US, Israel – Iran Conflict V: Random Thoughts

US, Israel – Iran Conflict V: Random Thoughts

Every morning, one rises to the eerie anticipation of where the US-Iran war is going. Has the President decided to bomb Iran again? Social media has left no stone unturned to inform its readers that Iran is defiant and ready to face another US and Israeli onslaught. Iran’s remaining leadership seemed more confident than ever to punish the US with veiled warnings from its Foreign Minister about surprises which are in store for the US if another round of bombing or any operations start. With decades of sanctions and months of blockage, the claim seems unreal, even when one takes into account the complete lack of concern of the Iranian regime for the safety and well-being of its population. What about the families and interests of the people who are in the regime, the families of the IRGC cadres and the vast network of Basij volunteer force? They are all bearing the brunt together. If nationalism transcends human needs and medical care for near and dear ones, it is hard to believe.

So what is the truth? That is hard to state, but one can speculate based on past experiences and how humans behave in adversity. How do regimes on the verge of being wiped out respond to existential threats? Despite the complete loss of faith that the US President has suffered in his country and abroad, the US military and the government functionaries have not been dropped into their current roles from Togo land (New phrase for Timbuk-Too). They have served in previous conflicts and government appointments. They have experience to back their current appointments. Hence, when they say a deal is being negotiated, it means there are some back-channel parleys going on with the Iranian government. It does not matter if these parleys are happening through Qatar, Pakistan or one-on-one. The parleys are happening because people in Iran fear that another attack could well destroy the regime. The damage that Iran could inflict on its neighbours (read GCC states) would be far less than what they would suffer themselves. Thus, no amount of bravado can wash away the reality. Had Iran been in a stable economic situation, this rhetoric could have resonated with reality somewhere. But given their present condition, it is most likely false bravado.

The apparent back-and-forth between drafts or demands that keep moving from one to another may have two reasons. First, the Iranians are trying to get the best deal for themselves, but, more importantly, there is ambiguity about who will decide to reach a deal. Is it the new Ayatollah, their supreme leader, but whether he is alive or dead, sane or otherwise or yet recovering from his brutal injuries? In his absence, the IRGC top boss, Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi? What about the President: Massoud Pezeshikian, the Foreign Minister: Abbas Araghchi, and the Speaker of the Parliament: Mohammad Ghalibaf, the three surviving civilian members of the regime? Are they in any position to call the shots? Making bold statements is not the same as making decisions. These are not good signs for the regime and point towards an apparent schism in the ranks. It could very well be the reason why President Trump seems so frustrated at the Iranian decision-making. Could it be that Iran’s regime is signalling that they want a deal, yet does not know who the final authority is to approve it?

What are the alternatives? The alternative is a full-scale bombing of Iran and consequent destruction, loss of life and collateral damage to the neighbouring states. The Dilemma of Hormuz would be exaggerated, and energy prices would skyrocket. It’s a Hobson’s Choice for President Trump. Suffer the ignominy of the domestic criticism emerging from a lack of a deal on one hand, and declaring a full-scale attack on Iran on the other. It is possible that the Iranian leadership is not as incoherent as made out to be, and is taking advantage of the Hobson’s Choice that President Trump faces.

Assuming that the US gets a deal to their liking, it should have two critical elements: first, a provision for sanitising the enriched uranium, which Iran has stated to be around 400 kgs and up to 60% enriched. And second is the opening of the Straits of Hormuz for free and safe navigation for international shipping. Iran is likely to give up the second claim to the Gulf of Hormuz, but giving up the first would entail a complete reversal of its earlier stance and could lead to widespread condemnation. This complete surrender seems very unlikely. Stalling the surrender of uranium, or promising not to enrich uranium for another 10-15-20 years, is most likely. Whether it will satisfy the US and Israel is a matter of conjecture. Israel’s requirements out of this conflict have not come to the fore, due to the media glare of the US-Iran public spat. Having spent a considerable amount of resources in the first round of the Iran conflict, Israel would be looking for its share of spoils from the deal. The absence of any such gains will leave Israel free from accepting any ceasefire, at least against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Any logical analysis of the situation should lead us to conclude that the clauses of a deal with Iran would not fully satisfy either the US or Israel. There would be some issues of dissent that would leave either party dissatisfied. How does it augur for the future of the region? Not very well. The region would continue to remain volatile. No sooner are the midterm elections in the US over than the pressure on President Trump lessens, and once again the desire to find the final solution to the problem re-emerges. For the Iranians, any respite in the war and any flow of funds will find only one recourse: Arming for the Future. For the Israelis, it would be back to status quo ante. Their war with Iran and its proxies will continue unabated.

The Persian Gulf has changed forever, no matter what the outcome of the Iran deal or the Iran war with the US and Israel is. The Iranians have blown up their bridges with much of their neighbourhood. Saudi Arabia, the region’s biggest player, would have been wise to draw its own conclusions. One cannot depend on a foreign country’s armed forces to defend one’s national interests. The thought is applicable for their dependence on the US as much as it is on Pakistan. The UAE has already begun seeking new alliances, and its dream of becoming the techno-financial hub of the Middle East has suffered a severe setback. A dream that the Sheikh would have to rebuild on more robust mechanisms, which cannot be so easily destroyed by unleashing a few Shaheen drones. It’s hard to state what the outcome of the crisis would augur for Pakistan. One suspects that Pakistan will continue to remain amongst the ‘Usual Suspects’, who cannot be relied upon despite its tall claims. Playing both sides in this conflict has exposed their double game. Pakistan is a victim of its own choosing. Playing the American card while being a China benefactor is detrimental in the long term.

For India, the conflict may have come at the right time. While losing a partner for supplying energy and maritime destination, India may gain more friends in the Persian Gulf. The promise and size of the growing economy afford India this advantage. It does not negate the fact that India could still retain its friendly relations with the current Iranian dispensation or any future one. If Marco Rubio’s surprise visit to India this weekend is a signal, it is that the US is seeking more allies in the region. Whether it would end India’s woes caused by the US is a matter of conjecture, but the US Secretary of State’s visit does signal a shift in that direction.

One can argue that the conflict has given more pain than gain to all the countries surrounding it. Hence, was it necessary to start a conflict? The answer depends on what glasses you wear. Iran was on a tangential path vis-à-vis its neighbours for a long time. Saudi Arabia realised that the path of sponsoring terrorism was a one-way path to doom, and hence it mended its way to start investing in people, technology, and Economy with a vision to create a new Saudi Arabia by 2030 (Vision 203). So were the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait. Yet Iran spent its revenues more on fuelling its nuclear ambitions and its terrorist proxies. The regime was more despotic than any other in the region. It is a fair probability that in the absence of this conflict, Iran would have made a nuclear bomb in the near future. The presence of a nuclear bomb would have given the regime a powerful leverage to be used at its own convenience, and that would have been a dangerous development for the region. It may have fuelled many a race towards greater armaments. The above is a conjecture, but it is based on the pattern of behaviour of forces within Iran, which hold all the authority but bear no accountability or responsibility to the international community. It is thus up to the reader to decide whether going to war with Iran was the right thing for the US. The last line should clinch that argument.

Are we likely to be safer than we would have been before?