Aristotle for Dogs

n.b this post is too long for emails. there is so much more that could be added, as the NE is a rich text covering many concepts. this post was a lot of fun to write: if people are interested, please let me know and i may make a part two in the future! it feels almost criminal that an Aristotelian post on ‘man’s best friend’ didn’t discuss friendship, yet perhaps that is for the best and worthy of its own post.

The Nicomachean Ethics (Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια, Ēthika Nikomacheia)1 is one of Aristotle’s most famous works. Aristotle believes that ethics falls into the practical realm of philosophy, rather than the theoretical side. Therefore, the book aims to teach readers how to achieve the life of happiness or the best life: eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία). In the simplest of terms, achieving eudaimonia is done through habituating oneself to virtuous actions to build a virtuous, i.e. moral, character. It is through a virtuous character that one is able to live the best life. These beliefs place the Nicomachean Ethics into the category of virtue ethics due to the emphasis on virtue above moral duty (deontology) or consequences of actions (consequentialism).

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is quite dense and this post aims to be a brief guide to the vocabulary and philosophical ideas he puts forth in the book. Common Aristotelian vocabulary will be bolded from this point forward.2 A month ago, I posted the following note:

That note has received more likes than anything else I have posted to Substack. Message received: the people want Canine Aristotelianism.

Aristotle himself did not include much discussion of non-human animals in his Nicomachean Ethics. The occasional mentions of non-human animals are as “non-rational animals” (ἄλογος, alogos)3 in contrast to human animals (ἄνθρωπος, anthrōpos),4 or paired with children (παῖδες, paides) as “other animals” (τἆλλα ζῷα, talla zōa).5 His views on non-human animals are often complicated and contradictory (e.g. pairing non-human animals with human children, claiming other animals are capable of politics, etc.).

Roughly 600 years after Aristotle (fourth century BCE), the third century CE philosopher Porphyry used Aristotle’s works to help make his argument that non-human animals are, in fact, rational animals in his De Abstinentia. Porphyry even goes as far as to claim that non-human animals are capable of virtue: “indeed, a certain virtue is distinguished in each one [i.e. animal],” (“Propria enim quaedam in unoquoque virtus excellit”).6 For a more detailed look at Porphyry’s De Abstinentia and an argument in defense of non-human animals’ capacity for virtue, see my post on Ancient Animal Advocacy.7 Despite the lack of attention Aristotle gives to non-human animals himself, there is an ancient precedent for applying Aristotelian ethics to non-anthropocentric conversations.

Now, let us begin our journey following an ancient puppy as he learns Aristotelian virtue ethics.8

Meet Argos. He is an alopekis puppy and only a few months old. This is the perfect time for him to begin his training in virtue ethics. Aristotle says that the early years of one’s education (παιδεία, paideia) are the important, formative years for developing a virtuous character:

“On this account, it is necessary to have been led directly from youth, like Plato says, so as to enjoy and to find pain in the proper things: for this is the correct education.”

“διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ: ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν.”9

Scholars often refer to the Aristotelian conception of early education as the upbringing, and I will do the same.

Argos’ upbringing will determine whether he is a good (καλός) or a bad (κακός) dog. As Aristotle might say: ἆρα ὁ κύων Ἄργος καλός ἤ κακός ἐστί; (is Argos a good or a bad dog?). Argos’ owner will want to give him the proper training to ensure that he is a good dog; although, there are some animal owners who seem not to care whether their pet has any form of training, but let’s assume Argos has a good and caring owner. We can imagine that Argos’ education in finding enjoyment or pain in the proper things is quite literal. He will receive treats for good behavior, i.e. properly following a command like “sit” or “paw,” and scolding for bad behavior, i.e. “bad dog!” in response to unwanted barking or eating of furniture.

Under an Aristotelian ethical education, Argos will learn how to perform these actions well and for the proper reasons or aims. He will eventually understand that the purpose of obeying the command “sit” is sitting itself, not the reward of a treat; though, this is a benefit and incentive presented to him in his upbringing as a pedagogical tool. In Aristotelian terms, we call this proper aim or goal the telos (τέλος) of an action (πρᾶξις, praxis).

