A summer story broke last week about the arrest by Belgian authorities of a suspected female spy. The first news emerged in a Belgian prosecutor’s statement on Saturday, July 25, which indicated that the woman “is suspected of spying on behalf of a third country and of being a member of a criminal organization.” [i] The spy suspect was not named by the Belgian authorities.
The story hit Canadian news outlets the following Monday, July 27.
The Belgian criminal system operates under the charming principle that suspects are not publicly identified until a trial commences, in order to protect the “presumption of innocence.” [ii]
Such a principle, however honourable, cannot withstand the modern practices of social media usage, investigative journalism, and leaks. The principle carries with it no legal penalties if breached. The suspect was soon identified as a Canadian of Chinese origin by the name of Biwei Zhang. She also went by the names Claire and Catina.
Her social media profile, where she identifies herself as “aggressively Asian,” provided details of her c.v. She was born in 1993, and had status as a Canadian permanent resident. She may have gained Canadian citizenship.
Her educational background includes a B.A. in Economics from York University in 2019, and a subsequent M.A. at the University of Ottawa in computer science and systems engineering. [iii] As part of her graduate studies, she conducted research on autonomous vehicles. [iv]
Her work experience includes a temporary contract with the National Research Council in 2018; and a full-time job with Statistics Canada which she apparently held in 2020-2021 (though her LinkedIn profile suggests a longer period). During this time, she applied for a position as a junior analyst at CBSA, but did so fraudulently by submitting applications under two different names. Her application was not successful and she was required by the Public Service Commission to undergo ethics training and by supervised by a manager. [v] She worked as an intern briefly at the WTO in 2023. Her online resume also states that she worked as a policy analyst at the European Space Agency, at the Standards Council of Canada, and at the Canadian Space Agency. [vi] That’s a lot of different job pursuits over a span of a few years.
Zhang arrived in Mons, Belgium, in July 2025 to take up an internship at NATO’s SHAPE (“Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe”). According to a Reuters source she was working in SHAPE’s IT department. Her internship may have been coming to an end at the time of her arrest. [vii]
Zhang would have come to Mons with a Canadian security clearance. Such clearances are an advisory process administered by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) with support from an RCMP criminal records check. Canadian security screening is meant to assess four categories: reliability, honesty, trustworthiness, and loyalty to Canada. [viii] The degree of depth of investigation depends on the level of security clearance sought (it can be anything from basic “reliability” to “top secret”). [ix] What level Zhang required for her NATO internship is unknown. The CSIS security clearance advice would have been provided to Global Affairs Canada, who would have made the final determination. The combination of CSIS, RCMP and GAC were the Canadian security gatekeepers.
There are also NATO gatekeepers. All NATO interns and temporary personnel are required to obtain certificates from the Departmental Security Officer (DSO) for the NATO division to which they are assigned. [x]
Sometime between her arrival at SHAPE in July 2025 and her arrest in July 2026 she aroused suspicions at NATO about her behaviour. Those suspicions were transmitted first to Belgian military intelligence, as per NATO protocols, and from there to Belgian police. The more precise time frame from initial suspicions, to investigations, to arrest is, at this stage, unknown, as are the triggers.
For now, Zhang remains in pre-trial detention, which her lawyers are challenging. We may not learn much more about her case until it goes to trial.
On the surface, it’s not much of a spy story. A low-level internee working at a NATO headquarters was arrested within a year of commencing her duties.
In fact, it may not be a spy story at all. (Keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, in more ways than one).
Here are some possible scenarios:
1. Zhang was an innocent with an imperfect grasp of her security responsibilities, and an over-developed curiousity about work that wasn’t her business. Security
mindedness does not always come naturally to people.
2. Zhang was a “Walter Mitty.” A person attracted to the allure of espionage and pretending to be a spy
3. Zhang was an apprentice spy in the making. Groomed by a foreign power to seek out job opportunities that might offer access to valuable intelligence.
4. Zhang was a penetration agent. Established in the espionage business (though remarkably restless)
5. Zhang was a false-flag recruitment. Meaning: she was approached by a foreign power asking for her assistance, perhaps in the beginning with a few innocent-seeming requests, but that foreign power was not who it pretended to be and had a longer-term game plan for Ms. Zhang. (OK, if you need a clue, think Russia pretending to be, say, the PRC).
I offer all these various scenarios with diffidence. Who knows at this stage what the truth might be? None of the scenarios strike me as an obvious winner. But then all spy cases have their weirdness.
With stories such as this, there is always a hue-and-cry-about breakdowns in security clearance processes. I think I will reserve judgement until more is known.
All one can say about Ms. Zhang is that she broke the ‘George Smiley rule’: don’t draw attention to yourself.
Maybe I should add another scenario? Ms. Zhang was an incompetent. No Mata Hari (but then Mata Hart was not much of a Mata Hari). Whew, maybe we dodged a bullet.
[i] BBC News, “Belgium says Canadian Intern is suspected of spying at NATO. Here’s what we know,” https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwymk20n0v7o
[ii] CBC News, “CBC identifies Canadian woman accused of spying at NATO military HQ,” July 29, 2026, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canadian-nato-intern-espionage-arrest-biwei-zhang-9.7290088
[iii] CTV News, “What we know about the Canadian intern accused of spying on NATO,” July 30, 2026, https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/what-we-know-about-the-canadian-intern-accused-of-spying-on-nato/
[iv] CTV News, Judy Trinh and Rachel Hanes, “Alleged NATO spy: were red flags missed?” August 3, 2026, https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/retracing-the-steps-of-the-alleged-nato-spy-in-canada/
[v] Marie Woolf, The Globe and Mail, “Arrested NATO intern has history of fraud, was ordered to take ethics course, July 31, 2026, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-arrested-nato-intern-fraud-history-ordered-to-take-ethics-course/
[vi] CTV News, Judy Trinh and Rachel Hanes, “Alleged NATO spy: were red flags missed?” August 3, 2026, https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/retracing-the-steps-of-the-alleged-nato-spy-in-canada/
[vii] Reuters, “Pretrial custody of alleged NATO spy extended, Belgian prosecutor says,” July 28, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/arrest-alleged-nato-spy-extended-belgian-prosecutor-says-2026-07-28/
[viii] Treasury Board Secretariat, “Directive on Security Screening,” https://www.tbs-sct.canada.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32805§ion=procedure&p=A
[ix] Government of Canada, “Levels of Security,” https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/services/industrial-security/security-requirements-contracting/safeguarding-equipment-sites-assets-information/levels-security.html
[x] NATO SHAPE, https://shape2day.com/in-out-processing/shape-id/are-you-a-national-civilian-component/intern
Comments
Nothing yet. Say the first thing.
Sign in to join the conversation.