No One Knows the Day or the Hour:

Long ago, in June 2025, negotiations between Iran and the United States were taking place over the contentious issue of Iran’s on-again-off-again nuclear development program. Progress, at least to outside observers, was being made with Iranian officials, and finally an offramp from the ongoing Israel-Iran war was emerging. Amidst a myriad of Israeli and Iranian strikes and also growing conversations about a possible offensive US strike in Iran, negotiations and peace were gaining steam, and a settlement was within reach. Sadly, however, none of this was real, at least to the extent that Trump administration officials were ever serious about delivering a deal. Reality, it turned out, proceeded to deliver a massive nothingburger wrapped in a clandestine bombing operation.

On June 22, American air and naval forces attacked three nuclear facilities in Iran with bunker buster munitions and tomahawk missile strikes, all of which successfully hit their targets. All three facilities were heavily damaged, with Iran’s nuclear program likely being set back by several months or even longer depending on the true extent of destruction. Following these events, Trump declared the operation a massive success and moved on to more pressing domestic matters. The PR and military move had ended, and soon many within the US forgot that the event even happened.

Fast forward to now, and Iran is once again filling our airwaves and charging our political debate. But now, unlike in the summer, the situation seems to be rising in both scope and severity. The largest US military buildup in the Middle East since 2003 now finds itself stationed, consisting of destroyers, carriers, littoral combat ships, jets, and various other air and naval assets. An attack could occur anytime within the next several days, with the order to launch the operation only hinging on Trump’s word. The significance of this buildup and its implications have not been lost within establishment circles.

As you read this, slews of media pieces and think tank analyses are being published around the possibility of toppling the Iranian regime. Decades-long dreams and aspirations are finally coming to fruition, with hawks and centrist internationalists alike rejoicing about the seemingly inevitable campaign and its ability to decimate our long-time adversary. Within Congress, very little is being done by the Republican Party to enforce constitutional constraints on the president’s ability to declare and wage war. A bipartisan attempt led by Representatives Ro Khanna and Thomas Massie, while set to force a vote on the war sometime this week, is not likely to gain much traction among skeptical members. And even if House passage was assured, its survival in the Senate and over the President’s veto both seem rather improbable.

Thus, war with a foreign nation is currently steamrolling ahead with little oversight or democratic accountability. Thousands could perish, American soldiers could be put in harm’s way, and no governmental institution seems poised to follow the constitution or exert its checks on executive power. No one in Washington knows the day or hour of attack, but much like an approaching storm, we have estimates on when it is set to arrive and what kind of damage it is bound to unleash.

In all likelihood, the attacks will transpire sometime this week, and once the attacks occur, it is decreasingly likely that the campaign’s scope will be either limited or focused on short-term achievements. The sheer magnitude of the buildup, alongside Israel’s recent movements toward war footing, implies that something much more substantial is brewing, and with serious regional implications if ostensible goals are actually achieved.

The question now is not whether the US will be able to inflict severe pain and destruction against Iran, but rather what the actual goals of these operations are and what they are meant to destroy. Is the goal to further strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure? Is it a short-term psychological operation meant to instill insecurity and thus drive Iran to greater concessions? Or, taken to its logical conclusion, is the massive buildup an attempt by the US to engage in decapitation strikes and regime change? All of these questions are vital, and so far, the administration has not been clear on what its true intentions are.

If the goal is to further impede Iran’s nuclear capabilities, this seems like an increasingly fruitless endeavor considering the level of unknowns on the ground. Just as in June, the short-term bombings of facilities would likely stop development for the time being, but any long-term solution to this crisis will eventually require either a political settlement or a near-constant military campaign. This kind of operation would need not only a comprehensive bombing strategy, but also a coordinated assassination campaign focused on the officials and scientists who possess knowhow into Iran’s nuclear program. The scope would be enormous, cost billions, and violate various international laws and rules. Put simply, any kind of potential military solution would require a mass commitment on the part of the US, and an increased willingness to get bogged down in a long-term conflict predicated on precise air and naval attacks and expanded degrees of violence.

If the buildup is simply just a short-term negotiating tactic, we’ve again seen this show before. Back in June, neither our attacks nor their subsequent fallout jolted Iran into a conciliatory position. Even today, our increased leverage in the region has yet to mollify Iran or shift their domestic behavior toward our demands. On the contrary, over the past several months and weeks, Iran has put itself on war footing, with the promise of diplomacy being looked upon suspiciously because of past precedent. Missile and air bases have been repaired, facilities have been hardened and fortified, and domestic dissent has been decimated and killed. The country is now more insular, more insecure, and far more paranoid about domestic protest and foreign intelligence. Violence is prevalent, and democratic revolution is far off and distant.

Considering all of this, if the goal is to attempt regime change, this too would find itself struggling from a series of complications. Any decapitation strategy would require long-term commitment in the country and slews of precise strikes which are able to comprehensively destroy Iranian leadership. The Ayatollah and his posse would have to be eliminated alongside regional governors. The IRGC, too, would need to be fully dismantled because of its potential to lead any post-clerical Iran through direct force. It’s also an open question whether direct strikes would even carry enough weight to help topple the regime or incite a revolution, especially considering the Iranian opposition’s struggle with interval divisions and fracturing.

If the regime does manage to fall, any immediate response would likely not be democratic or stable. Post-regime conflict would beget radicalism, violence, nationalism, and sectarianism. Various groups and networks could weaponize the instability and commit horrific atrocities against minorities, women, and other dissidents. Moreover, any kind of subsequent conflict would be driven by which forces emerge from the collapse with the most power and control. The IRGC could potentially emerge from this kind of milieu as a kingmaker, alongside other military officials and regiments. Under these conditions, Iran would simply shift from religious theocracy to nationalist authoritarianism. A military junta would be born, being led by resentful and paranoid officials who now have every reason to rebuild and hedge themselves against the United States.

Just like with the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, the fallout from such a campaign could be bloody and highly unpredictable. There’s no telling how a civil war would impact the region, or how failed-state status would impact tens of millions of Iranians. The broader region too would face mounting tensions as refugees flee and new groups attempt to gain influence. Border disputes and skirmishes could emerge and increase the potential for sectarian and political violence. The Ayatollah would be gone, but there’s no guarantee that what comes next would be better, or that it would be more willing to work and negotiate with the US.

The calculus here is incredibly slanted towards war and aggression, with regime collapse being treated as something which is both easy to obtain and free of consequences. The strikes, just as they were in June, are dangerous and carry with them enormous risks for regional stability writ large. The lives of hundreds of millions of people could be impacted by Trump’s decision in the coming days, and for the sake of all of us, let’s hope that he is able to be whittled down to a more peaceful settlement. Maybe a new JCPOA-like agreement can be signed by slapping Trump’s name all over it, with overtures also being made toward the World Peace committee and its sought-after prize. The likelihood of conflict is high, and very little will likely cause Trump to change course, but here’s hoping that something might help peace and cooperation prevail during these trying times. We ultimately need less war and violence, and now seems like an awful good time to start practicing this creed before things get way out of hand.