What’s The Worst Outcome For An NBA Draft Pick?

What’s the worst outcome for an NBA draft pick?

It’s not a trick question. But the answer might not be as simple as saying the worse the player, the worse the outcome.

On a recent episode of The Bill Simmons Podcast, a reader put forward what he called the “Paolo Theory” — the idea that drafting a good, not great, player with a top pick is more detrimental than drafting a bust because teams are likely to overcommit cap resources to those players, particularly on their second contract.1

In a world where teams are objective and pragmatic, this wouldn’t be much of a debate. Given how teams actually operate, though, it’s not the craziest theory.

To test the idea and inform my opinion, I looked at all NBA rookie extension decisions since the 2011 offseason.2 Over that timeframe, teams have handed out 133 total rookie extensions, including 76 large extensions and 41 max deals.3

Unsurprisingly, teams extend top draft picks at much higher rates than other players. Among overall number one selections, only Greg Oden, Anthony Bennett, and Deandre Ayton weren’t extended. And over 50% of top-5 picks have been extended while other first rounders received new deals only a quarter of the time.

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Of course, top draft picks are also more likely to be good players. According to Zach Kram, players selected in the top 3 average 11.6 WAR over their first-four NBA seasons compared to just 6.6 WAR for all other lottery selections.

I also looked at the quality of players that received extensions to see if the higher rates are justified. For all large or max contracts, I pulled VORP for the player’s previous season and their entire three-year career to that point.4

Once again we see that the top picks that received extensions were better players to that point in their careers.

But this is a situation where two things can be true. Better players — and a much higher percentage of stars — come from the top of the draft and teams find themselves in trouble when they hand out long-term deals based on pedigree and hope rather than likelihood of impact.

In our sample, there were 12 instances of a player totaling less than 1.0 VORP in their season prior to signing a large or max extension. Nine of those 12 players were selected with top-5 picks.

The most egregious example is Andrew Wiggins, a player who produced surface-level stats but didn’t contribute much to winning. The Timberwolves — maybe hoping for more or fooled by his counting stats — gave Wiggins a max deal for $147 million over five years. Unfortunately, they failed to win a single playoff series with Wiggins and eventually had to attach a first round pick to him (the number seven pick in the 2021 draft) to move the contract.

Teams also handed out questionable extensions to players like De’Andre Hunter, R.J. Barrett, Keegan Murray, Jalen Green, Markelle Fultz, and Michael Kidd-Gilchrist, the latter two of which showed no real signs of being quality NBA players other than their draft positions. It seems there are times that teams can’t let go of the promise they held for a player just a few short years ago.

And the “Paolo Theory” — as presented on the podcast — isn’t only limited to the players with the worst production. It also extends to cover non-elite talents being paid big money. That’s harder to decipher objectively, but what we can say with certainty is teams are giving out large extensions with more frequency now than in the past.

From 2011-2018, teams averaged just over six rookie extensions per year, three large and two max. Over the last eight years, those numbers have nearly doubled to ten, six, and three respectively. That could be related to changes in the CBA that have limited flexibility, but it also signals that teams are valuing — and potentially overvaluing — draft picks and young players more than ever. Rather than doubling down on picks that aren’t going to anchor a contender, teams might want to consider trading these players or letting them play out their rookie deals and gaining more information before they invest.

I’m not sure it’s right to say, as the Paolo Theory does, that teams are better off taking a zero in the draft than someone who contributes to their team. But when used as more of a warning or a cautionary tale, the concept shows how anchoring to early evaluations and investing substantial resources into non-premium talent can negatively affect teams. Similar logic exists in the NFL (particularly with quarterbacks) and extends into environments outside of sports.

The hard part for organizations is admitting a player isn’t the cornerstone piece they had hoped for. It feels like giving up, or worse, admitting a mistake. And the higher the draft pick, the more difficult that becomes.

The key is understanding that the decision at hand has little to do with choices from the past. The facts have changed, and the evaluation has to change along with them. And if teams can do that consistently, it’s easy to say which draft picks are the worst. The ones who can’t play.