This week has seen the emergence of yet more strikes by the US and Iran on a tit-for-tat basis. Iran’s foreign ministry condemned the US strikes on the country, saying that it has rendered the ceasefire “practically meaningless”. Earlier the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) launched retaliatory strikes on US forces in the region, including Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, according to Iranian news reports. The US military launched attacks “against multiple targets in Iran”, saying the strikes were in “self-defence”. The attacks come hours after President Donald Trump accused Tehran of taking ‘too long’ to negotiate a deal but later claimed that a deal could arrive this weekend.
This has stalled the hope of further negotiations to continue the ceasefire. The situation in Lebanon has pushed Iran out of the negotiating process with the US and yet again demonstrated that Middle Eastern diplomacy today depends less on formal negotiations than on what is happening on the ground.
Tehran has suspended its indirect exchange of messages with Washington because of Israel’s expanding operation against Lebanon and Hezbollah. This decision was a reaction to a broader crisis in which the Lebanese front has become entwined with US-Iranian negotiations, Israel’s security calculations, Lebanon’s domestic politics, Hezbollah’s position, Tehran’s regional strategy, and undermined Trump’s attempt to impose at least a temporary formula for de-escalation.
This crisis appears to follow the familiar pattern of Israeli-Lebanese confrontation. Israel says it is acting to protect the country’s northern areas, from which residents were evacuated after Hezbollah attacks. Hezbollah presents its actions as resistance to Israeli strikes and links the Lebanese front to the broader struggle against Israel. The Lebanese state calls for an end to the attacks and for respect for its sovereignty, yet it lacks the power either to control Hezbollah’s decisions or to stop the Israeli military.
The US is trying to keep negotiations alive because a wider regional war would threaten its interests, energy markets, and the positions of its allies. Iran, meanwhile, sees the developments in Lebanon not as a local episode, but as a blow to the entire architecture of its regional influence. As long as the war remained limited to exchanges of fire along the border, it could still be presented as a controlled conflict.
However, the expansion of Israel’s ground operation, its advance deeper into southern Lebanon, its strikes on areas linked to Hezbollah, and its attacks on Beirut’s southern suburbs have changed the politics around the conflict. Rather than simply responding to threats, as Israel claims, it is trying to forcefully alter the security landscape of the region.
Israel’s recent advance in the area of Beaufort Castle has been especially symbolic. For military planners, it is an important height and a point of control. The Lebanese, however, see it is a place associated with the memory of earlier wars and resistance against Israel’s presence. The seizure or occupation of such an area is a signal that Israel’s goal is deep intervention in southern Lebanon. This is why France requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council.
France has historical ties to Lebanon and a strong interest in preserving Lebanese statehood, while Israel’s advance represents a threat not only to security, but also to the very principle of Lebanese sovereignty. Israel’s traditional partners in Europe have criticised particular Israeli actions before, but they have usually maintained a balance between recognising Israel’s right to security and calling for restraint. However, Israel’s actions on the ground recently have not helped maintain that balance.
Following the war in Gaza, European public opinion had already become more critical of Israel. With the new operation in Lebanon, the risk of a long-term occupation of the south, and the collapse of talks with Iran, even Israel’s customary allies are beginning to distance themselves. They may not be taking the side of Iran or Hezbollah, but they are increasingly unwilling to offer unconditional political cover for the policies of the Israeli government.
Israel’s strength has always rested not only on its military capabilities and its alliance with the US, but also on its ability to remain part of the Western political system. If France, Germany, the UK, and other European partners increasingly see Israel’s actions as a source of further escalation, international support wil begin to shrink. This does not mean an immediate rupture in relations, but it does mean a gradual erosion of political patience. Cooler official statements could emerge, followed by pressure at the United Nations, and eventually debates will centre on arms supplies, trade agreements, legal accountability, and recognition of new political realities on the Palestinian and Lebanese fronts.
Why does Israel need this escalation? Military necessity is only part of the answer. Israel’s leadership wants to bring residents of the north back home, restore deterrence after Hezbollah’s attacks, and show Israeli society that the state is capable of defending its borders. Since October 7, 2023, security has become a test of public trust in the state itself. Israel knows that the northern front has become a measure of whether the government can restore control in places where citizens have felt abandoned.
However, Israel also views Hezbollah not merely as a key component of Iran’s military system on Israel’s borders. Striking Hezbollah means striking Iran. Israel wants to dismantle the infrastructure that allows Tehran to maintain pressure on Israel through Lebanon. The operation against Hezbollah is therefore directed simultaneously at Beirut, Tehran, and Washington. Israel has made it clear that it does not intend to wait for the outcome of US-Iranian negotiations if those talks might preserve a situation in which Hezbollah retains an armed presence in southern Lebanon.
It is also about Israeli domestic politics. Netanyahu’s government depends on right-wing and religious-nationalist forces for which security means territorial control rather than compromise. In this political environment, temporary security zones can easily turn into demands for a long-term military presence. In Gaza, this has manifested itself in discussions about displacement, military administration, and the possible return of settlements. In relation to Lebanon, this means the need to control the south of the country, push Hezbollah back toward the Litani River, and create a reality in which Israel itself defines the perimeter of its security.
This is where the idea of a ‘Greater Israel’ comes to the fore. It is not the official doctrine of the Israeli state toward Lebanon, yet it does exist within the world-view of certain radical right-wing and settler circles. These groups see neighbouring territories as part of a broader historical and biblical map. Even when this ideology does not translate into an explicit decision to annex southern Lebanon, it creates a political atmosphere in which the occupation of other people’s territory can be justified as a historical right as well as strategic necessity.
