Poster De Conférence Année : 2025

Enhancing Keystone Security Against Cache Timing Attacks: A Modular Approach

Résumé

Confidential computing includes various methods to enhance data security, notably by processing sensitive information within Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). However, TEEs remain vulnerable to Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs), such as cache timing attacks, which exploit timing variations to extract confidential data. Existing TEE designs do not provide sufficient protection against these threats, highlighting the need for stronger security measures. This study focuses on integrating countermeasures specifically targeting timing and cache vulnerabilities within a TEE. The implementation will leverage the RISC-V architecture to explore its potential in mitigating SCA within TEE.

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Dates et versions

hal-05056900 , version 1 (05-05-2025)

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  • HAL Id : hal-05056900 , version 1

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Oussama Elmnaouri, Pascal Cotret, Vianney Lapotre, Loïc Lagadec. Enhancing Keystone Security Against Cache Timing Attacks: A Modular Approach. Colloque 2025 du GDR SoC2, Jun 2025, Lorient, France. . ⟨hal-05056900⟩
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