This is why dogs look sad after catching their own tail: their actions have failed to meet the proper telos. The telos of chasing one’s own tail is not catching one’s own tail, but the action of chasing itself. This type of action has a telos for its own sake, i.e. the telos is the action itself rather than some other result brought about by the action. Aristotle considers this type telos the Good (ἀγαθός, agathos):

“Then, if some telos of things done we wish for because of itself, and others because of this [telos], and we do not choose everything because of some other thing (for it continues this way to infinity, so that the desire is to be empty and vain), it is clear that this [telos] would be the Good and the best Good.”

“εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι᾽ αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι᾽ ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ᾽ εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ᾽ εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον.”10

The Good is achieving one’s telos through one’s actions. It is understood that the Good is done with reason (λόγος, logos), which is why Aristotle notes that “desire is to be empty and vain.” Desire is in the realm of the non-rational (ἄλογος, alogos), so actions can be done with a telos of desire, but this is an improper telos for Aristotelian ethics.

There is another word Aristotle uses that we could also translate as “good,” so before moving too far into Argos’ education, we must make the distinction clear to avoid confusion. The Good is a translation of the Greek word ἀγαθός (agathos). We should think of the Good as the concept of goodness itself or, as Aristotle uses it, specifically in relation to moral goodness. The other Greek word that one might translate as “good” is καλός (kalos). The kalos is a sort of qualitative goodness. Other ways scholars translate kalos is as “fine,” “well,” “noble,” or “beautiful,” with “fine” and “noble” as the most popular translation choices for Aristotle’s use of kalos in his Nicomachean Ethics;11 personally, I prefer leaving kalos untranslated and giving an explanation of its meaning to provide a more comprehensive sense of the word. We can describe someone’s actions, characteristics, or physical traits as kalos, and even talk about objects as kalos. These two senses of good—goodness itself and qualitative goodness—work together. Our Argos can perform a kalos action in accordance with and aiming at (telos) the Good.

In fact, Argos cannot reach the Good unless he acts kalos. Therefore, Argos must learn how to perform kalos actions. This is where Aristotle’s conception of virtue (ἀρετή, aretē) comes into play. A virtue of character is a mean (μεσότης, mesotēs), which is a state (ἕξις, hexis)12 that is appropriate for each person in a given situation, i.e. the mean is not a sense of moderation or a neutral state. The virtue of character contrasts with the vice (κακία, kakia) of character, which is a state that is either an excess (ὑπερβολή, hyperbolē) or a deficiency (ἔλλειψις, elleipsis):

“Then, virtue is a state of choice, being in the mean for us, defined by reason as the prudent man would define it. The mean is between two vices, the one as excess and the one as deficiency.”

“ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν.ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ᾽ ἔλλειψιν.”13

Argos can perform a virtuous action without being a virtuous person himself. If the action is kalos—done well and with the proper telos (i.e. the action for its own sake and not an external aim, such as validation, fame, or other rewards)—then Argos will have performed both a virtuous action and have virtue of character.

Imagine that Argos is a therapy dog trained to alert his owner when the owner’s blood sugar is either too high or too low. The act of alerting is always a virtuous action; it is the appropriate thing to do in the situation. However, if Argos expects a reward or treat for giving the alert, then he lacks virtue of character because he does not understand the proper telos and therefore is not acting kalos. In this instance, it is likely that Argos is simply too early in his upbringing to fully understand how to perform a kalos action with the proper telos needed to develop a virtuous character. Over time, Argos will learn to give the alert without any expectation of a treat. He will know that the alert is given for the sake of giving the alert, and then he will have done a virtuous action and also have virtue of character.

Virtue of character is not the only type of virtue according to Aristotle. There is also the virtue of thought:

“There are two kinds of virtue: the one of moral character and the one of thought. Virtue of thought more so has its origin and growth from teaching, and for this reason needs experience and time. Virtue of moral character results from habit, which is where its name comes from, deviating a little bit [i.e. ēthos (ἦθος) versus ethos (ἔθος)].”

“διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ᾽ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.”14

Outside of a formal education, the best way to build virtue is through our habits (ἔθος, ethos) or habituation (ἐθισμός, ethismos). Neither type of virtue arises naturally or unnaturally,15 which is why the proper upbringing is so important for Aristotle: the right kind of education and habits are necessary to develop virtue of thought and character; we all have the capacity for virtue and the upbringing fosters it. Argos needs an upbringing with an attentive owner to teach him how to be more than a “good boy,” and instead the “bestest, most virtuous boy.”

