The latest edition of the Qiushi journal has a lot of useful information to cover. The headline theme of the edition is improving disaster prevention, mitigation and relief capabilities. So the lead article is a collection of quotes by Xi Jinping on this theme.
In this edition of the newsletter, I’ll offer a breakdown of five articles. These cover:
Disaster prevention, mitigation and relief
Xi’s four global initiatives
Germany’s domestic politics and economic and foreign policies
What does loyalty to the Party mean, and how should it be tested and built?
Let’s begin with a piece by the Party Committee of the Ministry of Emergency Management, which is worth reading in this context. Here are the key excerpts:
The CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has consistently treated disaster prevention, mitigation and relief as a major and important task, driving historic achievements in the work on disaster prevention, mitigation and relief.
First, there has been a major shift in the approach to disaster prevention, mitigation and relief. All regions and relevant departments have thoroughly implemented the principle of the ‘two commitments and three shifts’ The mindset of emphasizing disaster relief while neglecting prevention has gradually been reversed, and a consensus is rapidly forming around shifting from passive disaster relief to proactive risk prevention, from fragmented responses to comprehensive coordination, and from disaster response to risk governance.
Second, the system for disaster prevention, mitigation and relief has undergone comprehensive restructuring. A National Disaster Prevention, Reduction and Relief Commission was established through institutional integration, while emergency management departments were established at all levels from the national level downward. This has strengthened integrated management of all types of disasters, management throughout the entire process, and the integration and optimization of response forces and resources. From risk identification and the investigation of potential hazards, to monitoring and early warning; and from emergency response and rescue operations, to post-disaster recovery and reconstruction, a work system featuring comprehensive coordination throughout the entire process and effective links between all stages has basically been established.
Third, capabilities for the prevention and control of natural disasters have been comprehensively strengthened. Projects such as the disaster risk survey and key hidden-danger investigation project, the project to reinforce housing and facilities in earthquake-prone areas, and the water conservancy improvement project for flood control and drought relief have been deployed and implemented, and a batch of key disaster hidden dangers have been effectively addressed. In 2023, the central government additionally issued 1 trillion yuan in treasury bonds to support post-disaster recovery and reconstruction and to raise capabilities for disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief, driving a further enhancement of natural disaster prevention and control capabilities.
Fourth, the emergency system for natural disasters has been progressively improved. The National Emergency Command Headquarters and six national regional emergency rescue centers have been built; the national comprehensive fire and rescue force has accelerated its transformation and upgrading; and aviation emergency rescue capabilities have achieved breakthroughs. The Emergency Response Law and the National Overall Emergency Plan for Public Emergencies were revised, the ‘Interim Measures for Natural Disaster Investigation and Assessment’ were formulated and implemented, and emergency preparedness in terms of plans, mechanisms, forces, and materials was strengthened. Publicity and education on disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief have been carried out on a regular basis, and the level of joint social governance has continually improved.
Through the joint efforts of all parties, our country has successfully responded to major disasters such as the earthquakes in Luding in Sichuan, and Jishishan in Gansu, the floods in the Haihe River basin, and super typhoon ‘Yagi.’ The number of deaths and missing persons due to disasters, and the proportion of direct economic losses from disasters relative to gross domestic product, have continued to remain at the lowest historical levels since the founding of the PRC.
