Ancient Animal Advocacy

n.b. this post is too long for emails. many thanks to Linch for reviewing an earlier draft of this post!

poema pro scillis // a poem for the shrimp

fāta scillārum, tibī nōn cūrā sīs, sed iuvēmus
pārvās psychās, ūt prō faciāmus bonō.
The fate of shrimp—you might not care yourself—but let
us help small souls, so that we might do good.

Scansion

fāta scill | ārum, ti | bī nōn | cūrā | sīs, sed iuv | ēmus
pārvās | psychās, | ūt || prō faci | āmus bo | nō.

Shrimp Welfare is a hot topic here on Substack (at least for those within the analytic philosophy circle, which if you are not, you should be). Moralla W. Within rose to fame with her post on arguing that we should save 10^100 shrimp over one human; although, readers should know that that Moralla was actually making the case that humans do not value human life infinitely and are adverse to beliefs that sound unpleasant even if those beliefs align with ethical truth, not necessarily advocating for shrimp welfare. Bentham’s Bulldog likewise has argued that we should save infinite shrimp over one person because saving an infinite number of sentient beings is more valuable than saving only one sentient being; he has also argued that we should support diminishing wildlife populations because nature is cruel and most animals have bad, painful lives. It’s clear that even if the examples used may turn away some readers, the philosophers on Substack care deeply about the suffering and wellbeing of non-human animals.

While the discourse centering shrimp welfare is modern, concerns over non-human animal welfare are nothing new. In the third century CE, the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry wrote his De Abstinentia Ab Esu Animalium (On the Abstinence from Eating Animals).1 Porphyry’s treatise is composed of four books, in which he refutes arguments against vegetarianism, opposes animal sacrifice, claims that animals are rational beings, and covers the origins of a vegetarian diet. The De Abstinentia can be a bit odd for those who do not believe in souls or worry about animal welfare. Nevertheless, it is a useful look at how the ancients viewed non-human animals in relation to human animals.

Porphyry tackles arguments that to this day are made against vegetarianism and veganism. He refutes claims about: the need to kill and consume animals for health,2 over population,3 the discovery of fire makes eating cooked flesh natural and uncooked flesh unnatural,4 and that man is superior to all other living things.5 Porphyry’s primary argument in favor of vegetarianism or abstinence from consuming flesh is that it is unjust. He believes that we ought to extend justice to non-human animals:

“[...] animam omnem quae sensus et memoriae sit particeps, rationalem quoque esse demonstremus. Si enim demonstratum hoc fuerit, ius ad omnia animalia ex eorum etiam sententia pertinere constabit.”

“we shall explain that every soul which participates in sense and memory is also rational. For if this has been demonstrated, it will be correct to extend justice to all animals even from the opinion of those [who disagree].”6

Porphyry makes his case that non-human animals are rational beings in Book III. of his De Abstinentia. He contrasts his views with the Stoics (ca. 300 BCE), who believed that human animals are the only rational animals. The Stoics come to this conclusion through asserting that there are two kinds of reason: internal (interna), which is correct (recta), and external (externa), which is corrupt (depravata).7 Since the Stoics believe that all humans possess reason, even if they are “corrupt” or using the wrong kind of reason, i.e. external, then Porphyry believes it is unfair—even itself irrational or “completely deprived from reason” (“quod privatum omnino ratione est”)8—to exclude non-human animals from possessing reason. He strongly holds this view, concluding a section of Book III. by saying:

“At si verum dicere oportet, non solum absolute ratio in omnibus animalibus spectatur, verum etiam in multis ex ipsis ratio eius modi conspicitur, quae significationes prope ad perfectionem accedentes prae se ferant.”

“But if it may be proper to speak the truth, not only is reason simply seen in all animals, but even reason of this manner is noticed in many of them themselves, which meanings they bring before themselves approaching near perfection.”9

In the following section, Porphyry says that just because we do not understand animal speech (an external trait of reason), it does not mean that they lack it. He compares non-human animals to foreigners or barbarians whom we may not understand, yet cannot deny possess speech. Furthermore, just as human men follow their own laws of speech, Porphyry attributes animal speech to the laws of God or nature:

“Cum igitur quicquid voce per linguam effertur, quomodocunque sive barbare, sive graece, sive canine, sive equine expressum fuerit, oratio sit, eius caetera quoque animalia quae vocem habent, capacia sunt: sed homines quidem lege humana loquuntur, caetera animalia vero ea lege qua a diis et natura concessum unicuique est.”