For example, Argos has the natural ability to bark and the capacity to habituate himself to the appropriate and virtuous barking actions. Argos barks out of fear; there is nothing unusual about that behavior, he simply needs an Aristotelian ethical education to teach him how and when it is proper to bark. This puts barking as an action in relation to the character virtue of bravery (ἀνδρεῖος, andreios). Bravery relates to feelings of fear (φόβος, phobos) and courage (θάρσος, tharsos). If Argos has too much fear and barks at everything all of the time, then he has a deficiency of courage. Aristotle calls the deficiency cowardly (δειλός, deilos). If Argos has too much confidence and never barks at all, then he has an excess of courage. Aristotle calls this excess reckless (θρασύς, thrasus). Theoretically, having a dog who never barks sounds nice, yet what happens if someone breaks into your home? The appropriate (and hopeful) response is that the dog barks at the intruder in an attempt to scare them away and defend the home. Argos, being the virtuous dog that he is, knows the right action to take thanks to his upbringing and habituation. He barks at the intruder with the proper mean of fear and courage: bravery.16

Now that Argos knows how to habituate himself to the virtues, he can learn about the ultimate telos of the ultimate Good: eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία). Eudaimonia is a word that means “happiness” or “prosperity” in the sense of living well. Aristotle uses eudaimonia to describe a type of life, i.e. meaning the life of happiness, the life of prosperity, or the life well-lived. While someone who has achieved eudaimonia surely experiences some pleasure, it is not to be confused with pleasure itself or hedonistic behavior. Eudaimonia is complete (τέλειος, teleios) and self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης, autarkēs), making it the most choiceworthy (αἱρετωτάτην, hairetōtatēn) Good:

“We think eudaimonia to be such as this: the most choiceworthy of all the [goods] not included with the others—since, clearly, included among the smallest of goods [we would think it is] more choiceworthy. For the addition of the goods results in superiority, and the greater of the goods is always more choiceworthy. Eudaimonia seems [to be] something complete and self-sufficient, being the telos [i.e. aim] of things done.”

“τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι: ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην—συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἱρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν: ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον ἀεί. τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος.”17

Eudaimonia is not a feeling for Aristotle, which is part of why I have chosen to leave it untranslated myself rather than calling it “happiness.” We can think of eudaimonia as a state of being that arises from the one’s habits, so while it can be reached in one’s lifetime, this occurs in older age because the upbringing is needed to first learn the virtues and how to act upon them. Its dependence on decision making and action taking relates eudaimonia to Aristotle’s virtues of thought. Argos must think properly to determine the virtuous actions to take.

Prudence (φρόνησις, phronēsis) is one of Aristotle’s virtues of thought along with wisdom and comprehension. The deliberative and contemplative nature of prudence is required for someone, such as Argos, to choose the proper moral and virtuous actions. It is silly to claim that dogs lack the ability to perform prudence, and the philosopher Porphyry points out that Aristotle himself has made a claim in support of prudent non-human animals in one of his other works.18 In his Metaphysics, Aristotle says:

“Therefore, by nature animals are born having sense-perception, and from this, for some of them memory does not arise, but for others it does. For this reason, those [animals] are more prudent and more capable of learning than those unable to remember,”

“φύσει μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα γίγνεται τὰ ζῷα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐγγίγνεται. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν ἐστί,”19

Anyone who has interacted with a dog can tell you that they are capable of learning and remembering tricks! Dogs clearly have the ability to both learn and remember things. It only logically follows that dogs are capable of prudence, and because of this, capable of striving for and achieving eudaimonia.

After a long day with Aristotle, Argos is set on the proper path to a virtuous life of happiness and living well. A lifetime of good habits will assist him on his journey to eudaimonia. Hopefully, the journey is long and one that he has plenty of doggy treats to give him the mental and physical energy he needs. If Aristotelian ethics ever feels intimidating, just remember that if our beloved puppy, Argos, can learn virtue ethics, then so can you! Wagging his tail, he will stay by your side simply for the sake of being with you.