Konstantin Malofeev argues Starlink is a NATO weapon fueling Ukraine's war effort and urges Russia to consider anti-satellite strikes to force peace.
Dear readers and subscribers,
Ukraine has requested permission from the US to use Starlink satellites over Russian territory for stable communications and target acquisition. Donald Trump and Elon Musk have not yet supported this idea. However, it is not difficult to pressure Musk, and Trump could be significantly weakened in the upcoming November elections. The result would be drone raids against which traditional electronic warfare methods are powerless.
“Will peace come soon?”
Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov wrote on social media about the importance of the Starlink satellite network for Ukraine and how Musk’s company helped his country by disabling Starlink for the Russians.
Elon Musk modestly replied: “I try to do the right thing. I hope peace comes soon.”
That is a lie. For peace to come, Starlink needs to be turned off for everyone—and first and foremost for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). This would not only deprive the enemy of rapid communication but also blind their tracking and decision-making systems. A fair fight would then ensue—one that would be hopeless for the enemy.
Starlink is more than just communication. Musk’s Starlink and Peter Thiel’s Palantir collaborate closely on military and defense systems. Together, they form a “communications plus data processing” technological alliance for the US military and its allies (primarily the AFU). Starlink provides continuous, secure, high-speed battlefield communication, while Palantir’s software platforms (such as the Gotham operational intelligence and analysis tool) process massive datasets from drones, satellites, and sensors.
Starlink satellite internet transmits information with minimal latency; Palantir software instantly converts this data into actionable intelligence and strike coordinates, creating what is known as a “digital kill chain.” A sequence for striking Russian targets.
Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, outlines various scenarios for the conflict’s evolution and writes about the “advisability of using effective weapons to neutralize the adversary’s advantages in information technology and communication systems”:
This could include severing communication channels on land and on the seabed, disrupting data centers, destroying enemy reconnaissance and command aircraft within our engagement range—regardless of their national affiliation—and disabling communication satellites, including the notorious Starlink constellation, which forms the backbone of the adversary’s telecommunications. Without contact with American and British targeting specialists, planners, and analysts, the Armed Forces of Ukraine would be blinded and lose the ability to conduct systematic combat operations.
In Glazyev’s view—a perspective that is hard to dispute—striking key communication infrastructure would cause the collapse of the financial bubble inflated in the US around artificial intelligence. This would trigger the implosion of the derivatives pyramid scheme, the volume of which is already double that of the one that precipitated the 2008 global financial crisis. The US financial system would be destroyed, and a deep economic crisis would grip Western nations. This would lead to a sharp weakening of the forces stoking the war against Russia, as well as a restructuring of the ruling elites in NATO countries.
Starlink is owned by SpaceX, a company traditionally associated with Elon Musk. Musk does not exercise absolute control over SpaceX; he holds 80% of the voting shares but only 42% of the equity. Equity stakes ranging from $17 billion to $77 billion are held by Nvidia, the Saudi Public Investment Fund, Gigafund, Fidelity, and, of course, the ubiquitous Alphabet—better known by its Google brand. Smaller shareholders include Microsoft and Amazon. In short, the entire technocratic elite has invested in the war against Russia.
If Starlink were to cease operations right now, the world would not collapse.
In-flight connectivity for passengers would be cut off. There would be no accidents, however, as flight control systems are not linked to Starlink.
Maritime transport would face serious issues, though all vessels possess backup communication channels—ranging from traditional two-way radios to standard navigation equipment.
Certain nations that rely on Starlink for basic digitalization—specifically in areas where laying fiber-optic cable is economically unfeasible (often because the materials would simply be stolen)—would face difficulties. Nigeria, Rwanda, Kenya, the DR Congo, Sudan, and other “progressive” countries that chose a Western development path would suffer the consequences.
Ultimately, however, this would benefit both them and the world at large.
