Musings mostly about Open Individualism....
This it the list of references for my work Subject of experience and personal identity . ALBAHARI, Miri (2002). Against No-Ātman Theories of Anattā. Asian Philosophy 12 (1):5-20. FASCHING, Wolfgang (2010). 'I am of the nature of Seeing': Phenomenological Reflections on the Indian Notion of Witness-Consciousness. In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, No Self?: Perspectives From…
This is the conclusion of my work Subject of experience and personal identity . It is conceivable that I could have been another person. It isconceivable that the experiences immediately given in the same way this experience now, of Edralis writing this, is immediately given, would not be Edralis’s experiences, but rather those of a different person. That an experience is mine does not consist in…
This is chapter 6 of my work Subject of experience and personal identity . The problem of personal identity is the problem of determining whether some person is the same person as some other person. In other words: If there is a person A and a person B, under what circumstances is it the case that person A is the same as person B? Different solutions to the problem of personal identity offer…
This is chapter 5 of my work Subject of experience and personal identity . Why, of all people in the world, is this one the center of my experience? Why does this particular brain generate me ? By what mechanism is it determined which brain is to be the generator of experiences with this particular mineness? Why am I this person? Some might dismiss the question, finding it trivial and…
This is chapter 4 of my work Subject of experience and personal identity . All experiences possess the quality of mineness. Some experiences are mine relative to me . The mineness of experience peculiar to me is its immediate givenness to me. If there are many mineness-properties, each one of them peculiar to some subject, what is the cause of an experience having a particular mineness-property,…
This is chapter 3 of my work Subject of experience and personal identity . This experience, currently unique among all experiences in that it is mine (so people believe – i.e. they believe that now there are also other experiences which are not mine), is immediately replaced by a new one, which is then the one immediately given and present to me. What changes is the content of what is now, what is…
This is chapter 2 of my work Subject of experience and personal identity . 2.1. An analysis of experience This is what I mean by “experience”: an experience is the totality of co-present (in/to a particular subject) phenomena. It is the entirety of what is simultaneously existent in the same subjectivity. It is a non-temporally extended unified phenomenal event. An experience exists subjectively ,…
This is the chapter 1 of my work Subject of experience and personal identity . This is the starting point of my investigation: that it is conceivable that I were a different person than the one I actually am (i.e. Edralis). That is, that the person that I am could have existed without me, and I could have existed even if she had not. I can imagine being a different person than the one I happen to…
ALBAHARI, Miri (2002). Against No-Ātman Theories of Anattā. Asian Philosophy 12 (1):5-20. BARKER, Chris (2002). The Dynamics of Vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy 25:1–36. CARNAP, Rudolf (1950). Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4. pp. 20-40. DASGUPTA Surendranath (1975), A History of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass) DEUTSCH, Eliot (1969).…
[This blogpost is a part of the series Awareness Monism , originally my Master’s thesis. Go to the disambiguation page here .] Conclusion: Being awareness Even considering AM as a possible truth about ourselves shifts a person’s attitude toward others—and toward themselves. If it is actually the case that not only this particular human being from whose point of view you’re currently experiencing…