Armenia, Russia and the EU's Democratic Dilemma

Over the past few weeks, Armenia has become one of the European Union’s closest partners in the South Caucasus. It has also found itself under growing pressure from Russia. Watching these two developments unfold side by side raises an uncomfortable question: how far can strategic interests outweigh concerns about democracy?

When Armenians went to the polls on 7 June, the election had become a contest over the country’s foreign policy direction. Both Moscow and Brussels openly sought to influence the outcome. While the European Union threw its weight behind Pashinyan, Russia warned against closer ties with Europe and, according to numerous investigations and reports, relied on political operatives and disinformation networks behind the scenes.

Economic pressure accompanied the political messaging. Throughout June, Russia gradually expanded restrictions on Armenian flowers, fruit, vegetables, brandy, wine and eventually fish -industries heavily dependent on the Russian market. Dmitry Medvedev warned that breaking with Russia would have “inevitable consequences” for ordinary Armenians.

Brussels responded almost immediately.

At the beginning of July, Ursula von der Leyen confirmed a 52 million euro support package for Armenia, including funding to diversify exports and reduce dependence on the Russian market. The European Commission also proposed temporarily removing tariffs on around 80 per cent of Armenian exports to the EU, particularly products hit by Russian restrictions (The proposal has yet to be approved, but the political signal was unmistakable). Von der Leyen praised the recent elections as proof of Armenia’s democratic resilience and assured Pashinyan that “when pressure on our partners increases, the EU steps in.”

The political message went even further. After returning from Yerevan, Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos posted photos of homemade apricot jam made from fruit she had brought back from Armenia, encouraging Europeans to buy Armenian apricots, plums and cherries because, as she put it, even a small purchase could support “Armenia’s democratic choice.”

For a moment, it was tempting to see Armenia as another Georgia, another European success story.

But Armenia is not Georgia.

Pashinyan is not trying to pull his country out of Russia’s orbit with one decisive geopolitical shift like Saakashvili years ago. Every step towards closer cooperation with the EU and the United States is balanced by maintaining working relations with Moscow.

This time was no different.

On 6 July, in the middle of the trade dispute with Russia, Pashinyan travelled to Yekaterinburg for the INNOPROM industrial forum, where he met Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. It was his first foreign trip since the election. While Moscow once again reminded Armenia to choose between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, Pashinyan stressed that Armenia remained committed to the EAEU and wanted to resolve disagreements through dialogue.

Three weeks later, he went one step further.

On 27 July, Pashinyan called Vladimir Putin, asking him to intervene over Russia’s import restrictions on Armenian goods. He argued that the measures violated both bilateral agreements and the rules of the Eurasian Economic Union. The Kremlin said little about the embargo itself. Instead, Putin reiterated that any future decision on Armenia’s membership of the EU or withdrawal from the EAEU should be decided by referendum.

The phone call made one thing clear: Pashinyan did not even pretend that the decision over the embargo was made anywhere other than the Kremlin.

Within just a few weeks, Armenia came under growing pressure from Russia while receiving its strongest political and financial backing from the European Union in years.

Whenever I comment on Armenia for Polish media, I am usually asked how far the European Union should go in supporting Pashinyan’s government. My answer has always been that supporting Armenia is not the same as supporting its current government. Thomas de Waal recently made much the same argument in Carnegie Europe, warning that the EU should not allow Armenia’s growing strategic importance to overshadow concerns about democracy and the rule of law.

Recent developments have reinforced that view.

On 3 July, parliament in Armenia rushed through amendments to the electoral code in less than twenty-four hours and without public consultation. Under the new rules, citizens must prove they spent at least 366 days in Armenia during the previous two years in order to vote. In practice, the change could disenfranchise thousands of Armenians living abroad and will already apply in this autumn’s local elections.

The government argued the measure was needed to prevent organised groups of voters from being brought in from Russia. Yet available data failed to demonstrate the scale of the problem cited by the authorities, while constitutional lawyers warned that the amendments may violate both Armenia’s constitution and standards set by the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission.

The changes to the electoral law were not the only source of concern.

The wave of investigations against government opponents had, in fact, begun before the election. Samvel Karapetyan, Pashinyan’s main challenger and leader of the Strong Armenia alliance, campaigned from house arrest on charges of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order and money laundering. On 6 July, authorities detained Gagik Tsarukyan, leader of Prosperous Armenia, on charges including large-scale fraud and money laundering, following coordinated raids on his residence and more than 70 properties linked to his business empire. In total, at least a dozen opposition politicians are now in custody.

It is difficult to assess these cases objectively. Some involve long-standing problems in Armenian politics, such as vote-buying and oligarchic influence. At the same time, Pashinyan openly campaigned on the promise that his three main rivals would “go to prison,” even asking voters to give him the mandate to make it happen. Against that backdrop, separating criminal investigations from political rhetoric becomes increasingly difficult.

One final detail. In July, the government approved almost 5 billion drams (around 13 million dollars) in bonuses for civil servants. It was the second such payout in a matter of months. The previous one had conveniently been approved just before the parliamentary election.

None of this should be easy for Brussels to ignore. Armenia's strategic reorientation may be Europe's immediate priority. But the real test will be whether the European Union can pursue that objective without lowering its expectations of Armenian democracy.

If you’re looking for in-depth reporting, analysis, and webinars on the South Caucasus, find my channel on WA.