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Circular from the Directorate-General for Political Affairs1

CSCE – Assessment of the Results

The original intention of the USSR was that a declaration on the principles governing relations between European states should be the essential, if not exclusive, outcome of the CSCE.

The purpose of this declaration should have been, on the one hand, to recognise territorial annexations and definitively establish the borders resulting from the last conflict; secondly, to recognise the political status quo and, in particular, the existence of special relations within the socialist community and the legitimacy of certain forms of intervention (Brezhnev Doctrine); and, finally, to establish, on the basis of the recognition of the existence of a European regional law, partly different from general law, the foundations of a security system in Europe in which the USSR could have acquired a predominant role.

The Western powers, and in some respects the neutral countries and Romania, strongly opposed this idea, the potential consequences of which were clear from the outset. These negotiations were extremely difficult, due to the profound differences in values and objectives, which explains why the second phase took so long. Thanks to their cohesion, particularly among the Nine, the Western countries were able to achieve results that we have no hesitation in describing as consistent with our ideas and requirements.

a) On the one hand, the declaration of principles is, formally speaking, on a par with all the other parts of the Final Act: our aim was not to conclude the Conference with mere statements of principles, but also to give it more concrete content in the form of specific commitments in the various areas of international cooperation, particularly those most conducive to the protection of human rights and the freer movement of persons, ideas and information.2

b) Secondly, the declaration does not constitute a recognition or crystallisation of the existing territorial situation. It highlights the inviolability of borders as a prohibition on the use of force to change existing borders; but peaceful changes remain lawful, which is particularly important for the prospects of the European unification process (as well as, of course, for German reunification).

Furthermore, the non-recognition of territorial occupations or acquisitions achieved by force is reaffirmed. Emphasis is placed on the prohibition of the use of force, not only in the declaration of principles, but also in a series of additional provisions, stipulated on the basis of a Romanian proposal, which seek to limit the possibilities of unlawful interventions.

c) The declaration of principles includes a series of provisions that can be invoked to challenge the “Brezhnev Doctrine” and prevent the political status quo from becoming entrenched: the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and self-determination are defined broadly and in a manner consistent with the concepts of freedom and pluralism in the democratic world; it is emphasised that the principles must be applied with equal rigour to all countries, regardless of their political, economic and social systems.

d) The principles are consistent with those already existing in general international law; they are consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and must be applied in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter itself. They do not therefore constitute a kind of special right for Europe.

e) In addition, after lengthy and difficult negotiations, Western countries obtained a definition of the principle of human rights and fundamental freedoms that exceeded expectations. This is the most developed principle in the entire declaration and contains, among other things, the important statement that respect for human rights is essential for peace, justice, friendly relations and cooperation, as well as the recognition, also as a value, of the commitment to implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a commitment that the Eastern countries had hitherto sought to downplay. The definition of self-determination is also entirely satisfactory: among other things, recognition has been obtained from the East that this principle is not only valid in an anti-colonialist context but also applicable to Europe. An argument of Swiss origin, approved by many Westerners, emphasises the need for progress in implementing the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and provides for future negotiations in this regard.

The general opinion of the Declaration of Principles, from the point of view of the free world, cannot fail to be positive, despite the inevitable flaws that are the result of seeking compromise solutions. While on the one hand it does not innovate, as was our intention, with respect to universally recognised international law, on the other hand it sufficiently reflects the dynamic conception of the West; it emphasises the dignity of the human person and recalls the role that the individual can play in international cooperation; it reflects, on the same level as the need for security, the needs for justice, cooperation and détente, understood not as a precondition but as the result of the implementation of all the CSCE’s achievements.

The close relationship between the political and military aspects of security was a constant feature of Western positions at the Conference.

The importance and sensitivity of the issue, not least because of its implications for the present and future security of individual participating States, made it impossible for a long time to make any progress in the negotiations, which were only resolved in the final weeks of the Conference.

The Soviet Union’s stubborn resistance to making specific commitments in the various areas covered by the so-called CBMs has significantly reduced the number and level of commitments. These consist of the exchange of observers at military exercises and voluntary notification of major exercises, meaning those that meet certain pre-established requirements. However, the voluntary nature of these commitments is offset by the link established between notification and the responsibility of states to strengthen trust and improve relations in Europe.

The measures adopted are therefore far from providing a basis for reducing tensions in Europe, due to the existence of large military forces, and cannot in any way create a sense of security.

Nevertheless, the difficult negotiations that took place in Geneva represent recognition of the failure of multilateral dialogue if it does not also include measures in the field of military security.

The results achieved in the economic field can be considered positive overall for Western countries, particularly for EU countries.

This assessment, shared by the Community partners and the Commission representative,3 is based above all on the text obtained on economic and trade cooperation which, in our view, must be developed on the basis of reciprocity of advantages and obligations for the parties concerned. On the other hand, it has been possible to prevent the Eastern countries from obtaining a definition of most-favoured-nation treatment that would imply the affirmation of the principle that the application of such treatment would be a condition for the development of trade and that automatic benefits could therefore be attributed to the granting of such treatment. Consequently, the Eastern European countries will not be able to invoke the granting of most-favoured-nation status by market economy countries in all circumstances. The provisions concerning measures to improve economic information and business contacts, as well as those defining, as far as possible, the nature and forms of industrial, scientific and technical cooperation and cooperation in the environmental field, may be considered equally satisfactory.

