Destination set, route unknown: Evaluating the CCI's IndiGo–Air India order

By Natasha Aggarwal and Vishnu Suresh

Welcome to The Bridge! Regulatory orders shape markets, govern disputes, and test the rule of law, yet their quality rarely gets the scrutiny it deserves. The Bridge is TrustBridge’s window into the quasi-judicial work of India’s regulators: how they decide, and how they could decide better.

An aggrieved customer1 of InterGlobe Aviation Limited (“IndiGo”) and Air India Limited (“Air India”) recently challenged an order of the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”).2 In the underlying order dated 11 March 2026 (the “CCI Order”), the CCI decided not to investigate the customer’s allegations that the two airlines imposed “unconscionable and illegal” cancellation charges, on the grounds that:3

1. There was no evidence of agreement or concerted conduct between the airlines under Section 3(3) of the Competition Act, 2002 (the “Act”),

2. Collective dominance is not recognised under Section 4 of the Act, and

3. The dispute is contractual in nature and outside the scope of the regulator’s remit under the Act.

The appeal has brought renewed attention to the CCI Order. In this post, we evaluate whether the CCI Order satisfies the standards laid down in Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (“CCI v. SAIL”),4 in which the Supreme Court held that orders passed by the Commission in its adjudicatory and determinative capacity, such as those under Section 26(2) of the Act, must be speaking orders, with reasons, reflecting due application of mind. CCI v. SAIL establishes a qualitative benchmark that the CCI’s orders must match, and serves as a useful benchmark for evaluating the quality and completeness of the CCI’s orders. We propose a set of customised metrics that help determine whether a CCI order meets the standards prescribed by CCI v. SAIL.

In our evaluation, we find that while the outcome of the CCI Order is clear, its reasoning is not.

CCI v. SAIL establishes the legal standard for Section 26(2) orders, but provides little guidance on how compliance with that standard should be assessed. We therefore use a structured set of indicators to evaluate whether the CCI Order satisfies the requirements identified by the Supreme Court.

TrustBridge has developed a set of Good Order Writing (“GOW”) indicators to measure the completeness and quality of regulators’ adjudicatory orders.5 We customised these GOW indicators for the assessment of the CCI’s orders under Section 26(2) of the Act.6 The resulting framework comprises 89 indicators, including 41 competition-specific indicators (the “CCI-GOW indicators”).7

Using the CCI-GOW indicators, we assessed the standards set in CCI v. SAIL. For example, application of mind may be demonstrated by satisfaction of the indicator on whether order precisely demonstrates the applicability of the law to the facts. A detailed mapping of the requirements recognised in CCI v. SAIL to the relevant CCI-GOW indicators is provided in the Annexure.

Two researchers assessed the CCI Order against the CCI-GOW indicators: one conducted the initial assessment, and a second subsequently reviewed and verified the findings. The CCI Order scored 40% on the CCI-GOW indicators.

The CCI Order satisfies several CCI-GOW indicators, including indicators that capture some of the requirements identified in CCI v. SAIL. The CCI Order identifies the statutory and factual basis of the proceedings, presents the material facts clearly, evaluates the informant’s evidence, records the arguments advanced and clearly states its conclusions. It also avoids mere reproduction of statutory provisions and does not rely on extensive quotations from precedents or the informant’s submissions.

Moreover, the CCI Order attempts to anchor its decision within the statutory framework of the Act, and precedent. This is demonstrable from the following:

• In relation to the allegations under Section 3(3) of the Act, the Commission identifies the applicable statutory thresholds, examines the material placed before it and concludes that the informant has not produced evidence from which a concerted conduct between the airlines may be inferred.

• Similarly, while dealing with the allegations under Section 4, the Commission relies on its previous decision8 to reiterate its established position that the concept of collective dominance does not form part of the present statutory scheme of the Act. The CCI Order briefly examines the impugned cancellation and refund terms before concluding that the allegation is not a competition issue under Section 4. To that extent, the order situates its conclusions within both the statutory framework and the Commission’s existing jurisprudence.

Together, this indicates that the Commission engaged with the material placed before it meaningfully, identified the legal basis of its conclusions and expressed those conclusions in its own reasoning rather than through mechanical reproduction.

The CCI Order contains two weaknesses:

First, the CCI Order does not provide (i) a concise statement of the main question, (ii) a well-reasoned analysis or an analysis that demonstrates applicability of the law to the facts, or (iii) the issues under consideration. As a result, its analysis is not organised in a step-by-step manner: it identifies the informant’s allegations and the relevant statutory provisions, but then jumps to the Commission’s conclusions. Consequently, we find that the CCI Order fails to meet some of the indicators associated with requirements outlined in CCI v. SAIL.

