By Jeremy Gaines and Christian Hiller von Gaertringen
Two significant events took place in the Sahel last week. And in each instance, Russia was at the center of attention—in the one case in a positive light, in the other in a negative one.
On July 4, roughly 5,000 fighters in a coordinated multi-front assault launched by the Tuareg-led FLA (Azawad Liberation Front, seeking an independent secular Azawad) and JNIM (the al-Qaeda-linked jihadist coalition, which wants sharia rule over Mali) attacked Anefis in Mali, and simultaneously hit Gao, Aguelhoc, and Sévaré.
Anefis may only be a town of just some 5,000 inhabitants. But it matters because it straddles the logistics corridor between Gao and Kidal, about 150 km from separatist-held Kidal — and is thus effectively the gateway to the north.
It seems that the Malian Army (FAMa) and their Russian allies were caught sleeping, as the FLA and JNIM have historically been rivals with incompatible goals so their cooperation against the junta of Malian president Assimi Goïta is itself a significant development.
Since April 25, 2026, Mali has faced its largest offensive since the 2012 rebellion as the two rivals concluded a tactical alliance. In that April wave they retook Kidal — the historic center of Tuareg resistance that the Russian Wagner Group/Africa Corps had captured back in 2023; the Africa Corps reportedly withdrew under fire, apparently with Algerian mediation, leaving equipment and at least one downed helicopter behind.
With the support of the Africa Corps Malian troops held the garrison in Anesif itself but came under siege. A relief convoy was sent from Gao on July 5, but was ambushed near Tabrichat, 60 km West of Anesif on the RN18 linking Gao with Kidal. An official cited by Reuters said that the rebels downed a Russian Mi-24 helicopter, a large helicopter gunship designed by the Soviet Red Army in the 1970s for powerful attacks.
With no European or American troops remaining in the Sahel, and given that journalists and other observers are forced to report from cities that are often far away (Bamako is 1,200 km from Kidal), it is difficult to obtain reliable information about events in the region. Reuters itself claimed that it “could not independently verify” the information they gave. The information about the helicopter incident goes back to Russian Telegram channel Afrikar. It is unclear whether it was a helicopter belonging to the Africa Corps or to the Malian army.
At the same time, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, embarked on a tour of Africa from July 7 to July 10, 2026. He visited Ethiopia, Niger, Mozambique, and Burundi. Niger was Lavrov’s first-ever visit, and Russian commentary described it as closing a diplomatic loop, since he has now visited all three countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES): Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.
In Niger’s capital city Niamey, he pushed what Moscow calls a “3+1” format meant to coordinate security, finance, and media policy between Russia and the three Sahelian juntas, under the broader banner of a “Second Awakening” — the idea that political decolonization in the 1960s was not matched by economic sovereignty, and that Russia is now Africa’s partner in claiming the value of its own resources.
Lavrov’s trip was undoubtedly a diplomatic success, especially against the backdrop of the military setback in Anefis. However, some German media outlets turned this into a headline that completely misses the point:
“After the Bundeswehr’s withdrawal: Russia expands its dominance in the Sahel”
Firstly, the German army, Bundeswehr, has never played any significant role in the Sahel. It rarely ventured outside its camps and primarily provided support to the French fighting units. The Bundeswehr itself describes its Mali engagement in these words:
“From 2013 until the end of 2023, the Bundeswehr participated in the UN stabilization mission MINUSMA and the EU training mission EUTM in Mali. The deployment encompassed reconnaissance, air transport, and aerial refueling, as well as the training of Malian security forces, with the aim of stabilizing the country internally and combating Islamist terrorist groups.”
Secondly, the current situation is not at all about Russian “hegemony” in the Sahel or West Africa. Quite the opposite. Rather, Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to salvage whatever he can of his influence in this region. Russia’s precarious situation is also due to the fact that its logistical capabilities in the region are increasingly constrained.
Added to which, as we discussed in an earlier blog, the United States are slowly starting to become involved in the region again, even if the African Command AFRICOM recently confirmed it was withdrawing troops from Nigeria after “successful operations” against Sahel terrorism there.
So much for the facts—at least insofar as they are known and in as far as they can be verified. What concerns us most, however, are the implications for the entire region. Investors must worry not only about the consequences within the region itself but also about potential spillover effects into neighboring states – read “southwards.” In this context, a distinction must be made between two groups of investors, as our analysis behind the paywall will demonstrate. In the process, we will also see what Lavrov actually hoped to achieve with his trip to Africa—but did not openly state.
What awaits you behind the paywall:
The plans Putin is now pursuing in the Sahel
Which groups matter in the region now
Where the real risks for investors lie
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