Time for a Hard Reset: Reforming the Canadian Army Reserve

Note: I’ve been away from the laptop for a bit because of the chaos surrounding the start of school. I know a lot has been happening and I’m hoping to get back to a regular “schedule” with more current topics soon.

In the meantime, I thought this little piece was timely, although - because I have some pretty strong opinions - it may have suffered from over-editing.

Maybe you know the feeling. You’ve drafted a risky text or email—you know it needs to be sent, but there will be blowback.

This article is one of those, as the Canadian Army is about to restructure, and I’m going to write about the Primary Reserve.

Experience matters. This is a subject that I—for better or worse—have strong opinions on, developed over many years of direct experience. I began my career as a Reservist and worked with and alongside the Reserve Force for all 25 years of my uniformed service. My experience is with the Army Reserve; I know little about the Naval or Air Reserves. Army units form the bulk of Canada’s military reserves.

I entered the CAF with a civilian undergrad degree in military history and international relations. I thought I knew what I was getting into. I was very wrong.

First night, first lesson. My first night with my Reserve unit was a disaster. Drinking culture was rife, and the unit often seemed more focused on social activities than training and readiness. Only about half of the NCOs and junior officers retained qualifications in the unit’s assigned role. Lest I be considered too cynical, the qualified half were often exceptionally dedicated, making extraordinary efforts despite a complete lack of support and resources. The problem was leadership, not troops. Despite heroic efforts by Regular Force staff to change the culture, attitudes remain entrenched to this day—over three decades later.

Virtually nothing in the subsequent 25 years served to change my opinion of the Army Reserves, particularly its leadership. In my view, the Reserves remain the weakest component of the Armed Forces.

A long history. Canada’s Reserve Force—or Militia—predates the Regular full-time military by decades. Some units predate Confederation. This history, stretching through the Victorian era and two world wars, has driven many structural and operational decisions, even when it shouldn’t.

As Canada expanded, so did the Army Reserve. By the First World War, most communities had a Militia unit. Eventually, the Army ended up with roughly 186 units across 86 communities. Many units are very small—less than 100 soldiers—a size hasn’t changed much since the early 20th century. Units encompass all arms and services, totaling about 19,000 Army Reservists, organized into Reserve brigades under the four geographical Army divisions.

Size versus structure. Despite their size, units retain the trappings of full-strength battalions or regiments, with command structures, administrative staff, and messes. A 90-soldier unit may be commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel with a Regimental Sergeant Major and additional staff, whereas a Regular Force battalion using the same structure commands roughly 600 soldiers.

Units have sufficient equipment for local training only; most heavy equipment is stored at training areas or issued only to Regular units that can support it. The Reserves have limited logistics capacity of their own and rely on the Regular Force for any major training activity requiring a field deployment of more than a few days. Support for operations has to come from the Regular Army, (which may be augmented by the Reserves).

At one time, I was heavily involved as operational staff in generating forces for training in Canada and overseas missions. I can say without equivocation that the Reserve Force caused roughly 80% of the issues I faced.

Why?

• Unit size: Most are too small to generate significant numbers for tasks. Creating a sub-unit of 120 soldiers for operations or exercises sometimes required a division-wide effort, often involving a dozen units and weeks of training and screening.

• Training dependency: While the Army Reserve is capable of conducting its own basic training and basic trades training, more advanced courses are heavily dependent on Regular support - staff who were increasingly deployed or preparing for deployment, often resulting in course cancellations and recriminations.

• Leadership experience: Reserve senior leaders hold the same rank and authority as their Regular counterparts but generally lack equivalent training or operational experience. Senior Reservists were sometimes deployed without adequate preparation, leading to complaints from UN and US headquarters about unqualified staff in operational roles.

• Lack of Operational Agility. Deploying Reservists on operations requires a complete force generation effort including sourcing of individual soldiers, screening, pre-deployment training, and integration. This requires a major effort for what is often less than 20% of the overall deployed force.

These issues persist. Structural and equipment limitations, distance from training areas, and complexity of modern equipment exacerbate the problem. Western Canada, for instance, has few nearby training areas, requiring long travel or reliance on US facilities.

Starting around 2005, the Army Reserve was assigned responsibility for domestic operations through Territorial Battalion Groups (TBGs) and for the generation of other operational units such as Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and convoy escort troops. These were intended as exclusively Reserve roles but ran into difficulties due to:

• Dependence on volunteers; planners never know who will be available.

• A need for high-readiness and an immediate response.

• Small unit sizes requiring composite sub-units.

• Lack of logistics capability beyond a few days into a deployment.

Despite these systemic issues, some in the Reserve community continued to demand high-readiness assignments. The reality is that only the Regular Force possesses the flexibility, consistency, and logistics to perform agile, high-readiness tasks. The Reserves are limited to well-planned, volunteer-supported roles that can be executed within days, not hours.

• Reserve regiments and battalions are not full-strength units despite their trappings.

• Units train roughly three hours a week plus one weekend a month, limiting skill development and supervision.

• Many units parade fewer than 100 soldiers—a number unchanged for a century.

• Skill levels in Reserve leadership vary widely; only a few are equivalent to their Regular Force counterparts.

• Many units are located far from viable training areas.

• Equipment is limited to local training needs, not operations.

• Reserves cannot usually deploy even a company-level sub-unit without resorting to a composite group. Exceptions are extremely rare.

• Units lack logistics to conduct sustained operations without Regular support.

• The Army employs the Reserve mainly as individual augmentation or composite sub-units for low-risk, well-defined missions. The skill-set doesn’t currently exist to conduct tasks at the full unit levels.

• Attempts to reform unit structures have met resistance for decades, allegedly to maintain community footprint and theoretical wartime mobilization readiness. This resistance has often been politically motivated.

• Acknowledge that reform at the unit level is urgently needed.

• All units should reduce to a sub-unit structure, commanded by a Major, retaining customs and traditions.

• Each Reserve brigade should have battalion structures for training and operations, commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, providing the framework for territorial defence and domestic operations.

• Obtain local ranges and training areas—at least one per brigade, urgently in Western Canada.

• Reserve units could be assigned three roles: augmentation to Regular Force, territorial defence, and domestic operations.

• Provide equipment for training and territorial defence operations; Reserve equipment should match Regular Force equipment whenever practical.

• Reserve combat service support units should be structured and equipped to enable local operations for at least a week.

• Review and reform mess and non-public fund structures where necessary.

• Cap Reserve ranks at full Colonel; eliminate Reserve General Officers.

• Remove stovepiped chains of command and staff chains.

The point is: the structure needs reform, the Reserves need a defined role, and we must stop pretending dozens of small units contribute meaningfully to operational readiness. While they will never match the agility of Regular Force Immediate Reaction Units, assigning a territorial defence role is worth exploring.

As is happening across government, it’s time to think outside the box, develop innovative Canadian solutions, and act decisively. Reform of the Army Reserve has been bogged down for decades; now is the time to get it moving.