Ballots, Bullets, and Bullshit

As Ukraine navigates its ongoing conflict with Russia, questions regarding the legitimacy of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s tenure have gained renewed salience. This issue is particularly pressing given the United States’ extensive financial and military commitments to Ukraine and the potential for long-term economic agreements between the two nations. If such agreements are to be binding and enduring, the legal foundation of Zelensky’s authority merits rigorous examination.

Ukraine’s constitutional and statutory framework governing elections and the transfer of power is largely consistent with those of other post-Soviet states. The Constitution of Ukraine, in Articles 108–112, provides that the President serves a five-year term and that elections must be held accordingly. However, a legal ambiguity arises due to the ongoing imposition of martial law, which has been in effect since the Russian invasion commenced in 2022.

Article 83 of the Constitution and the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law explicitly preclude parliamentary elections during periods of martial law. Notably, no such categorical prohibition applies to presidential elections. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s Central Election Commission (CEC) has asserted that legitimate elections cannot be conducted under martial law, a determination that lacks judicial review or constitutional precedent. Given the CEC’s composition—seventeen members nominated by the President and confirmed by a simple majority in Parliament, where Zelensky’s Servant of the People party holds dominance—this assertion warrants scrutiny.

The current electoral framework establishes a self-reinforcing cycle of political control. The President nominates the members of the CEC, and Parliament—controlled by the President’s party—confirms them. In turn, the CEC oversees elections that determine both the composition of Parliament and the presidency itself. This structure, while formally maintaining the CEC's independence, raises concerns about the practical reality of its impartiality.

The ongoing extension of martial law further compounds these concerns. Under Ukraine’s constitutional framework, martial law is renewed every ninety days by a simple parliamentary majority. Given the ruling party’s control of Parliament, this renewal process has become a routine mechanism rather than an exceptional wartime measure. As a consequence, the indefinite postponement of elections has effectively suspended the ordinary mechanisms of democratic accountability. The President’s tenure, the Parliament’s authority, and the CEC’s role in determining electoral feasibility all persist in a legal limbo, sustained by an internally consistent but politically self-perpetuating framework.

While wartime exigencies undoubtedly necessitate Ukraine’s state of emergency, the legal and institutional consequences of prolonged martial law cannot be ignored. The indefinite suspension of elections, the concentration of appointment power, and the absence of judicial review in electoral determinations collectively create a governance structure that, while legally operative, raises significant concerns about democratic legitimacy.

As the United States and other international actors consider long-term agreements with Ukraine, the stability and legitimacy of its political institutions will be central to ensuring the enforceability and credibility of such commitments. Given the present legal ambiguities and structural entrenchments, the question remains: at what point does emergency governance transition from a temporary necessity to a de facto alteration of the democratic order?