Second, the order satisfies only 6 of the 36 applicable competition-specific indicators.9 Most notably, it does not satisfy any of the six indicators related to Section 19(3) of the Act or any of the thirteen indicators related to Section 19(4) of the Act. These sub-sections specify factors that the CCI must consider in arriving at its decision. These deficiencies are also relevant to the conditions set in CCI v. SAIL, particularly the requirements that the order identify and apply the relevant statutory grounds and provide reasons connecting the material considered to the conclusions reached.

These two weaknesses are demonstrable from the following:

• While assessing Section 3(3) allegation, the Commission found that the informant had not produced material showing an agreement or concerted conduct between the airlines. In those circumstances, it may not have been necessary to consider the Section 19(3) factors. However, the order does not explain this. Instead, the reader is left to infer why the Commission’s analysis ended at that stage.

• In ascertaining whether Section 4 of the Act has been violated, the CCI identifies the form of abusive conduct alleged and considers the terms of cancellation and refund. However, it does not undertake the preceding steps of analysing whether IndiGo holds a dominant position in the relevant market or even determine what the relevant market is. The CCI Order should have organised its analysis around the following three questions: the relevant market, dominance in that market, and abuse of such dominance.10 If the Commission considered it unnecessary to proceed through each step, it could have identified the stage at which the informant’s allegation failed and explained why the remaining stages did not require consideration.

Together, these weaknesses affect the traceability and coherence of reasoning. The CCI order tells the reader what the Commission concluded, i.e., that there was no evidence indicating coordination between the airlines and that the dispute arose from contractual terms and is not a competition issue. What is less visible is how the Commission used the statutory framework to reach those conclusions, or why it considered certain stages of the inquiry unnecessary.

Our evaluation of the CCI Order against the standards in CCI v. SAIL shows that the Commission’s conclusions are identifiable, but the intermediate step of reasoning supporting those conclusions is only partially visible. The issue is not whether the Commission reached the correct outcome, but whether the Commission has been able to sufficiently demonstrate how the applicable law, the arguments and materials placed before it were applied to arrive at this outcome.

The Commission, therefore, may consider adopting standardised templates or an internal order-review framework for Section 26(2) orders. This minor but effective shift in practice could help ensure that the reasoning underlying the Commission’s conclusions is consistently reflected in its written orders.

The present CCI Order makes the Commission’s destination clear. The challenge, and the opportunity, is to make the route to that destination equally visible.

- The authors are researchers at TrustBridge, and would like to thank Bhavin Patel and Renuka Sane for their feedback and suggestions.

CITATION

Natasha Aggarwal and Vishnu Suresh, 2026. “Destination set, route unknown: Evaluating the CCI’s IndiGo–Air India order”, The Bridge, TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation

Thanks for reading The Bridge! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support our work.

Website | LinkedIn | YouTube

Relying on the SC’s judgements, we have distilled the elements indicating conditions set in CCI v. SAIL to the following:

1. Identification specific, relevant statutory ground and explanation of its application to the specific case,11

2. Consideration of relevant materials and facts,12

3. Independent decision, i.e., no reliance on extraneous factors,13

4. Description of non-ambiguous reasons14 which links the materials which are considered and the conclusions which are reached,15 and

5. Absence of mechanical reproduction.16

Our CCI-GOW indicators assess the conditions set by CCI v. SAIL through the indicators as categorised below.

Airen Metals Private Limited v. Hindalco Industries Limited (Case No. 31 of 2024, Competition Commission of India)

Ajith K. v. Aneesh K.S., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1074

Balram Garg v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 472

The Competition Act, 2002 (12 of 2003)

Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 744

ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar Mohanty, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 180

In Re: Kannadiputhur Sundararaman Suresh v. Interglobe Aviation Ltd and Air India Ltd (Case No 42 of 2025, Competition Commission of India)

Indian National Shipowners’ Association (INSA) v. ONGC, (Case No. 01/2018, Competition Commission of India)

Kannadiputhur Sundararaman Suresh v. CCI (Competition Appeal (AT) No. 10 of 2026, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal)

Natasha Aggarwal and Bhavin Patel, “Evaluating regulators’ orders: The good order writing indicators explained”, (2026) The Bridge, TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation

Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. M/s Atwal Rice and General Mills, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 726

Rajeev Suri v. Delhi Development Authority, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 7

Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson v. CCI, (W.P.(C) 464/2014, Delhi High Court)

Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor, 1973 SCC OnLine SC 292