以习近平同志为核心的党中央坚持把防灾减灾救灾工作作为大事要事来抓，推动我国防灾减灾救灾工作取得历史性成就。一是防灾减灾救灾理念发生重大转变。各地区各有关部门深入践行“两个坚持、三个转变”，重救灾轻预防的观念逐步扭转，从被动救灾向主动防险、分散应对向综合统筹、灾情处置向风险治理转变的共识加快形成。二是防灾减灾救灾体制实现整体性重构。整合设立国家防灾减灾救灾委员会，从上到下设立应急管理部门，强化全灾种管理、全过程管理和力量资源整合优化，从风险识别、隐患排查到监测预警，从应急响应、抢险救援到灾后恢复重建，基本形成全过程统筹、各环节衔接的工作体系。三是自然灾害防治能力全面加强。部署实施灾害风险调查和重点隐患排查工程、地震易发区房屋设施加固工程、防汛抗旱水利提升工程等，一批重点灾害隐患得到有效治理。2023年中央财政增发1万亿元国债，用于支持灾后恢复重建和提高防灾减灾救灾能力，带动自然灾害防治能力进一步提升。四是自然灾害应急体系逐步健全。建成国家应急指挥总部和6个国家区域应急救援中心，国家综合性消防救援队伍加速转型升级，航空应急救援力量实现突破；修订突发事件应对法、国家突发事件总体应急预案，制定实施《自然灾害调查评估暂行办法》，强化预案、机制、力量、物资等应急准备；常态化开展防灾减灾救灾宣传教育，社会共治水平不断提升。在各方共同努力下，我国成功应对四川泸定、甘肃积石山等地震和海河流域洪涝、超强台风“摩羯”等重大灾害，因灾死亡失踪人数和因灾直接经济损失占国内生产总值比持续保持在新中国成立以来历史最低位.
The second section of the article makes the point that China “must never for a moment lower the guard regarding risk prevention and control.” This is in part because of China’s geography, which makes it prone to certain kinds of natural disasters. But there are other factors too.
Against the backdrop of current global climate change, the extreme nature of weather-related disasters has become more pronounced. As the global climate continues to warm, disasters such as torrential rain, floods, typhoons, and droughts have increased significantly, their destructiveness has intensified, and new changes have emerged in their spatial and temporal distribution. In recent years, rainfall events breaking observed extremes, high temperatures and droughts setting new historical records, and super typhoons have occurred repeatedly. In northern regions, the number of heavy-rainfall processes during the flood season over the past five years has been 50% higher than in the 1990s, while their average comprehensive intensity has been 50% higher than the average for the same period in normal years. In some areas, ‘a year’s worth of rain has fallen in just a few days’. Mountain torrents triggered by heavy rainfall, as well as geological disasters such as landslides and debris flows, are widespread and widely distributed, are more sudden in nature, and many occur outside officially registered hazard points. Affected by adverse meteorological conditions and other factors, the risk of forest and grassland fires is extending from traditionally high-risk fire-prone areas into low-risk areas, and is shifting from being seasonal to occurring throughout the year. The situation for fire prevention and suppression is severe and complex. 在当前全球气候变化背景下，天气灾害的极端性更加突出。随着全球气候持续变暖，暴雨、洪涝、台风、干旱等灾害显著增多，破坏性加剧，且时空分布出现新变化。近些年打破观测极值的降雨、刷新历史纪录的高温干旱、超强台风等屡有出现；北方地区近5年汛期暴雨过程次数较20世纪90年代偏多五成、综合强度均值较常年同期偏高五成，一些地区“几天下了一年的雨”；强降雨引发的山洪和滑坡、泥石流等地质灾害点多面广，突发性更强，不少发生于在册隐患点之外。受不利气象条件等因素影响，森林草原火灾风险由传统高危火险区域向低风险区域延伸、由季节性向全年性转变，防灭火形势严峻复杂.
With natural and man-made factors interwoven in their effects, the disaster amplification effect is also markedly strengthening. On the one hand, the trend of coupling and interlinkage among various types of natural disasters is intensifying, and the complexity and uncertainty of disaster risks continue to rise. On the other hand, population, resources, and economic and social activities are highly concentrated, making the consequences of disasters more severe. At present, our country’s permanent resident urbanization rate has reached 67.9%, with an urban permanent resident population of 954 million, 21 national-level metropolitan areas, 29 cities with regional GDP exceeding one trillion yuan, high-speed rail mileage surpassing 50,000 kilometers, and more than 30,000 highway tunnels. The high degree of complexity of social systems means that the chains of impact following any type of disaster keep lengthening. Major or catastrophic disasters may also spread over a wider area through industrial and supply chains, giving rise to systemic risks affecting the overall situation. 自然与人为因素交织影响，灾害放大效应也在明显增强。一方面，各类自然灾害的耦合联动趋势加剧，灾害风险的复杂性、不确定性持续上升。另一方面，人口、资源、经济社会活动高度密集，灾害后果更加严重。目前，我国常住人口城镇化率达67.9%，城镇常住人口9.54亿人，国家级都市圈21个，地区生产总值超万亿元城市29个，高铁里程突破5万公里，公路隧道3万余处。社会系统高度复杂化，使各类灾害发生后的影响链条不断延长。重特大灾害还可能通过产业链供应链等波及更广范围，造成全局性系统性风险.