These texts, together with those dealing with issues relating to transport, migrant workers and tourism, are to be considered a positive contribution to the development of cooperation in Europe.

The area of CSCE work covered by the Third Committee was considered one of the most difficult; among other things, the West found itself in the position of “demandeur”.

Negotiations remained at a standstill for a long time, which meant that no significant texts could be recorded.

The situation was broken in the second half of May following the presentation by the Western countries of a document for comprehensive negotiation in the two most sensitive subcommissions, namely those dealing with human contacts and information.

The Soviet opening came after the meeting in Vienna between Gromyko4 and Kissinger5 on 19 May, when the US Secretary of State reiterated the fundamental importance that the United States attached to this area of the Conference. The approved texts refer to contacts between people, information, culture and education and are intended to promote improvements in the administrative practices of the participating States with regard to certain significant aspects, including the protection of certain fundamental human rights. These commitments should create greater opportunities for people to move across borders for the purposes of family reunification, marriage between foreigners or other personal or professional reasons.

In the field of information, decisions have also been taken to improve the working conditions of foreign journalists, while in the field of culture and education, greater cooperation between States is envisaged, to be achieved both through better use of existing organisations and institutions and through other possible forms of cooperation.

Westerners view the results achieved in terms of the expression of intentions positively and consider them a sign of the willingness and openness of the participating countries.

However, it will only be possible to make a concrete assessment of the Third Commission’s texts during their implementation, the scope of which will depend on how they are applied. The governments of the participating countries will have to demonstrate their sense of responsibility and good faith in this regard.

The chapter on “questions relating to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean” originates from an Italian proposal of 16 July 1974 and a proposal by the delegations of Malta and Yugoslavia of 24 June 1974.

While it was the intention of Western countries, and Italy in particular, to recognise the existence of a correlation between security and economic cooperation in Europe and the Mediterranean area, in strict compliance with the Helsinki mandate, the position of Malta and some non-aligned countries was instead to extend, as far as possible, the specific competence of the Conference to the Mediterranean countries and, in this sense, to extend to them the documents relating to the CSCE follow-up.

The final document on the Mediterranean, while largely adhering to the main Western view of the problem, departs from it in the last two paragraphs of the operative part of the document. This is a result of Malta’s well-known last-minute hardening of its position and its threat to link the acceptance of its demands to the setting of a date for the start of the Third Phase of the Conference.

Despite the formation of a common front by all participating countries against Malta’s request, the last two paragraphs, although scaled down, nevertheless reflect, albeit only in part, an assessment of the problem that had been tried to avoid at all costs. The maintenance and expansion of contacts and dialogue with non-participating Mediterranean states, the intention to contribute to the reduction of armed forces in the region, to consolidate security, etc., are certainly issues that will have to be considered in 1977 by the representatives of the Foreign Ministers, given that they are included in the penultimate paragraph of the chapter on the Mediterranean.

Finally, it should be noted that the first paragraph includes a reference to the Declaration on Friendly Relations proposed by Malta, which was strongly opposed by the Soviets and supported from the outset of the negotiations by our delegation together with other Western countries, in particular the United Kingdom and France.

With regard to the follow-up to the Conference, the Nine countries of the Community presented a common position from the outset, which was set out in the document deposited by the Netherlands in Geneva on 26 April 1974.6

The guidelines of that document reflected the view of the Nine that the assessment of the impact of the Conference’s decisions on the process of improving security and developing cooperation in Europe could be based not so much on considerations of those decisions as on their actual implementation. Only after a certain period of time had elapsed would it therefore be possible to assess the results of the Conference, i.e. to verify how and to what extent the participating States had implemented those decisions, and to study the initiatives to be taken for follow-up.

The CSCE was conceived as a phase in the multilateral process, which it seemed logical to continue, while ruling out the creation of new institutional bodies that could interfere with the process of European integration and lead to the emergence of a pan-European collective security system.

For these reasons, the plan proposed by the neutral countries, which provided for the creation of permanent bodies responsible for monitoring the implementation of the CSCE results and organising meetings of experts and senior officials to further develop the multilateral dialogue initiated by the CSCE, was opposed from the outset.

The Eastern countries only took a position as the Conference drew to a close, giving their support, albeit without much conviction, to the establishment of a permanent body responsible for preparing a new Conference.

The document, which brought together the conflicting proposals of the various parties, recognises, on the one hand, that unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts must be made to achieve the objectives pursued by the Conference; on the other hand, that a first meeting between representatives appointed by the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries will only take place in 1977, after a preparatory meeting scheduled for 15 June 1977. At that first meeting, there will be an in-depth exchange of views on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act, the execution of the tasks defined by the Conference, the deepening, in the context of the issues dealt with by it, of mutual relations between the participating countries, the improvement of security and the development of cooperation in Europe, and the development of the process of détente in the future.

In essence, the approved document accepts the view of the Nine that, before deciding on new and more frequent meetings, it is necessary to first assess the extent to which the decisions taken by the Conference have been translated into reality. From this perspective, the continuation of multilateral dialogue after the Conference may have a real chance of success.7