The resignation of Sir Keir Starmer comes as a timely opportunity for a major Defence reset. The MoD had been asking for an increase in funds to deliver what had been signed off in the last Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The Chancellor refused to consider the priorities as being as important as her MoD colleagues did, even on their reduced estimates and even with a signed-off SDR. The consequence of this insurmountable intransigence was that the PM then lost four members of his ministerial Defence team, critically undermining his authority and contributing massively to his downfall.
In fact, this is a game the Treasury have been playing for a long time. As we explore in our new paper, War Plan Britain, it is a breach of an explicit promise made fifteen years ago and carries with it a massive and escalating risk.
The UK has seen its Defence capabilities rashly underfunded since 2011, and more generally underfunded for more. The shortfall is now visible to our enemies and has operational effect: in short, the military cannot effectively at times do their job, and our potential adversaries know it.
We’ve tackled the review by looking at what, as a country, we need to do and are trying to do, and then working backwards to identify the capability gaps that weren’t there before. That means we can then attempt to cost-plug them and compare that figure with the money sometimes quoted as the in-house shortfall. A perfect analysis? No, but a real head start on the bean counter nay-sayers.
Our estimate to fill these gaps requires £70.3bn, and an estimated additional £4.7bn sustainment spend in the Defence budget for successive years. This is significantly more than the £28 billion that has been leaked by Whitehall, revealing that their supposedly excessive sums only cover what’s needed to keep the wagon rolling on with three wheels. Even £70.3bn gets us to something approaching a capability of deterrence, and a posture allowing a global footprint, but not a position of overmatch – i.e. the UK avoiding quickly losing, but without actually winning, a short but intense conflict.
There is a real risk of Russia stumbling into war with the West, or more likely parts of the West, due to a mixture of tactical incompetence, bravado, internal political friction, and appalling strategic misjudgment. The UK is thus facing a significant risk of war with a peer power at a time of weakened NATO cohesion: our military shortfall severely limits the UK’s options, exacerbates the risk of confrontation turning hot through lack of credible deterrence, and risks catastrophic failure. The balance of risk has shifted, and the underspend gamble is no longer a choice for policymakers.
The absurdity of the situation is that we have a Whitehall that is in the casino happily gambling with our security without having the collateral for any chips.
You can find a link to the paper HERE. It was also covered in the Daily Telegraph HERE.
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