The piece then says that China faces “long-term, complex, and severe nature of natural disaster risks”. It also adds:
Insist on disaster prevention. In other words, focus on preparation and addressing current weaknesses. “The disaster-resistance capacity of infrastructure in some urban and rural areas is weak; there is a large number of old buildings without seismic fortification measures, distributed across wide areas; some river embankments have not reached design standards; 80% of existing reservoirs were built in the 1950s–1970s, and the overwhelming majority are earth-and-rock dams, leaving them with insufficient capacity to withstand disasters.” Under this, the piece calls to: Strengthen source-based prevention; strengthen the investigation of hidden hazards; strengthen engineering-based governance.
Establish a firm bottom-line mindset and enhance the capacity to respond to and handle major and catastrophic disasters.
Promote scientific and technological innovation and strengthen technological support for disaster prevention, reduction, and relief.
“To raise the scientific, professional, intelligence levels, and refinement in disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief, it is essential to strengthen scientific and technological innovation and the transformation and application of results. It is necessary to strengthen basic research on disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief with greater intensity and more solid measures, and to solve key problems such as the laws of disaster evolution, the mechanisms by which disasters occur, disaster prevention and control, and rescue and disposal. It is necessary to deeply advance the smart emergency management initiative, strengthen key technological breakthroughs in monitoring and early warning, emergency communications, life detection, and rescue and search, intensify the application of technological means such as artificial intelligence, satellite remote sensing, big data, the Internet of Things, and drones, and promote the deployment of advanced and applicable equipment. It is necessary to strengthen the development of the discipline of emergency management and accelerate the cultivation of a cohort of urgently needed talent in the field of disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief.” 提高防灾减灾救灾科学化、专业化、智能化、精细化水平，必须加强科技创新和成果转化应用。要以更大力度、更实举措加强防灾减灾救灾基础研究，破解灾害演化规律、致灾机理、灾害防控、救援处置等关键问题。深入推进智慧应急行动，加强监测预警、应急通信、生命探测、救援搜救等关键技术攻关，强化人工智能、卫星遥感、大数据、物联网、无人机等技术手段运用，推进先进适用装备配备。加强应急管理学科建设，加快培养一批防灾减灾救灾领域急需人才.
Strengthen the rule of law guarantee to elevate the level of rule-based governance in disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief.
“To raise the level of law-based governance in disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief, it is essential to improve the rule-of-law system in the emergency field. Legislation on a Natural Disaster Prevention and Control Law should be accelerated, based on its positioning as comprehensive legislation, establishing the basic principles, basic systems and safeguards for natural disaster prevention and control, and building a comprehensive, full-process system covering integrated disaster prevention, routine preparedness, monitoring and early warning, emergency rescue and disaster relief, post-disaster governance, and investigation and assessment. Laws and regulations concerning individual types of disasters should be improved, including advancing revisions to the Law on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters, the Flood Control Law, and the Regulations on Defense Against Meteorological Disasters, with provisions that are no longer suited to new circumstances revised and improved. It is necessary to strengthen the formulation and revision of standards, and, in light of different disaster scenarios, increase the supply of standards for infrastructure fortification, monitoring and early warning, disaster prevention and control, emergency communications, emergency equipment, emergency plans, and emergency rescue teams, working hard to raise the proportion of mandatory standards. At the same time, it is necessary to persist in combining the improvement of legislation with strict law enforcement, ensuring that all work in disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief operates in a standardized manner on the track of the rule of law. 提升防灾减灾救灾法治化水平，必须健全应急领域法治体系。要加快自然灾害防治法立法，立足综合性法律定位，确立自然灾害防治的基本方针、基本制度、保障措施，构建涵盖综合防灾、常态备灾、监测预警、抢险救灾、灾后治理、调查评估全过程全方位的自然灾害防治体系。完善单灾种法律法规，推动修订防震减灾法、防洪法、气象灾害防御条例，对不适应新形势的内容修改完善。强化标准制修订，针对不同灾害场景，加大基础设施设防、监测预警、灾害防治、应急通信、应急装备、应急预案、应急救援队伍等标准供给，着力提高强制性标准占比。同时，要坚持把完善立法和严格执法结合起来，确保防灾减灾救灾各项工作在法治轨道规范运行.
