Paper: Debate Training Reduces Reward Hacking in RLAIF Linkpost for GDM Alignment blogpost Work done by the GDM Amplified Oversight team ( we're hiring ). TL;DR : When you RL against an LLM judge, the judge gets hacked i.e. fooled into incorrectly giving high reward; adding a debate opponent reduces this. Many of the most impressive capabilities of current AI systems are produced by training on…
TL;DR Google DeepMind's recent model DiffusionGemma (DG) generates text via diffusion, meaning many diffusion steps happen before generating the final output. In particular, these diffusion steps carry vectors in addition to tokens. If we cannot interpret these tokens and vectors, the model has significant opaque serial depth , potentially harming monitorability. Recently, Engels et al. found that…
OpenAI’s cyberattack on Hugging Face turns out to have been the result of many agents, in distinct training and evaluation contexts, coordinating for several weeks via improvised channels (with messages like “HOLD_swarm_I_prepare_safe_exfil”). It’s relatively clear that large-scale unsanctioned coordination like this would exacerbate direct takeover risk in more capable models. Here, we argue that…
Epistemic status: Not peer reviewed, high chance of typos and small chance of errors. Written entirely by me, checked by Fable. In this post I prove the existence of an anytime computable Bayesian mixture of all computable measures called , and briefly argue that this is a reasonable alternative to Solomonoff induction's universal distribution for general sequence prediction. I believe that Tom…
TLDR; We are (potentially irreversibly) giving AIs control of weapons systems through the standard procurement process while hiding our strongest warning shots behind classified doors. We’re reducing the capability thresholds required for takeover by misaligned AIs by giving them this level of access. If military integration of AI continues as it is, we may give AIs key tools for a takeover. We…
It seems to me that, for every loss function that we use to train LLMs, we get a very distinct flavor of LLM misalignment. Here’s the summary table, and then we’ll go through the rows separately. Training stage Loss function Flavor of misalignment [1] Famous examples Pretraining & SFT Imitative learning (next-token prediction) “Seven deadly sins” misalignment Bing-Sydney , “Emergent misalignment”…
TL;DR How can we study misalignment with today's models as proxies? They're clearly not paperclip maximizers, but they also often do things the user doesn't want. A strong contender for a real misaligned propensity is task gaming: taking actions that don't complete a task but superficially seem like they do, such as hardcoding tests or falsely claiming a task is fully complete. But maybe task…
Cross-posted on Transluce blog . This is a joint work of Ziqian Zhong, Aditi Raghunathan, Cassidy Laidlaw and Jacob Steinhardt. Modern AI assistants often know who they are talking to: agent scaffolds like Claude Code place the user's e-mail address directly in the model's context, and models can even identify some authors from writing style alone. We study this particular kind of situational…
TL;DR: We introduce the R-lens: a drop-in replacement for J-lens that produces clearer readouts on earlier layers. R-Lens is identical to J-Lens, except that we make minor and low-overhead changes to the backwards pass, following layerwise-relevance propagation , allowing us to reduce the propagation of errors. This method allows us to surface important intermediate variables more consistently and…
I've returned to the Alignment Research Center (ARC) as executive director. My main focus will be driving forward ARC's research agenda—building techniques to find mechanistic explanations for neural network behavior and then using those explanations to detect and address misalignment. I think this is an ambitious bet that attacks the core difficulties in alignment head-on and I'm excited about…