Improving the security of peacekeepers is not a technical exercise

Members of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) are trying to reach consensus on a substantive report by the end of the week after having been unable to agree during last year’s negotiations. I’m personally not optimistic about the prospects, given the dynamics within the Committee, and I strongly believe that a significant re-think of its role and working methods are needed for the body to regain its relevance. But the focus of my commentary this week is not the C34 itself, but rather one of the topics under discussion in the C34 deliberations, namely the safety and security of peacekeepers.

In recent decades, the issue of safety and security has become a prominent fixture of debates on peacekeeping in New York, including in both the C34 and the Security Council. This is unsurprising given the uptick in peacekeeper casualties as a result of violent incidents. These concerns about the safety and security of peacekeepers spurred the Secretary-General to launch a review in 2017, led by Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz. They also prompted the Security Council to call for an independent strategic review of the response by peacekeeping operations to improvised explosive devices, led by Hugh van Roosen, in 2021.

Following the release of the Santos Cruz report, the Secretariat launched an action plan to improve the security of United Nations peacekeepers, implementation of which is ongoing.1 Efforts to improve safety and security of peacekeepers have also been a main driver of discussions on the adoption of new technologies in missions and the digital transformation strategy in peacekeeping.2 But these efforts—and the underlying analysis and recommendations in both the Santos Cruz3 and van Roosen4 reports—miss the point. They treat casualties and fatalities as a result of violent incidents as a technical issue that can be solved through more training, better equipment, and prosecution of perpetrators. They take as given the fact that peacekeepers are being targeted without interrogating the reasons why.

The Santos Cruz report noted that

…since 2013, casualties have spiked. 195 personnel in United Nations peacekeeping missions have been killed by acts of violence, more than during any other 5-year period in history. In 2017, there had been 56 fatalities at the time of publication – the highest number since 1994.

It is no coincidence that the spike in casualties corresponds with the period during which multidimensional peacekeeping operations pivoted away from peacebuilding towards stabilization. The adoption of Security Council resolution 2098 in March 2013 was a turning point. This resolution created the Force Intervention Brigade and tasked MONUSCO with “carry[ing] out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade…in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner”.5

Stabilization missions are generally understood as ones deployed into situations of active violence in support of host governments and whose mandates not only prioritize the protection of civilians, but encourage the use of force against armed groups that threaten civilian populations (i.e., “robust” peacekeeping).6 As such, they mark a significant departure from the three basic principles that underpin peacekeeping doctrine: impartiality, consent of the parties, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. The establishment of the Force Intervention Brigade was followed by the establishment of MINUSMA (in April 2013) and MINUSCA (in April 2014), both of which were also stabilization missions.

The relevant point here, however, is the fact that stabilization missions are deployed in support of host governments and their robust activities are generally directed towards armed groups opposed to those host governments, which arguably makes them a party to the conflict.7 This is significant, because peacekeepers become legitimate targets under the laws of armed conflict when peacekeeping missions become parties to a conflict.

In 1999, the United Nations issued a Secretary-General’s bulletin setting out the principles and rules of international humanitarian law (i.e., the laws of armed conflict) applicable to United Nations peacekeepers. The bulletin states that

1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.

1.2 The promulgation of this bulletin does not affect the protected status of members of peacekeeping operations under the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel or their status as non-combatants, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians under the international law of armed conflict.8

In essence, peacekeepers are entitled to be treated as civilians—and therefore not a legitimate target—as long as they are not combatants. But when they are engaged as combatants, they become legitimate targets under international law.

After the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade, the Secretariat acknowledged that, “by virtue of the tasks foreseen for the Intervention Brigade, it would appear that MONUSCO may end up being a party to armed hostilities in the DRC, thus triggering the application of international humanitarian law.”9 But the fact that MONUSCO became a legitimate target once the Force Intervention Brigade was established was apparently not well understood by Security Council members at the time resolution 2098 was adopted.10 There is little evidence that awareness has grown in the intervening years. In fact, the Security Council regularly asserts, including in the mandate renewal resolutions for stabilization missions, that acts of violence against peacekeepers may constitute war crimes. But such acts are only war crimes when peacekeepers are entitled to the protection given to civilians under international law—i.e., when they are not a party to the conflict.11

It should also be noted that the United Nations need not be directly engaged in combat operations to be considered a party to a conflict under international humanitarian law.12 The provision of material support by the United Nations to host country security forces or non-UN forces may also render the United Nations a party to a conflict.13 This has obvious implications for safety and security in contexts where the United Nations is responsible for delivering a support package to a non-UN force,14 whether under Security Council resolution 2719 or under an ad hoc arrangement.

Casualties and fatalities resulting from the targeting of peacekeepers cannot be effectively mitigated through technical measures alone. The Secretariat and member states need to come to terms with the fact that the increased threat to the safety and security of peacekeepers is directly linked to the robust turn in peacekeeping operations. When peacekeeping missions squander their impartiality, they not only compromise their ability to credibly support peacemaking efforts, but they also make themselves legitimate targets of attack.

There are many reasons why the United Nations turned to stabilization; these include failures by peacekeeping missions to respond to attacks on civilians15 as well as the preference of Western countries for interventions of more limited scope instead of broader (and more expensive) peacebuilding engagements.16 But the short-term focus on symptoms of conflict, such as violence against civilians, has come at the expense of the possibility of long-term solutions. Stabilization efforts undermine the perceived impartiality of the United Nations17 and reduce the incentives for pursuing a negotiated outcome to a conflict.18 As missions continue on with no end in sight, peacekeepers pay the ultimate sacrifice.

A sober reflection on whether the shift to militarized approaches has worked—and if it has been worth the price—is long overdue. This question deserves to be a central theme in the review of the future of all forms of UN peace operations. The Secretariat and member states regularly pay lip service to the principles of peacekeeping and the importance of political solutions. It’s time to walk the talk.

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© 2026 Eugene Chen under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations University.