Consolidate the grassroots foundations of disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief.
“Strengthen the implementation of responsibilities and establish a working framework in which all parties jointly manage the work and coordinate with one another…We must ensure that the Party’s leadership runs through the entire process of disaster prevention, reduction, and relief; clearly define the primary responsibilities of local Party committees and governments; strictly implement the responsibility system; and improve a system in which powers and responsibilities are aligned and dereliction or failure of duty is subject to accountability.”
Also in this edition is a piece by Chen Zhenlin, Party Secretary and Director-General of the China Meteorological Administration. Chen outlines the challenges related to climate change and extreme weather, which has resulted in a requirement of better monitoring and forecasting capabilities.
“The severe situation of climate change and extreme weather places higher demands on monitoring and forecasting capabilities, yet our country still has evident shortcomings in such areas as the development of its meteorological monitoring, forecasting and early-warning system; the density of meteorological monitoring in different regions and coverage of remote areas; and the ability to detect sudden localized small- and medium-scale severe weather events. For example, the lead time and accuracy of extreme weather warnings still need to be improved; blind spots remain in the dissemination of meteorological warning information for remote mountainous areas, sea areas, and the like; models for predicting the correlated risks of concurrent multiple disasters and secondary disasters are not yet well developed; and meteorological disaster defense system standards in some regions and industries still lag behind the trends of climate change. At the same time, the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation is accelerating, and frontier technologies such as AI and quantum science and technology are continually achieving breakthroughs, urgently requiring accelerated innovation in meteorological science and technology. Global climate governance is mired in multiple predicaments including geopolitical rivalry, policy divergence, and uneven distribution of resources; certain countries continue to comprehensively suppress and contain our country, with ‘small yards, high fences’ and ‘blockading and severing chains’ continually escalating, which has compelled the meteorological field to accelerate the achievement of high-level self-reliance and self-strengthening in science and technology.
At present, our country still has few core technologies and authoritative products that genuinely lead the development of world meteorological science and technology; a gap still exists between some core technologies of numerical weather prediction and the internationally advanced level; and there are shortcomings in organizing and guiding the forces of the sector to participate in tackling core technologies, in accelerating the transformation of scientific and technological achievements, and in enhancing the capacity for scientific and technological supply. These problems are the result of multiple factors interwoven and superimposed over a long period. On the one hand, there are objective constraints of the development stage and foundational conditions. Core meteorological technologies are characterized by long research and development cycles, high levels of system complexity, and intensive investment requirements. China has a vast territory and highly complex terrain and climatic conditions, and its meteorological work as a whole remains in a period of catching up and upgrading. Its long-term accumulation in foundational core fields such as numerical weather prediction remains relatively weak. On the other hand, there are constraints arising from coordination mechanisms. Natural-disaster prevention and defense cuts across multiple government departments, regions and sectors, and the effectiveness of emergency coordination and resource integration still needs to be fully realized.”
