does not notice a mass exodus of second-term Marines laterally moving to MARSOC. Although lateral movements exist, it is by no means catastrophic. The more damaging proposition is the choice. There are definite differences between each community which weigh heavily on a junior population, specifically the ability to homestead, deploy consistently as a tasked operational element, or receive increased pay aligned with operational SOCOM billets found in MARSOC.

Familiarity and Trust

The second historic challenge of the Amphibious Reconnaissance Community can be simply defined as a Commander’s willingness to commit the asset. The operational employment of reconnaissance across the Marine Corps and Joint Force has oscillated, specifically in the interwar years surrounding the GWOT. This is a result of numerous factors discussed in Part One and largely depends on the unique operational requirements for each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and Division, as well as the ebb and flow of potential missions while on deployment. Beyond a few specific deployment rotations within the GWOT, Reconnaissance Battalions do not normally deploy as a Battalion pure with its commander as the C2. The predominant, traditional model is the Battalion serving as a force provider for other Marine Corps deploying formations, such as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The willingness of a MEU or Joint Task Force commander to utilize an Amphibious Reconnaissance asset largely rests on their comfort level and familiarity with the intricacies of employment. Any leader who commands attachments or subordinate elements possessing niche skills comes with the inherent challenge of becoming intimately familiar with their planning, execution, and contingencies required for high-risk training or operations.

Utilizing a MEU model to further explain the complexity, a MEU commander accepts numerous assets under his command authority, to which he has varying degrees of familiarity. History shows both high-performing ground officers (typically infantrymen) and pilots commanding the ‘Crown Jewel of the Marine Corps.’ For example, consider the elements of the Air Combat Element (ACE) and the Ground Combat Element (GCE). Should an infantryman be in command, he is required to familiarize himself with the ACE, its components and capabilities, and accept risk when approving air operations. Vice versa, a pilot who is in command is expected to do the same for all ground elements. Despite the level of familiarity of the commander, an additional layer of complexity that may influence the assets’ utilization is advocacy and personal experience, which can influence the trust required to employ reconnaissance elements during high-risk operations.

The Marine Amphibious Reconnaissance Community lacks advocacy in comparison to other military occupational specialties, specifically, at the ranks from which amphib recon elements typically receive mission approval. The limited number of Reconnaissance Officers in the Colonel and General Officer ranks does not help the cause, but the lack of depth is natural due to characteristics of the community, such as its selection requirements and the career path being non-traditional. The burden of familiarizing commanders with employment rests squarely on Recon Battalion leaders to combat but requires receptive leaders in the gaining unit. Engaged leadership at the Recon Battalion Commander level and the Recon Company Commander level is a specified necessity.

The higher headquarters commander’s personal experience with Amphibious Reconnaissance employment is a secondary factor of influence. As described in Part I, mission priorities and employment between the three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) differ, which will characterize a Commander’s assessment on the specific capabilities required or appropriate employment method of Amphibious Reconnaissance. For instance, the current employment of 2d Reconnaissance Battalion on the 22^nd MEU. With Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) or Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) as a priority for the MEU, the Commander and staff afloat, as well as the Joint Task Force (JTF) operating as the Higher Headquarters, are by now well versed in the mission’s complexities. Yet a commander for a West Coast MEU may not share the same niche experience. Varying degrees of experience translate directly into comfortability which can lead to risk aversion as the commander’s familiarity will define his willingness to commit to high-risk operations. Finally, it is worth stating that at times the aversion is appropriate. Factors influencing this are based upon the capability or certification level of a recon unit in combination with the frequency and recency of executing high-risk tasks. Additionally, and potentially most critical, the desire to commit to high-risk missions resides directly in the commander’s assessment of the professionalism of the unit.

Regarding a commander’s experience, as mentioned in Part One, many tasks and capabilities of Amphibious Reconnaissance are more akin to the special operations domain. This highlights a significant difference between the two elements worthy of capture. Ranking officers who hold mission approval in SOCOM typically hold the same individual skills as practitioners from an early rank and complete numerous repetitions during their career. Through this familiarity, they are naturally more comfortable with employment considerations and risk.

Modernization

The third historic challenge to the Amphibious Reconnaissance community is modernization. Force Design 2030 represented the largest modernization the Marine Corps conducted in the service’s recent history. New decisions and directives of the service exhibited significant priority shifts, to include divestments and investments to achieve future success. Although not directly impacted by Force Design directives, the community was impacted indirectly by Force Design. The elimination of assets within each Division hampered how reconnaissance is layered and stacked within the battlespace for mixing, cueing, redundancy, and shaping. Reconnaissance laden tasks for infantry organic reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) were formally the role of the Scout Sniper elements. Without this element, RSTA planning and execution presents a gap, one which must be covered and may fall to an Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion element.

Not to say it would never be done, but tasking by an infantry battalion contradicts current employment models and command relationships, as Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalions are templated as Division or MEF elements. In the time since the 0317 MOS closure in late 2023, the close reconnaissance gap still exists. Although reconnaissance in the close battlespace is advancing with coverage provided by small unmanned aerial surveillance (sUAS) within tactical elements, manned reconnaissance employment will never be completely replaced. The service explicitly acknowledged the gap requiring a solution. Since the elimination of the Scout Sniper MOS, the Basic and Advanced Scout Program of Instruction (POI) are complete but have yet to produce appropriate staffing, and most critically, the viable product required for infantry commanders. Statistically speaking, nearly ten courses are complete, no PMOS exists, and close reconnaissance remains a critical task. The proposed solution outlined in Part Three of this series provides an opportunity for the creation of a Primary MOS 0315 (Scout) and will be discussed in greater detail.