The danger is that temporary military solutions in the Middle East often become long-term facts on the ground. Military action, initially aimed at eliminating a threat, morphs into observation posts, supply routes, exclusion zones, and special access regimes. Then the argument is made that withdrawal is impossible because the enemy will return, and it ends with an occupation, even if it is not formally acknowledged. Lebanon has already lived through such a scenario.
Israel’s earlier presence in the south was also justified by the security needs of the northern Israeli communities, yet for the Lebanese it became a symbol of occupation and one of the factors that strengthened Hezbollah. Israel needs to remove Hezbollah for good, but it may end up giving it a new political resource.
Inside Lebanon, attitudes toward Hezbollah are far from uniform. Part of society believes that the movement, because of its ties to Iran, drags the country into war without the consent of the Lebanese. For many Christians, Sunnis, and segments of the secular public, Hezbollah is a state within a state, one that limits Lebanese sovereignty and subordinates the country to Tehran’s external strategy. Yet when Israel attacks, criticising Hezbollah becomes politically more difficult because it can claim to be defending the country against external aggression.
The Lebanese state is in the weakest position of all. It cannot disarm Hezbollah, because doing so would risk an internal confrontation but neither can it stop Israel without Hezbollah’s military strength. It depends on international assistance, but international mechanisms cannot quickly change the situation on the ground. As a result, Lebanon once again becomes the arena for other actors’ strategies:
Israel is trying to solve the problem of its northern security
Iran is defending its regional network of allies
The US is trying to preserve negotiations
Europe fears a new destabilisation on the Mediterranean
Lebanese civilians pay the price.
For Hezbollah, the current crisis is also a test. On the one hand, it is suffering military and infrastructure losses, but on the other hand, the Israeli offensive itself helps its political narrative. Before this escalation, internal Lebanese voices had been asking why the country should remain hostage to Iran’s strategy. Hezbollah can now legitimately ask “Would you rather Israel dictate its terms?”
Hezbollah is one of the most important elements of Iran’s deterrence system against Israel. If Israel can destroy Hezbollah’s positions in Lebanon without paying a serious price, Iran’s entire regional strategy is put at risk. Tehran’s withdrawal from the negotiating process with Washington was an attempt to restore leverage as much as it was a gesture of solidarity towards an ally. Iran will not discuss de-escalation with Washington while Israel expands its operation on the Lebanese front.
This is especially important because the Trump administration has been trying to negotiate on several fronts at once, seeking to maintain a channel with Iran, secure an extension of the ceasefire, reduce risks in the Strait of Hormuz, and at the same time support a process of settlement between Israel and Lebanon. US officials described contacts on the Lebanese front as productive and positive. Netanyahu, for his part, spoke of the need for negotiations that would address Hezbollah’s disarmament and the establishment of peaceful relations between Israel and Lebanon. On paper, this looked like an opportunity to tie together Israel’s security, Lebanon’s stabilisation, and continue a dialogue with Iran.
While the US was trying to persuade the parties of the need for a deal, Israel intensified its offensive, and Tehran saw this as proof that Washington was either unable or unwilling to restrain its ally. As a result, the talks that were supposed to reduce tensions became hostage to military action.
The US now finds itself in a contradictory position. It wants to support its key ally Israel, but also prevent a wider war that would threaten American bases and trade routes, and avoid a dangerous direct war with Iran. It also needs to stabilise Lebanon because another war here could destroy what remains of state governance and trigger regional escalation. Yet these objectives are futile if Israel continues to avoid the diplomatic process.
Has Israel once again undermined an attempt at negotiations between Iran and the US? Formally, it can argue that its actions are driven solely by security considerations. Formally, Tehran can say that it is suspending exchanges with Washington because of violations and mistrust. Formally, the US can insist that negotiations remain possible. But the political sequence of events is clear enough - classic stalemate.
Whether Israel intentionally set out to sabotage the talks or not, that is exactly what happened. For Israel’s right-wing cabinet, any US-Iranian agreement that does not eliminate Hezbollah and dismantle Iran’s regional network is unacceptable. Israel’s escalation in Lebanon pushes Iran out of the process, strengthens the hawks in Tehran, and gives Israel an argument that they cannot negotiate with Iran.
At the same time, Israeli policy itself has become hostage to domestic dynamics. Netanyahu, under pressure from right-wing allies and amid distrust from a significant part of society, feels the constant need to demonstrate strength. Any halt to the operation in Lebanon without a visible result would be seen as weakness, and any pressure from the US could be used as evidence that only a hard-line cabinet can protect the country from external diktat.
In the long term, Israel’s decision to continue military action and jettison diplomacy comes at a strategic cost. It can win battles against Hezbollah, destroy its command centres and infrastructure, and push it away from the border. But if the end result is another occupation, it will not solve any of Israel’s problems in the long term. On the contrary, it could again turn Hezbollah into a symbol of resistance, weaken the Lebanese critics of the movement, and return the region into a cycle it has already experienced.
Another question arising from Israel’s actions in Lebanon is whether diplomacy can survive in a region where every military operation immediately becomes part of a larger bargain. The situation in Lebanon has already pushed Iran out of the negotiating process with the US. It may now determine whether Washington retains any room for mediation, whether Trump can impose even a temporary deal on the parties, whether Lebanon can avoid another collapse, and whether Israel will turn yet another security operation into a new cycle of occupation, resistance, and international isolation.
Israel’s partners will continue to lose patience and see ever more reasons to restrain Israel. The main conclusion is that Israel may achieve a tactical advantage in Lebanon whilst losing any strategic advantage. In the meantime, the Middle East conflict remains at an ongoing stalemate until the geopolitical chessboard is upended with unpredictable results. Sources
Edited from a report by Murad Sadygzade, President of the Middle East Studies Center,
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