dodis.ch/77050

Conversation between Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 5 July 1973 in Helsinki1

CSCE: Canadian-Soviet Discussions

Bilateral consultation between SSEA and FM Gromyko July 5 was held at Canadian request under Protocol on Consultations.2

2. Asked by Gromyko how he assessed CSCE, SSEA said he was hopeful of good results, given business-like way delegations were going about work, but quick results should not be expected. Indeed on matters touching vital interests and policies of states, it would be better if negotiations took longer time; this would give greater possibility of satisfactory results.

3. Gromyko replied that if quick results were wanted, they could be obtained quickly. Proposals now being put forward, including Soviet draft and various explanatory documents, would provide basis for quick resolution of problems and preparation of final papers.

4. SSEA referred to Canadian submission to be made later in day, and advance copy passed to Gromyko as example of sort of subjects we would wish to see discussed at Stage II.

5. Gromyko then turned to main point on which he rang changes for most of rest of meeting. It seemed to him many countries did not want to talk about major issues of peace and disarmament but rather about contacts. There had been more contacts than ever before just prior to World War II but this did not prevent war. USSR thought present emphasis on contacts was way of avoiding really important issues. They did not underestimate significance of contacts – they had their place – but CSCE should put emphasis on important issues of preventing war and reducing tension: every square kilometer of Europe had its tanks, guns or bombs, but in practice nobody was doing anything to reduce them by one machine gun. In these circumstances, all that people were doing was worrying about somebody that could not marry someone else. If war came, all would be dead.

6. SSEA recalled that Canada had always maintained position that CSCE and MBFR should proceed together. Purpose of CSCE was to reduce tension; to do this, it was not enough to declare that one would not go to war: we had to try to eliminate problems that caused peoples to go to war. One thing that caused tension was inability of families to travel. There was interrelation between impediments to contacts and high level of tension. Gromyko replied wars were not caused by problems of marriages, visas, travel or tourism; we were living on powder keg, which certain groups did not want to see removed. Such “politicians” (not, he specified, including Canadians) preferred to talk about visits to grandparents and not about issues of paramount importance.

7. SSEA agreed that questions of human contacts did not have immediate effect on war and peace questions, but effect on durable peace should not be underestimated. If people were not permitted to be in touch with others, they would wonder what other side was plotting. What were Russians afraid of? No-war declarations, resolutions on arms reductions, etc., were all very well, but situations they were trying to correct were results of mistrust – our major problem was to make people less suspicious of one another.

8. Gromyko repeated previous argument, then referred to visa questions etc., as “cheap propaganda pretext to cover lack of desire to get down to serious business,” but he did not impute these motives to Canadians. CSCE was appropriate forum for doing something positive. USSR would not refuse to deal with other issues, but those of paramount importance should be tackled now. Hitler did not invade Poland because a visa was not issued, nor were visas mentioned in Goebbels’ speeches.

9. SSEA pointed out that German people in 1930s were prepared for war by creation of hatred and sense of insecurity. Our idea was to reduce such suspicions and one way of doing so was through freer movement.

10. Gromyko reiterated that cause of war was insecurity of boundaries, and sense of proportion with contacts should be maintained. SSEA replied that he hoped more would come out of CSCE than declarations on inviolable borders, and renunciation of war and aggression.3