气候变化与极端天气的严峻形势对监测预报能力提出更高要求，但我国在气象监测预报预警体系建设、不同区域气象监测密度和偏远地区覆盖率、突发的局地中小尺度灾害性天气捕捉能力等方面仍存在明显不足。比如，极端天气预警的提前量和精准度仍需提升，面向偏远山区、海域等气象预警信息发布还存在盲区，多灾种并发及次生灾害的关联风险预测模型尚不完善，部分地区和行业气象灾害防御体系标准仍滞后于气候变化趋势，等等。同时，新一轮科技革命和产业变革加速演进，人工智能、量子科技等前沿技术不断突破，迫切要求气象科技加速创新。全球气候治理深陷地缘博弈、政策分化、资源分配不均等多重困境，个别国家对我国持续全面打压遏制，“小院高墙”和“封锁断链”不断升级，倒逼气象领域加快实现高水平科技自立自强。目前，我国真正引领世界气象科技发展的核心技术和权威产品仍不多，数值天气预报部分核心技术与国际先进水平尚存在差距，在组织和引导行业力量参与核心技术攻关、加快科技成果转化、增强科技供给能力等方面存在短板。这些问题是多重因素长期交织、叠加作用的结果，既有发展阶段与基础条件的客观约束，气象核心技术具有研发周期长、系统复杂度高、投入强度大等特点，我国疆域广袤、地形气候条件复杂，气象工作整体仍处于追赶提升期，在数值天气预报等基础核心领域的长期积累相对薄弱；也有协同机制的制约，自然灾害防御横跨多部门、多区域、多行业，应急联动、资源整合效能尚需充分释放.
Following this, Chen outlines a five-point agenda:
First, advance innovation in meteorological science and technology.
From understanding the physical essence of climate change to weaving a tight ‘net across sky and earth’ for responding to extreme weather, science and technology help us win greater initiative in the struggle against natural disasters. The more the leading role of scientific and technological innovation is emphasized, the more we must squarely face problems such as insufficient original breakthroughs at the foundational level of our country’s meteorological science and technology, and the loose connection between basic research and operational needs, and take forceful, targeted measures. It is necessary to strengthen basic research and scientific experiments, conducting research around urgently needed breakthroughs such as the mechanisms of extreme meteorological disasters and their disaster-causing mechanisms, including abrupt shifts between drought and flood, the fine structure and evolutionary mechanisms of small- and medium-scale weather systems, and the formation mechanisms and predictability of high-impact weather events. It is necessary to advance the implementation of the Asia–Australia–Africa Monsoon International Big Science Program, and scientific experiments should be conducted on the Tibetan Plateau, typhoon–ocean interactions, torrential rainfall in North China, and the Huai River Basin. It is necessary to strengthen the tackling of key core technologies, urgently overcoming the core technologies of Earth system models and the digital twin Earth, and developing key technologies such as meteorological disaster monitoring and risk forecasting and early warning, early warning of climate change risks, and forecasting of global high-impact weather and climate events. It is necessary to accelerate the layout of new fields and new tracks in meteorological science and technology, promote the deep integration of artificial intelligence with meteorological operations, cultivate and expand emerging operations such as low-altitude meteorology and financial meteorology, and release the value of meteorological data as a factor of production. It is necessary to improve the national meteorological science and technology innovation system, build to high standards a forecasting technology research and development center and a highland of meteorological artificial intelligence innovation, promote the coordinated layout of education, science and technology, talent, and platforms, optimize the allocation of resources across the spectrum of meteorological research projects, and comprehensively strengthen whole-chain deployment and whole-field layout of scientific and technological innovation.
一是提升气象科技创新能力。从理解气候变化的物理本质，到织密应对极端天气的“天罗地网”，科技帮助我们在与自然灾害的抗争中赢得更多主动。越是强调科技创新的引领作用，越要正视我国气象科技底层原创性突破不够、基础研究与业务需求衔接不紧等问题，针对性采取有力举措。要加强基础研究和科学试验，围绕旱涝急转等极端气象灾害机理及致灾机制、中小尺度天气系统精细结构及演变机理、高影响气候事件形成机理和可预报性等亟待突破问题开展研究，推动实施亚洲—澳洲—非洲季风国际大科学计划，开展青藏高原、台风—海洋、华北暴雨、淮河流域等科学试验。强化关键核心技术攻关，抓紧攻克地球系统模式和数字孪生地球核心技术，发展气象灾害监测和风险预报预警、气候变化风险早期预警、全球高影响天气气候事件预报等关键技术。加快布局气象科技新领域新赛道，推动人工智能与气象业务深度融合，培育壮大低空气象、金融气象等新兴业务，释放气象数据要素价值。完善国家气象科技创新体系，高标准建设预报技术研发中心和气象人工智能创新高地，推动教育科技人才平台协同布局，优化气象科研项目谱系资源配置，全面加强科技创新全链条部署、全领域布局.
