Reorienting the Iran War

Here’s the current situation.

• Iran’s decentralized defensive system is intact despite the decapitation of its prewar leadership and a massive month-long bombardment.

• Iran continues to inflict significant damage on US military assets and its allies despite the loss of its air force and navy.

• Iran has successfully closed the Strait of Hormuz (causing shortfalls in oil, LNG, fertilizer, refined fuels, and Helium) for a month.

Based on the results so far, it’s clear that the US was unprepared for this war. This lack of preparation was due to an orientation failure (a mental framework, from assumptions to expectations, used in sense-making and goal achievement in decision-making). Based on its actions, here are the key assumptions or expectations generated by the US military’s orientation at the start of the war;

• Iran’s leadership and its military capabilities would collapse under the intense pressure of a prolonged air bombardment.

• Drones (even if used at scale) won’t significantly change the way wars are fought. Navies and air forces are far more important.

• Iran’s drones (from ballistic to aerial to surface) would not be effective at causing anything more than minimal damage to US assets and allies before they were suppressed (and by extension, they wouldn’t be able to blockade the Straits of Hormuz).

These assumptions/expectations were repeatedly proven false;

• The war has lasted far longer than anticipated (a month). Iran’s government didn’t fall, and Iran’s ability to inflict damage remains intact. Furthermore, much of Iran’s drone stockpiles and drone production capabilities are still intact.

• The damage Iran caused in the war far exceeded expectations. Specifically, when Iran’s drones disrupted critical infrastructure networks, their effectiveness was amplified (drone attacks cause tens of billions in daily damage to the global economy).

• Logistical and planning failures. The US ability to defend against drone attacks was insufficient from the start and has continuously degraded due to a shortage of interceptors (insufficient numbers were produced prior to the war). Furthermore, after some soul searching, the US discovered that it didn’t have the capability to force open the Strait of Hormuz under continuous drone bombardment.

A good indicator of a failed orientation is an inability to agree on goals (where are our decisions taking us?). This war jumps between control of Iran’s oil assets, eliminating Iran’s drones, removing Iran’s nuclear capabilities, regime change, and unconditional surrender, depending on the day.

From day two, it should have been clear to US leadership that the facts on the ground didn’t match its prewar orientation.