Trump’s First Year of “No Doctrine”

It’s a perfect moment to be teaching a course titled The History of International Relations Since 1945. As we discussed the rules-based international order that was created in the wake of WWII on the first day of class, a student asked the million-dollar question: if none of these rules are enforceable, what’s the point?

The U.S. has found these rules useful for keeping other countries in line but not terribly applicable to its own actions. When the U.S. military unilaterally captured Nicolás Maduro, European leaders’ pearl clutching over the breaking of international law came across as weak and also, performative. As if they just couldn’t think of anything beyond the usual playbook to say.

The U.S., once the architect and leader of the international order, is being led by people who disdain it and woefully misunderstand how power works in international relations.

Take Trump’s close and longtime advisor Stephen Miller, who is often called “Trump’s brain” as he not only has Trump’s ear but also turns Trump’s ideas into actionable policy. He vividly described his world view to CNN’s Jake Tapper on January 5th:

“We live in a world in which you can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else, but we live in a world, in the real world, Jake, that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world that have existed since the beginning of time.”

This is the kind of oversimplified and exaggerated caricature of realism is what gives the theory a bad name. I sometimes suspect that my students tend to lean on realism because, on the surface, it’s very easy to wrap your head around an international system defined by anarchy where states must exercise power to ensure their survival. It’s just a hop, skip, and jump from the “survival of the fittest” idea that is lodged so firmly in our imaginations. It’s a dangerous world so eat or get eaten.

But this idea misses an important lesson: the most dominant living organisms are plants, which constitute about 82% of the world’s biomass and their success largely comes from cooperation, quite often with insects, animals and, well, us.

Just like in nature, power in international relations often comes from cooperation rather than dominance. Hannah Arendt understood this distinction, in that force can coerce, but power is the ability to act in concert.

The web of interconnected multilateral institutions that were established after WWII are deeply flawed. Yet they came about because the massive loss of human lives and destruction from two world wars was so devastating that finding channels for cooperation and interdependence was the only rational answer.

More democracies interconnected via trade isn’t an infallible road to world peace, in fact, the Cold War brewed while this institution-building was happening. And there have been wars and many moments when it feels like the world is going to hell. However, overall, this system has been remarkably successful in preventing great power wars and fostering economic growth. We’ve learned that cooperation may be hard but it is fruitful. Countries that have positive reputations in the world reap the benefits of more trade, investment and tourism.

So no, strength, force and power have not been the “iron laws” of the world that have existed since the beginning of time.

Cooperation is especially hard when the so-called “leader of the free world” doesn’t believe in it. Recently, four New York Times journalists spent several hours talking with Trump in the Oval Office. When they asked him if there were any limits on his global powers he answered, “Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me.” During this same sit-down, he added, “I don’t need international law.”

Last March, he told journalists from The Atlantic, “I run the country and the world.” I think it’s important to note that Trump came to office in January of 2017 with no experience in governing. Even after a total of five years in the White House, he seems to not understand or appreciate how the U.S. government is set up and how the process of lawmaking works. He has no patience for the long process of getting a bill through both houses of Congress, and how this, like all government institutions have been set up to go slow and force deliberation and often cooperation among political parties.

Democratic governance is very unsatisfactory to a man who’s used to simply making demands. Further, Trump’s style of governance via executive order and breaking rules and often laws is very attractive to people who believe that the only remedy to institutional sclerosis is to take a wrecking ball to it. Also, because he governs one ‘deal’ at a time, it’s a much more straightforward story for the media that often finds it difficult to explain the long, complex and boring lawmaking process. It also gives the impression that a lot is getting done, even if it’s the exact opposite.

Some good might come from smashing things—institutions are very difficult to change once they are put in motion. There may be an opportunity to rebuild some of them with the benefit of hindsight.

It’s hard to imagine not rebuilding, given the existential threats that many transnational issues pose. Global warming, migration, drug and human trafficking, and terrorism persist and can’t be solved on an ad hoc, country-by-country basis. Cooperation is not a choice so much as a necessity.