Stationary Target Digital Money -- An Unacceptable Security Risk

Everything built by men and for which there is no mathematical proof to the contrary, can be, and will be cracked. It is just a matter of time. On this premise most (but not all) CBDC under advanced consideration in the world today, as far as we know, are an invitation for digital bank robbers to steal the goods. They are all hinging on a fixed detailed-published algorithm, fitted in a fixed exposed public protocol. If you lock your treasures with a strong lock for which all drawings are made public, then you better be sure that, however long it will take -- your lock will be cracked.

How can one then protect their treasure? The answer presents itself: be sure to change the lock before the bank robber figures out how to crack the replaced lock. No brainer, as simple as that: change your lock before your lock picker finds out how to compromise it.

For CBDC it means: reject all stationary target digital money, and secure your treasures with quantum safe, smarts safe, bank robber safe, moving non-stationary target. This is an added challenge that must be met.

If an important encrypted message is cracked then the damage, big as it may be, is nonetheless bound. But if the national currency is breached at its mathematical level (distinguished from implementation level) then, not only that future transactions stop -- the present status is untrustworthy because money was likely shadily shifted around before the breach was discovered. Money accounts will be all stained, payments will stop. And that is why it would be highly irresponsible to rest national survival on stationary target digital money.

BitMint*LeVeL  is an example of dynamically powered non-stationary target digital money. It was designed for this purpose. Other solutions are in sight. Among them central banks ought to choose in order to honor their grave responsibility for their nation's well-being.