Computers Are Bad is a newsletter on the history of the computer
and communications industry. It will be thrown directly at your doorstep on
semi-regular schedule, to enlighten you as to why computers are that
way.
I have an MS in information security, several certifications, and ready
access to a keyboard. These are all properties which make me ostensibly
qualified to comment on issues of computer technology. I do my best to stay
away from my areas of professional qualification, though. Instead, I talk
about things that are actually interesting. Think mid-century
telecommunications history, legacies of the Cold War, and the rise and fall
of the technology industry's stranger bit players.
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During the heyday of AT&T, it was often said that the telephone system was the
largest machine ever built. The "hello machine" certainly was vast, but whether
or not you consider it to be a single machine raises challenging questions of
definition. The Internet, I think we can all agree, is not a single machine but
a system of interconnected ones. The telephone network, though, felt a lot more
like one device. "One Policy, One System, Universal Service" was once the slogan
of AT&T, a message that the telephone network is more than just a sum of parts.
The third of these principles, "Universal Service," is a key point around which
telecom policy pivots even today. As the telephone system was at its
apex, Universal Service became its undoing.
We know the Internet to be a network of independent devices in part because of
the wide variety of ways that we access it. Computer networks, almost to their
origin, have emphasized independent implementations of standardized interfaces.
Computers, as network nodes, are interchangeable. As a result, much of the
complexity must be pushed to the edge, where end-user systems are most able to
adapt to the unique needs of, well, the end-user. The telephone system was much
different: few types of telephone instrument existed, largely from a single
manufacturer. Complexity was drawn into the center where telephone offices
could house the huge machinery required by mid-century automation. All of it
was, for a very long time, hard-wired: central office switches and customer
telephones were designed and installed to suit each other. This core difference,
between the flexibility of computer networks and the central caretakership of
telephone networks, was a core issue in the series of changes that rocked the
telephone business in the early 1980s.
1984 is the K/T line of telecommunications, the year the sea peoples came. It is
difficult to overstate the extent to which telephone technology, the
communications industry, and the basic concept of what a telephone is changed
between the 1970s and the 1980s. This was not a single, well-planned, carefully
executed reform the way some accounts of divestiture can make it out to be. In
practice, it was chaotic, messy, and often drawn out.
Email, one of the most pervasive and enduring technologies of computer
networking, was invented in about a dozen places by dozens of people in the
1960s. It's hard to lay out a clear history of the technology because it's just
so obvious—pretty much as soon as more than one person could use a computer,
there was some kind of mail facility. These ranged from mainframe-centric
systems where all of the users of a single computer could write messages to each
other, to PC-centric systems where workstations would mount a network share to
store and retrieve messages. Pretty much any scheme you can come up with for
moving messages was probably in use somewhere from roughly the 1960s to the
1990s, by which time the ARPANET-derived family of email implementations had
taken hold.
This form of email has a clearer heritage, to Ray Tomlinson, who came up with
the core idea that addresses could identify both a user and a host, and that
some kind of open protocol could be used to send messages to another host when
necessary. Over time, and with many revisions, Tomlinson's design became SMTP
and was joined by protocols like IMAP that built out the form of email we use
today. This is a form of email that is in some ways decentralized (any user is
free to choose a host) and in other ways centralized (each host assumed to be
continuously online to store-and-forward messages for its users). Tomlinson's
design was flexible enough that we have not had to totally get rid of it, but
enough has changed about the modern Internet that we have had to take a new
approach.
Email has many vexing limitations, artifacts of its age. For example, email
handling should not be assumed to be "8-bit clean"—email protocols were
originally defined over 7-bit ASCII and ran on many machines that used the
eighth bit as a checksum. These machines were prone to changing the last bit of
each byte, or otherwise mishandling email with 8-bit content. That wasn't a
problem when text was completely limited to that 7-bit plane, but both Unicode
and the desire to send binary files made 7-bit email unworkable. MIME was
developed as a workaround, an encoding technique that solves a few problems in
one go by encoding all non-ASCII content of email in the form of ASCII
characters.
In 1914 the Department of the Interior, through the Bureau of Reclamation,
investigated the possibilities of developing the Columbia River. Thousands of
arid but potentially fertile acres needed only water to become the Imperial
Valley of the Northwest. Locked in the mountain ranges were valuable ores
awaiting electricity to turn them into needed metals.
Two years later the State engineer of Oregon urged the development of the
Bonneville site as a national-defense measure: he saw in the proposed power
project a source of fertilizer in time of peace and nitrates in time of war.
The dam also would completely drown out the Cascade Rapids and extend
slack-water navigation some 40 miles eastward to The Dalles.