“Therefore, since whatever is carried out by the tongue through speech, regardless of whether it has been expressed as Barbarian, or Greek, or canine, or equine, it may be speech; other animals, too, which have a voice, they are capable: but certainly men speak with human law, truly other animals [speak] by that law, which everyone has been granted by God and nature.”10

After Porphyry has made his case that non-human animals are rational, he goes even further, arguing that these other non-human animals are capable of virtue. Porphyry discusses other philosophers throughout his De Abstinentia, including Aristotle. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses how to acquire a virtuous character to achieve the ultimate telos (τέλος) of a human life: eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία), which is often translated as “happiness.” Aristotle emphasizes one’s upbringing and habituation to foster the virtuous character necessary for the life of “happiness” or living well.11 While Porphyry makes no specific mention of the Nicomachean Ethics by name, he references Aristotle as he discusses learning, knowledge, and taming (mansueti)12 to make the case that non-human animals are rational before claiming that each animal has its own virtue (“Propria enim quaedam in unoquoque virtus excellit”).13 I believe that it is possible to read these discussions of non-human animals with an Aristotelian framework of habituation and the development of a virtuous character.

Porphyry asserts that non-human animals have intelligence because they can learn from both each other and human animals:

“Atque ut ipse etiam inquit, multa sunt, quae a se mutuo, multa item quae ab hominibus caetera animalia discere consueverunt.”

“As he himself [Aristotle] also says, there are many things which other animals are accustomed to learn from each other, likewise there are many things from men.”14

Porphyry suggests that the taming of non-human animals demonstrates that they can learn to reason; he goes as far as to say the dogs are capable of dialectics (“dialecticae”).15 Additionally, Porphyry claims that there are some non-human animals who exceed human animals in their senses:

“Immo longe superari nos ab aliis animalibus perspicuum est.”

“Indeed, it is evident we are long surpassed by other animals.”16

Although he makes this statement to then immediately compare Lynceus (a man in fables, “qui in fabulis”) to a dragon (draco), he later goes on to discuss nonfictional examples such as: eagles and their sight (aquilam), cranes and their hearing (grues), and dogs and their scent (canum).17 Indeed, these anecdotes of his do seem to generalize further than he knew. The mantis shrimp18 has one of the most complex pairs of eyes in the animal kingdom. Each eye can be controlled both together or independently and contains three focal points, allowing the mantis shrimp to perceive depth. Their eyes also contain twelve photoreceptors, whereas human eyes contain only three.19 Although mantis shrimp are worse at detecting subtle color differences than humans, their unique eyes allow them to see something no other animal can: circular polarization. Scientists theorize that mantis shrimp shells reflect circularly polarized light with male and female shrimp having different patterns, aiding in decision making about who is a potential mate or threat.20 Porphyry may not have written about the mantis shrimp himself, yet this creature’s strange vision makes a great example of non-human senses.

(this is a link to a video of Ludo21 the peacock mantis shrimp. he is adorable and i love him <3)

Furthermore, Porphyry draws his attention back to Aristotle’s discussion of the virtues and their relation to non-human animal senses:

“At quae vegetioribus sensibus praedita sunt, ea esse etiam prudentiora Aristoteles asserit.”

“But those [animals] who are gifted with more lively senses, Aristotle claims them to also be more prudent.”22

Although this is a reference to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the word used to describe animals (zoa, “ζῷα”) is the adjectival form of the word he uses to discuss prudence (phronimotera and phronesis, “φρονιμώτερα” and “φρόνησις”) in his Nicomachean Ethics.23 Aristotle calls prudence a virtue because it is deliberative and therefore allows one to contemplate the proper actions necessary for making the proper moral choices.24 If non-human animals with more vigorous or lively senses (vegetioribus sensibus) are more prudent (prudentiora), then one must first assume that they have the capacity for virtue.25 The capacity or possession of virtues would surely entail that non-human animals are rational beings:

“In eo igitur esse differentiam concedendum est, quod uel magis uel minus ratione seu oratione praedita sint, non quod penitus ea careant: neque quod nos eam habeamus illa non habeant.”

“Therefore, it must be conceded to be different in this degree, that [animals] are provided with either more or less reason or speech, not that [animals] may be entirely without them: nor because we may have [reason or speech], they may not have them.”26

While Porphyry believes that non-human animals do have speech and reason, he does not want to assert that all non-human animals possess good souls. As with variations in the body between any creature of the same kind, so too is there diversity in the kinds of souls:

“Quemadmodum enim in uno et eodem genere corporum et in aptitudine ad sanitatem, aut morbum suscipiendum magna diversitas est: sic in animabus quoque aliae bonae, aliae pravae reperiuntur.”

“In fact, just as there is great diversity in one and the same kind of body, and in capacity to health or catching sickness: so too in souls are found some good, others vicious.”27

He uses this point to further justify why the intelligence of other non-human animals should not be discredited simply because human animals may possess more or a greater intelligence:

“Non igitur si nos quoque magis quam caetera animalia intelligimus, adimenda propterea caeteris animalibus intelligentia est.”

“Therefore, even if we understand more than other animals, intelligence from other animals should not be taken away for this reason.”28

I think this is a reasonable position! Just because you understand the experience of human intelligence, it doesn’t mean you have the ability to truly know the intelligence of other non-human animals. For this reason, the cognition of other animals is something that scholars treat with caution. Therefore, Porphyry is correct to say that human animals—even with a superior intelligence—should not discredit the intelligence of non-human animals. He considers comparisons between non-human and human animals as matters of differences or degrees, not of rationality versus irrationality. For Porphyry, all animals—human and non-human alike—possess reason through their ability of speech and memory. When we consider non-human animals as rational, it becomes unjust to consume animal flesh.