Second, enhance meteorological monitoring and forecasting capabilities.
Third, enhance capacity for coordinated emergency response to meteorological disasters.
In recent years, our country’s meteorological disaster prevention and mitigation system of ‘Party committee leadership, government direction, departmental coordination, and social participation’ has given full play to its role. The emergency linkage mechanism led by meteorological early warning and the ‘call-and-response’ system for high-level warnings have been established and improved; the progressive meteorological service mechanism conforming to the scientific laws of meteorology has been steadily perfected; and localities have successively issued normative documents making clear that meteorological disaster warnings are one of the preconditions for initiating disaster prevention emergency measures. Practice has proven that a carefully designed and efficiently operating response and linkage mechanism has become a distinctive advantage in our country’s efficient prevention and control of natural disasters. We must uphold and make good use of this valuable experience, practical problems that still exist, such as departmental barriers and ‘information silos’, further strengthen the linkage between meteorological early warning and disaster forecasting and emergency response, and open up the ‘last mile’ from monitoring and forecasting to disaster prevention action. It is necessary to strengthen joint departmental consultation, early warning, and coordinated response, optimize the four-level ‘national–provincial–municipal–county’ meteorological coordination system, promote the construction of joint prevention and coordination mechanisms for disaster prevention and mitigation across provincial borders, and make good and flexible use of the progressive meteorological service mechanism. It is necessary to strengthen grassroots services, accelerate the establishment of meteorological disaster risk warning operations oriented toward cities and counties, promote mandatory-reach technologies such as ‘flash messaging’, and incorporate meteorological disaster prevention and mitigation into grassroots grid management systems in townships and subdistricts. It is necessary to optimize the ‘call-and-response’ procedures for high-level warnings, improve the forecasting and service mechanism linking higher and lower levels during major weather processes, promptly ‘activate’ the national-provincial coordinated working team for short-term and nowcasting services for severe convective weather, and transform institutional and mechanism advantages into effectiveness in disaster prevention and control.
三是提升气象灾害应急响应联动能力。近年来，我国“党委领导、政府主导、部门协同、社会参与”的气象防灾减灾体系充分发挥作用，以气象预警为先导的应急联动机制和高级别预警“叫应”制度建立健全，符合气象科学规律的递进式气象服务机制日臻完善，各地相继出台规范性文件，明确气象灾害预警是防灾应急启动先决条件之一。实践证明，周密设计、高效运转的响应联动机制，已成为我国高效防治自然灾害的独特优势。必须坚持好运用好这个宝贵经验，直面当前仍存在的部门壁垒、“信息孤岛”等现实问题，进一步加强气象预警与灾害预报、应急响应联动，打通从监测预报到防灾行动的“最后一公里”。强化部门联合会商、预警、响应联动，优化“国—省—市—县”四级气象联动体系，推动省际边界防灾减灾联防联动机制建设，用好用活递进式气象服务机制。强化基层服务，加快建立面向市县的气象灾害风险预警业务，推广“闪信”等强制触达技术，将气象防灾减灾纳入乡镇、街道等基层网格化管理体系。优化高级别预警“叫应”流程，完善重大天气过程上下联动的预报服务机制，及时“激活”强对流天气短临预报服务国省协同工作专班，将体制机制优势转化为灾害防治效能.