It is appropriate to acknowledge that not every unit in the Corps required a facelift from Force Design. Worth noting, however, the Reconnaissance Community was largely left out when they could have used it. Sensor-rich battlefields are the norm, and the service continues to experiment and evolve tactical sensor integration, command and control methods, and ties into the joint fires architecture. Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalions are experimenting on pace with every other element of the Marine Corps regarding sensor integration and concealment, but weaving in multi-disciplined intelligence or multi-domain reconnaissance capabilities remains a challenge. Because of the sheer difficulty of accession, production, and consistent high-risk training by Amphibious Reconnaissance Marines, integration of enabling capability during employment can at times introduce more risk than reward. Although rarely completed at the speed or scale of SOF units, this gap remains worthy of exploration for future Force Design and service-level experimentation.

Regardless of the challenges above, the gravest challenge to Amphibious Reconnaissance is community internal. Most relevant is a timely solution or combination of solutions that facilitates the creation of Reconnaissance Marines. Despite similarities of Amphibious Reconnaissance to special operations units, one element stands out: Reconnaissance Marines are predominantly made in a ‘street to fleet’ model, meaning the bulk of Amphibious Reconnaissance Marines attain their specialty directly following their exit from the same Marine Corps Boot Camp as the rest of the service.

A Marine on an Amphibious Reconnaissance contract, better known as a Hotel Zulu (HZ), is one of the most difficult to fill by Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) standards. The main reasons are the required aptitude (105 GT score or above) and the necessity to possess a Secret Clearance. These stringent entry gates create additional barriers for recruiters who already have a demanding job. In a perfect world, recruiters could screen for aptitude in the aquatic skills that are bedrock to the community and a main attrition factor during entry-level training. However, to demand it would be a fool’s errand on top of their current workload. Thus, the necessity to screen and select entry-level Marines with the appropriate physical attributes must occur after accessions. Currently, the task is the responsibility of Reconnaissance Training Company (RTC) in Camp Pendleton. Yet, attrition statistics equate to a systemic problem requiring intervention.

Entry level training for a Reconnaissance Marine or Special Operations Independent Duty Corpsman (SOIDC) is split into two parts: Reconnaissance Training and Assessment Program (RTAP) and Basic Reconnaissance Course. Passing both courses produces an entry-level graduate who transitions to specialized schooling required as a Reconnaissance Marine or SOIDC to include Survival, Evasion, Resist and Escape school (SERE), Basic Airborne, Military Free Fall, and Marine Combatant Dive School. Over the past quarter-century, attrition rates have ebbed and flowed, but currently illustrate a pattern requiring attention. Although attrition statistics vary from year to year, the combination of the two entry-level courses equates to roughly a 70% attrition rate. In the last two years, Reconnaissance Training Company consistently manipulated its Program of Instruction (POI) in hopes of creating even marginal effects: maneuvering test dates for physical events, increasing physical training instruction time on high attrition aquatic skills, and establishing mentor and focus groups to increase resiliency and grit. However, attacking the margins internal to the course has yet to create repeatable and sustainable change.

Considering current manning statistics, requirements for employment, and retention rates, the Reconnaissance community requires external assistance. The health of the MOS faces a herculean fork in the road, leaving three options to impact production: drop standards expected at entry-level training, continue course internal minor manipulations in search of the panacea, or institute external POI changes to create marginal gains on top of course curriculum changes. The first two options are the least viable. Decreasing standards will create a product incapable of accomplishing the current and future task expectations of the Marine Corps Amphibious Reconnaissance. Minor manipulations did create marginal gains, but will likely not achieve the desired MOS health. The third option, however, has never been attempted. It is likely because it requires service level intervention to impact elements of the Marine Corps, which the Reconnaissance Community does not control.

Despite success of the community over the past 88 years of Marine Corps History amidst challenges and setbacks, it’s modernization and MOS health future is at the center of a new initiative. A USMC Training Command proposal surfaced in late 2025 and, with the assistance of the Reconnaissance Community stakeholders, received a warm reception from senior leaders in the Corps. The proposal aims to establish commonality in training standards for Marines who conduct both ground and amphibious reconnaissance, all the while facilitating the growth of the Amphibious Reconnaissance Community. This would serve as the foundation to create and reinforce efficiencies between multiple RSTA elements within the Marine Corps (both Scouts and Reconnaissance Marines). If done correctly, the Amphibious Reconnaissance community may realize MOS health it has not possessed in over a decade, and more importantly, be poised to assume the challenging mission of creating multi-domain, multi-int sensing and battlespace shaping required for peer-to-peer conflict. Maximizing this opportunity relies upon two groups of individuals. First, Reconnaissance community leaders must be early adopters of change and lead the community to evolve. Second, the Corps’ senior leaders should emphatically stand behind the Amphibious Reconnaissance community as the primary benefactor, reinforcing the foundation for future modernization. Both elements are mission-critical.

This is Part Two of a series published in conjunction with The Connecting File. The initiative and relevant recommendations to ensure its success will be discussed in Part Three of this series, to be released at 1800 EST on 22 April 2026. Please distribute these widely.