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1925 directed the Secretary of War, through the
Corps of Engineers, United States Army, to prepare and submit to the Congress
an estimate of the cost of surveys, examinations, and investigations of all
navigable streams and their tributaries where power development appeared
feasible. (Q1)
It is difficult to succinctly explain why, exactly, the United States Army has
spent much of its history involved in the construction of dams. It is partly an
accident of history, partly the result of interagency federal politics, and
entirely a product of American culture. In his book "Cadillac Desert," Marc
Reisner examines the history of the American West's water control projects
as a religious project, one animated less by practical needs than by a sense
that domination of the West's rivers was destiny.
The Bureau of Reclamation, part of the Department of the Interior, was formed
for that purpose. At the time, though, the Army had already been used to survey
and improve rivers for nearly 100 years. They were not content to give it up. The
result was a rivalry, one with several feints and blows before the two settled
into their modern areas of control. For the Bureau of Reclamation, the Hoover
Dam was their signature project. For the Corps of Engineers, the battle that
would go down in history was the Columbia River Project.
Through decades of consolidation, reorganization, and divestiture, AT&T left
a famously complicated corporate history. One of the greatest enterprises in
American history, arguably the greatest enterprise, AT&T has often
rivaled the federal government in the size of its budget and workforce. One of
the reasons, as we well know today, was monopolization and its close relative
vertical integration. AT&T was the telephone system, or at least aspired to
be, and for decades the meaning of "Universal Service" was that the service was
designed, built, and operated by AT&T—universally.
While AT&T's tangled origins are fertile ground for the historian, they also
obscure many of the early stories of telephone history. Much of the work of the
early independent telephone industry has been lost in the voluminous
achievements of AT&T. Even very basic facts become obscure. For example, who
invented the telephone? Well, we all know the answer: Alexander Graham Bell. We
have mostly forgotten that, at the time, this was a hotly contested question.
One of the most prominent alternate claimants to the title was a man named
Elisha Gray, today immortalized as the "Gray" in electrical distributor
"Graybar," but better known in his time as an inventor of telegraph and
telephone equipment. Gray contracted prototyping of some of his inventions to an
upstart manufacturer and de facto Western Union spinoff, founded by Enos M.
Barton (the "bar" in Graybar) and George Shawk. Impressed by Barton's operation,
and at odds with Shawk on its future direction, Gray put together the money to
buy out Shawk and became half-owner of the company that would reincorporate, in
1872, as Western Electric (WE).
It is ironic, of course, that a man who might fairly be called one of the top
enemies of Bell helped to found the company that would become one of the most
important parts of the Bell System. It's not a coincidence: Gray's involvement
in WE included plans to manufacture his own telephone design, for
which he had filed a provisional patent. Like many of the late 20th century's
telephone inventors, Gray's greatest challenge in commercializing his invention
was not technical but legal. His provisional patent on a telephone transmitter,
substantially similar to the one invented by Bell and possibly older, led
Western Union to take take part ownership in WE to advance their
own plan to compete with AT&T as a telephone company. That set off a protracted
legal battle, whose end result included the termination of Gray's patent claim
and Western Union's abandonment of telephony.
It has been an unfortunate turn in the software industry, one of many as of
late, that gambling is once again one of its primary engines. With the rise of
almost nationwide online sports betting, not to mention prediction markets,
making odds on real-world events and extracting the money of suckers is no
longer limited to island nations. It is a great American pursuit, or at
least, that's what modern television sports coverage leads you to believe.
There has always been an uncomfortable relationship between software and the
manipulation of marks. Techniques developed by casinos became a fundamental part
of consumer software, while the software industry wholeheartedly embraced
"gaming" as a market (the older meaning of the term here, meaning gambling).
We can readily point to a couple of reasons: first, gambling is profitable, and
technology is first and foremost a means of accumulation. Second, gambling is
mathematical, or at least arithmetical, in nature. Most forms of gambling
involve some sort of complex calculation with real-world stakes.
Gambling predates history, or it might be better to say that gambling has been
around for as long as recorded history has been able to observe it. Most early
gambling seems to have been based on card or dice games, but humans have been
betting on animal fights for more than a thousand years. As sensibilities and
resources changed, animal fighting has mostly given way to animal competition.
The most famous of these wagering opportunities is horse racing, a form of
gambling with such a long and pervasive history that it has often achieved a
unique regulatory status as one of the only legal sports betting venues in the
US. Well, at least, before Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.
The earliest recorded horse races were held in England in 1539, and bets were
placed. By 1666, horse racing had reached such prominence that King Charles
II—himself a jockey—commissioned and then won the "Newmarket Town Plate." That
event's eccentric history gave way to the King's Plate, a broader 17th-century
racing series whose royal remit made up the first formal rules for the sport.
Queen Anne founded the racetrack at Ascot in 1711; while it took decades for
permanent facilities to be built at the track, only stands for the royal family
came before a betting office. As British empire expanded around the world, horse
racing spread with it. Likewise, horse racing spread throughout Europe. By the
19th century, horse racing could be found almost anywhere.