Fourth, support the building of a climate-adaptive society. Under this, Chen calls to
“incorporate climate security into the core framework of the national security system, persist in moving the gateway forward and putting prevention first, and explicitly incorporate objectives and indicators relating to climate security into national and local social development plans, the rural revitalization strategy, and new-type urbanization development plans. Integrate ‘climate feasibility assessments’ based on future climate scenarios into urban and rural planning and construction, conduct climate-risk stress tests on critical lifeline systems such as transportation, energy, and water conservancy, and promote a shift from ‘designing defenses based on historical experience’ to ‘designing defenses based on future climate scenarios.’ Establish mechanisms for transferring and diversifying climate-security risks, innovate financial instruments such as weather derivatives, catastrophe insurance, and green bonds, and further strengthen measures to reduce meteorological disaster risks. Accelerate efforts to address shortcomings in flood-control, drainage, disaster-resistance, and other infrastructure in northern China, promote the transformation from ‘traditional infrastructure’ to ‘resilient infrastructure’, and enhance the safety and resilience of society as a whole. 为更加有效对冲和分担气候变化风险，要将气候安全纳入国家安全体系核心框架，坚持关口前移、预防为主，在国家和地方的社会发展规划、乡村振兴战略、新型城镇化发展规划中，明确纳入有关气候安全的目标与指标. 将基于未来气候情景的“气候可行性论证”融入城乡规划建设，对交通、能源、水利等生命线系统进行气候风险压力测试，推动“依历史经验设防”向“依未来气候情景设防”转变。建立气候安全风险转移分散机制，创新天气衍生品、巨灾保险、绿色债券等金融工具，进一步强化气象灾害风险减量措施。加快补齐北方地区防洪排涝抗灾基础设施等短板，推动“传统基建”向“韧性基建”转型，增强全社会安全韧性.
Finally, actively participate in and advance global meteorological governance. Under this, Chen argues:
“At the opening ceremony of the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference and High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance, General Secretary Xi Jinping announced that over the next five years China will promote the implementation of the ‘Mazu’ meteorological intelligent early warning solution in 30 countries, watching over the lights of countless homes and safeguarding tranquility across the four seas. Today, an increasing number of countries are gaining a tangible appreciation for the values of reverence for nature, protection of life, and mutual assistance embodied in China’s fine traditional culture. Looking ahead, we must actively participate in the governance of international organizations such as the World Meteorological Organization, and deepen and expand cooperation with relevant UN agencies in fields such as disaster prevention and mitigation, responding to climate change, and humanitarian relief. Relying on distinctive international talent cultivation programs such as the BRI meteorological visiting scholars program, we must popularize China’s concepts and experience in disaster prevention and mitigation and promote the enhancement of Global South countries’ capacity to respond to extreme weather. We must actively build ‘Mazu’ as a Chinese service brand in the meteorological field, and, adapting to local conditions on a “one country, one policy’ basis, promote the precise implementation and application of ‘Mazu’ in more countries. Through more ‘small but beautiful’ projects, we must tailor lightweight, easily implemented, and sustainable global meteorological service products for partner countries, continually bridge the digital and intelligence divide, and further deepen ‘hard connectivity’ of infrastructure, ‘soft connectivity’ of rules and standards, and ‘heart connectivity’ of popular sentiment.”
习近平总书记在2026世界人工智能大会暨人工智能全球治理高级别会议开幕式上宣布，未来5年，中国将推动气象智能预警方案“妈祖”在30个国家落地应用，守望万家灯火，护佑四海安澜。如今，越来越多国家真切感受到中华优秀传统文化中敬畏自然、守护生命、守望相助的价值追求。面向未来，我们要积极参与世界气象组织等国际组织治理，深化拓展与联合国相关机构在防灾减灾、应对气候变化、人道主义救援等领域合作。依托“一带一路”气象访问学者等特色国际人才培养项目，推广中国防灾减灾理念与经验，推动提升全球南方国家应对极端天气能力。积极打造气象领域中国服务品牌“妈祖”，因地制宜、“一国一策”推动“妈祖”在更多国家精准落地应用，通过更多“小而美”项目，为合作国家量身提供轻量化、易落地、可持续的全球气象服务产品，不断弥补数智鸿沟，进一步深化基础设施“硬联通”、规则标准“软联通”和民心民意“心联通”.
Let’s now move away from climate and disasters to foreign policy. There are two pieces that I want to highlight.
The first one is by Fu Xiaoqiang, who heads China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). Fu talks about the four global initiatives, arguing that they “were born of changes in the world and established in response to the predicaments of governance. They provide strategic guidance for promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind, and are landmark achievements of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy that combine innovation of the times with global influence...” 全球发展倡议、全球安全倡议、全球文明倡议、全球治理倡议（以下简称“四大全球倡议”）因世界之变而生、应治理之困而立，为推动构建人类命运共同体提供战略引领，是习近平外交思想兼具时代创新性和全球影响力的标志性成果，也是我们深入学习《习近平外交文选》第一卷、第二卷必须深刻领会和准确把握的重要内容.
