It would always be a tough act to follow. And it would always be complicated. In the three years under Pete DeBoer, the Stars had a winning record; not just in the regular season (149-68-29) but in the postseason too (29-27). They were top 10 on the power play and on the penalty kill during that span. Jake Oettinger’s poor start in Game 5 versus the Edmonton Oilers in 2025, and DeBoer’s angry and emotional response would be everyone’s undoing, starting with DeBoer, who was subsequently fired; literally minutes after I wrote in D Magazine about Dallas needing to stay the course no less.
However, the drama was always just that — drama. On the ice, there was a different problem. The Stars were often scored on first, and they often gave up late goals. Not only were they turning into an oddly inept team with the lead under DeBoer, but that pattern went from bad to worse as their defensive numbers (previously solid) became poor; something I dug into the day it happened. If there were hockey reasons to end DeBoer’s tenure, and if that was the discussion upstairs beyond the personal rift between Oettinger and his head coach, then I suspect this was it: Dallas’ defense had degraded from a team with good defense that had some specific flaws to a bad defense that had some specific flaws.
We walk down memory lane together because it’s the thing I keep going back to as we turn to Glen Gulutzan. Was this his pitch? Beyond the bluster of trying to get more physical after what happened in the Edmonton series. Or was this cheap talking point — because that’s what it always was — secondary to Gulutzan’s pitch to fix the defense, which had been growing cracks for years?
It’s important to frame Gulutzan’s hiring the right way. Because in some respects, we’re still in the dark. If Jim Nill’s decision to fire DeBoer was informed by more than just the Oettinger drama, then the choice to bring in Gulutzan was more intentional, and thus, it would behoove fans to have more faith despite the first-round exit. If it wasn’t, and it was a reactionary move, then the choice to bring in Gulutzan and the outcome of being eliminated in the first round might exist as a rather unfortunate praxis.
None of the above is to run away with our own, superficial conclusions. It’s possible that Nill took everything into account, and still made the wrong decision. But even if it was a reactionary move, that doesn’t automatically make the decision to bring in Gulutzan the wrong one, nor does a first-round exit mean that Gulutzan is “in over his head.” If it sounds like I’m running in circles, it’s because you can always cut through the chatter, hot takes, rhetorical questions, and empty talking points by simply analyzing what happened on the ice. Thankfully enough has happened since that dramatic offseason to prompt the right questions.
Comments
Nothing yet. Say the first thing.
Sign in to join the conversation.