If Starlink succeeds in saturating orbit with third-generation satellites capable of transmitting data at one terabit per second, it will effectively hold dozens of nations hostage to this convenience. Musk frequently emphasizes—and rightly so—that the “last mile” cost of laying fiber-optic cables far exceeds the expense of deploying Starlink ground stations and satellites. It is the cheapest solution—and a flawed one, as is the case with most “cheapest” options.
An over-reliance of critical systems on satellite internet will inevitably make the owner of that internet the master of the country. He would gain access to all key data and control over government administration, military plans and developments, and the healthcare sector. Sovereignty is impossible without a communications infrastructure independent of foreign control.
Musk left his native Africa practically as a refugee, fleeing the rise of Black revanchism. Now, he has exacted his own form of revenge by gaining control over the digital industries of several African nations.
But saving Africa is a task for later. Right now, striking at Starlink is a matter of basic self-defense.
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Starlink is not a constellation of geostationary satellites; they all race across the sky at tremendous speeds. It is impossible to destroy only those “hovering over Ukraine,” because nothing actually hovers over it. The entire system must be targeted as a whole.
There are several ways to neutralize the satellite constellation.
Electromagnetic and radio-frequency attack.
This appears to be an ideal option, yet it remains untested in actual operation. The “Volna-Kupol-Garant” system could be deployed: a specialized electronic warfare (EW) unit costing around $1.5 million per unit, mounted on trailers equipped with special antennas. The system is designed to direct a powerful high-frequency signal straight at a passing Starlink satellite, temporarily “blinding” or disabling it. According to the developers, a single unit can disrupt communications within a radius of up to 20 square kilometers. The question of why this is not being done remains unanswered. The Tobol and Tirada-2 systems (along with the ambitious Alabuga electromagnetic weapon project) were also previously announced with massive budgets; these are strategic-level stationary and mobile systems designed to jam satellite communications over vast areas. Unfortunately, we have not seen them used in actual combat against enemy communications—or at least such use has not been publicized.
Kinetic anti-satellite weapons—specifically anti-missile systems like the A-235 Nudol and S-500 Prometheus—are perfectly capable of shooting down objects in low Earth orbit, as demonstrated during testing.
However, expending a single expensive interceptor missile to destroy a single cheap satellite is an act of reckless extravagance.
Creating “debris clouds”: ejecting hundreds of thousands of metal spheres from orbital platforms.
At orbital speeds, a collision with such an object is guaranteed to destroy or disable a satellite’s solar arrays and electronics. This would trigger the Kessler effect—a cascading destruction of everything at that altitude. Most impacts would strike the solar panels; the resulting debris would then serve as a secondary weapon, finishing off the satellite constellation.
And finally, unconventional weapons.
The kind that would draw fierce condemnation at the UN: detonating a nuclear device in space, generating a powerful electromagnetic pulse, or creating artificial radiation belts capable of instantly frying the electronics of hundreds or thousands of low-orbit satellites. Of these options, only the first is fully ready for deployment.
At the same time, we operate our own low-orbit communication system, “Rassvet” (Project Bureau 1440), at virtually the same altitude as Starlink, effectively guaranteeing the enemy’s safety. We can no longer strike at Musk’s brainchild without incurring a cost ourselves. [Read below for details on Bureau 1440.]
Yet, this remains the optimal choice. This is what it means to “do the right thing.”
The legal ramifications of such a decision are of no consequence. Even the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits only the deployment of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, etc.) in space; it does not ban other types of anti-satellite weaponry—such as kinetic systems (ramming or impact projectiles), lasers, or electronic warfare capabilities.
More importantly, all such treaties have long since been reduced to dust by NATO’s illegal eastward expansion and its actions in that region.
Destroying Starlink does not equate to winning the war.
The Russian soldier is capable of fighting better than any other under even the most adverse conditions—and it is precisely Russian soldiers we are up against.
But without Starlink, the bloodshed would end much sooner.
[Translated from the Russian Language.] —Jerry b. Marchant
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