When Will China Dump Putin?

For years we were told that Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin had forged an unbreakable “no limits” partnership. A new axis challenging Western dominance. A marriage of convenience that would reshape the world order. But scratch beneath the surface of the official statements and the carefully staged summits, and a very different picture emerges.

As of mid-2026, Russia has become dangerously dependent on China. Beijing, meanwhile, is playing a much longer and colder game. The question is no longer whether the relationship is strong. The real question is: how far is China prepared to go to keep propping up Putin’s regime, and what happens when that support no longer serves Beijing’s interests?

The great asymmetry nobody wants to talk about

Since the 2022 invasion, China has quietly become Russia’s economic lifeline. It buys Russian oil and other commodities at a discount, supplies the dual-use components that keep Russian factories (and war?) running, and provides the financial plumbing that allows Moscow to dodge Western sanctions. Trade between the two countries has exploded. China now accounts for nearly 40 percent of Russia’s total trade.

But the numbers tell only half the story. Russia represents less than 4 percent of China’s trade. Putin needs Xi far more than Xi needs Putin. During Putin’s May 2026 visit to Beijing, the much-hyped Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, Moscow’s desperate attempt to redirect gas flows to the East, once again failed to materialise. Chinese negotiators reportedly demanded prices close to Russia’s own domestic rates. In other words: take it or leave it. It was one of the first signs of stress in this special relationship.

So, it’s not a partnership of equals. China holds almost all the cards and seems to be using Putin as an aggressive pitbull confronting the West, so China can keep quite for now.

Beijing seems preparing for life after Putin

Smart analysts saw this coming. Joseph Webster of the Atlantic Council noted after the latest summit that Beijing is deliberately “institutionalising ties with Moscow in anticipation of a power transition.”

Why? Because Xi Jinping plays the long game. He knows Putin will not live forever. China has no interest in tying its future to one man or one regime. It wants a stable, resource-rich neighbour that remains dependent on Beijing, whether that neighbour is led by Putin or by whoever comes next, in a classic great-power behaviour. Quietly diversify your options while your junior partner remains useful. Even seasoned observers in the West are increasingly blunt about Putin’s narrowing options. Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh recently laid it out without sugar-coating:

“Russia’s economic deterioration will continue and will worsen as the clock ticks. There is currently no path for recovery. Putin has lost his place as a world power. The Damocles sword is there and it is getting heavier and heavier. The question is ultimately whether he is ultimately a realist or will enter the history books as self destructive fool. At this point no commentator knows the answer.”

Hersh closed his analysis with a stark historical reminder: “Putin knows the ghost in the Kremlin closet: Revolution.”

A European diplomatic scholar put the same reality in different words during a private conversation. The minute Putin “loses the war someone in Russia will replace him, like they did with Khrushchev. Not kill him, but treat him like an exile.” Another Russian expert who has held high national security posts in Washington was equally direct: “Putin is in a no-win situation, a business elite that wants a one way out to cut losses, and a security elite that want to go more hardline.”

These comments reflect a growing consensus that Putin’s position is structurally weakening, caught between economic reality and the hardliners who still dominate the security apparatus.

The clearest signal yet that Chinese support has hard boundaries came in July 2026. As Russian media and officials ramped up nuclear saber-rattling, Beijing delivered a message that Ukrainian President Zelenskyy described as “very clearly and very firmly, even in ultimatum form.” There could be “no thought whatsoever” of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. China, effectively told Moscow: do not cross this line. The warning was also quietly passed to Western governments, according to some analysts. It showed that Beijing is willing to use its leverage when Russian behaviour risks dragging the world into a direct superpower confrontation.

Even inside Russia, some voices are growing uncomfortable. Pro-Kremlin commentators have publicly complained that Beijing treats Moscow as a junior partner rather than an equal. They are right to be nervous. When one country floods another with cheap manufactured goods while buying its raw materials at favourable prices, the long-term power shift is obvious.

An abrupt, dramatic break is still unlikely. But the direction of travel is clear: China will support Putin’s Russia only for as long as it serves Chinese interests. The moment it doesn’t, whether because of internal Russian instability, economic costs, or strategic calculations, the support will be adjusted quietly, efficiently, and without sentiment.

The bigger picture in the global reset

We are living through one of the great power shifts in modern history. The old Western-dominated financial and geopolitical order is under pressure. Sanctions, de-dollarisation talk, and the weaponisation of trade have accelerated the move toward a more multipolar world. In that context, Russia has become a useful but ultimately disposable asset for China. Cheap energy, a weakened military power that no longer threatens Chinese interests in Central Asia, and a convenient distraction for the United States, these are valuable. The “no limits” partnership always had limits. The only question now is how visible those limits will become in the years ahead, and whether the West is paying attention while China quietly rewrites the rules of the game.

The reset is already underway. The only surprise would be if Beijing continued subsidising a junior partner long after that partner stopped delivering strategic value, or after the Damocles sword hanging over the Kremlin finally falls. History suggests that is not how rising powers operate.

I wouldn’t be surprised to see China take over large parts of Siberia during a future collapse of the Russian power structures.

(Grok assisted writing, all prompting and editing by Willem Middelkoop)