Vegetarianism is not a term in either Ancient Greek or Latin, which means that Porphyry describes the “vegetarian diet” he advocates for using phrases rather than a single word. Here are a handful of ways Porphyry refers to this diet or lifestyle:

• “abstinentia a carnibus” “abstinence from flesh/meat”

  “τροφή ἄσαρχος” “fleshless food” or “a diet29 without flesh”30

• “carnium experte victu” “a diet without flesh”

  “ἀσάρχου διαίτης” “fleshless lifestyle”31

• “inanimatis cibus” “lifeless food”

  “τά ἄψυχα” “lifeless things” or “things without souls”32

The emphasis always seems to fall on the fact that the food one consumes is free from flesh. While other scholars often interpret this as vegetarianism, I believe Porphyry aligns more closely with modern notions of veganism:

“Porro si iniustitiam prorsus quispiam hanc existimet, neque lacte, aut lana, aut ovis, aut melle utendum ipsi erit.”

“Moreover, if someone should think this [i.e. killing animals] is entirely an injustice, he himself will not use milk, nor wool, nor sheep, nor honey.”33

He continues to explain why one should refrain from what modern readers would consider non-meat animal products. Porphyry states that taking a sheep’s wool is akin to stealing a man’s clothing, cow’s milk is for the calf and not humans, likewise honey is food for bees.34 It seems that many of the arguments people make to this day (even here on Philosophy Substack) originated nearly two millennia ago. Additionally, Porphyry thinks that philosophers are best suited for this lifestyle because they are “devoted to contemplation” (“contemplationi deditus”) and that “[philosophers] may undergo pain and trouble for the purpose of true health” (“ut verae salutis causa dolores ac molestias subiremus”).35 Thus, he believes that one should follow in the footsteps of the philosophers who have argued for abstinence from flesh, like Pythagoras and Empedocles, not those who opposed such abstinence (the Stoics, Peripatetics, and Epicureans).36

While the discussions about shrimp welfare by the philosophically inclined on Substack have taken an analytic form thus far, my contribution is different: I have written a poem dedicated to shrimp as a Latin elegiac couplet and translated into iambs. The form philosophy takes is an interest of mine and—as shocking as it may be—analytic philosophy is not the only form. Throughout Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy,37 his own personification of the discipline uses poetry herself. Even after scaring away the Muses for doing so, Lady Philosophy speaks to the Narrator in poetry—how absurd! Although this behavior and use of poetry by Lady Philosophy is peculiar and seemingly contradictory, it reveals that there is something of interest in poetry for philosophy. After all, why would Lady Philosophy’s consolation use poetry unless it possesses both comforting and philosophical qualities.

Lady Philosophy speaks in elegiac couplets in the first poem of Book V.. The Consolation’s V.M1 is composed of six elegiac couplets and follows Lady Philosophy’s prose explanation of chance or fortune (“fortuitum”) at the end of V.P1, retelling the same story to the Narrator, only this time through poetic metaphor. Her use of poetry helps to reinforce the message to the narrator that chance is “coincidental” (“inopinatum”). The poem repeats words which were used by the Narrator in his opening poetic lament of Book I.M1, creating a “repetition of a sens­ory exper­ience” to “repro­duce imme­di­ate and involun­tary recol­lec­tion.” In this way, she has effectively addressed the very concerns over fortune that began her interaction with the Narrator.38 Walter J. Ong, a scholar who has written at length about the evolution of oral cultures into literate ones, has looked at the psychodynamic effects of orality. Ong says that mnemonic patterns help primary oral cultures “retain and retrieve carefully articulated thought,” particularly for “lengthy analytic solutions” to complex problems. Additionally, rhythmic patterns and poetic elements cause “speakers to reflect with high intelligence and sophistication, on the situations in which they find themselves.”39 The poetic qualities of language require great skill to perform and aid in the remembrance of complicated arguments.

Moralla is correct that people are turned away by arguments that sound unpleasant or that come up against our beliefs. Many people hold the belief that they are animal lovers while still consuming meat—a product that requires the killing of animals. This is contradictory and it seems the assertion from non-vegetarians that they love animals comes from a desire to protect one’s ego with pleasant words, not from truth itself. My poem argues that we should care about “small souls” like shrimp, yet the poetry serves as a sort of sweetener to help the message go down. The sweetness is not to evade truth, but to emphasize it in a way that is, perhaps, more appealing and memorable.40

If arguments against the consumption of meat and other animal products have existed in analytical41 form for approximately 1800 years, yet the animal agricultural industry is larger than ever, then perhaps philosophy needs to employ another form of argument to reach more people and reinforce her message. This does not take away from the value of analytic arguments nor does it lessen the truth: it only makes them stronger.

Consider donating to the Shrimp Welfare Project!