“The world today is falling into the overlapping predicament of the ‘Four Major Deficits’—the peace deficit aggravates geopolitical conflicts, the development deficit widens the North-South divide, the security deficit erodes the foundation of mutual trust, and the governance deficit undermines the effectiveness of multilateralism. Looking back at history, since the Age of Discovery in the 15th century, in the narratives of Western historians, Spain, Britain, and the United States successively established their own global hegemony and shaped the dominant international order of different periods. Although these three hegemonic powers maintained order and stability in particular regions during different periods, they ultimately could not escape the historical fate of the strong preying on the weak, the powerful bullying the weak, and the cycle of rise and fall and succession. Getting to the root of it, the essence of the Western hegemonic order is that ‘one country’s security overrides the security of all countries’, ‘one country’s development deprives other countries of their right to development’, ‘one country’s civilization disparages the value of diverse civilizations’, and ‘one country’s governance substitutes for common global governance’. This in fact also reveals the historical origins of the ‘four deficits’.” 当今世界正陷入“四大赤字”的叠加困境——和平赤字加剧地缘冲突，发展赤字拉大南北鸿沟，安全赤字侵蚀互信根基，治理赤字消解多边效能。回望历史，自15世纪地理大发现以后，在西方历史学者的叙事中，西班牙、英国与美国先后确立了自身的全球霸权，塑造了不同时期的国际主导秩序。这三大霸权国家虽然在不同时期维持了特定区域的秩序稳定，却终究无法摆脱弱肉强食、恃强凌弱、兴衰更替的历史宿命。究其根源，西方霸权秩序的本质是“一国安全凌驾于各国安全之上”、“一国发展剥夺他国发展权利”、“一国文明贬抑多元文明价值”、“一国治理替代全球共同治理”。这实际上也揭示了“四大赤字”的历史渊源.
Note: This bit above is a very broad interpretation of the concept of the four deficits. In Fu’s perspective, these deficits are not a product of shifting balance of power, technological shifts or the structural realities of international relations. He seems to be making a cultural/civilisational argument, i.e., that there is something inherent in how Western countries conceptualise order, which gives rise to these deficits. This, of course, makes it far more difficult to reconcile between competing visions of order, in my view. Anyway, Fu does not really dwell on this further; he moves to explain how the four initiatives align to the four deficits. This is not new.
But later in the article, Fu does distinguish China’s vision for order from Western-led orders. I read these paragraphs more for the ambition that has been expressed than anything else. The Chinese articulation of order remains rather abstract, but that does not mean one cannot triangulate stated ambition with actual diplomatic practice to understand the contours of what Beijing seems to be shaping. It’s also worth thinking about the capability gap between the stated ambition and what Beijing has actually been able to do. Finally, there’s a lot of moralising in ambition, but that’s to be expected. All great powers try to find moral pitches to garner normative legitimacy. Take all that with a pinch of salt.
Here’s what Fu says:
“The four major global initiatives squarely face the real predicaments arising from the profound changes unseen in a century, applying distinct policies to each of the ‘four deficits’ while integrating them systematically: creating the interests of cooperation through development, safeguarding the environment for cooperation through security, forging the consensus for cooperation through civilization, and improving the mechanisms of cooperation through governance. They respond precisely to the difficult problems of the times and possess extremely strong practical relevance. This systematically integrated logic of governance has achieved historic breakthroughs across the dimensions of governance actors, governance architecture, and governance paradigms.
An overall plan for global governance put forward and led by a developing country. The theoretical system, top-level design, and rules and institutions of global governance have long been controlled by Western developed countries, serving the interests and value orientations of a small number of countries. The broad mass of developing countries has long occupied a subordinate position of passively accepting rules, participating far too little, and being voiceless in expressing their interests. The four major global initiatives focus on resolving structural contradictions such as North-South imbalance, security disorder, discord among civilizations, and governance failure. They transcend the Western system of governance theory and break through the old pattern of ‘the West dominates, the world obeys’.
Building a systematic framework of global governance across the four dimensions of development, security, civilization, and governance. Since World War II, whether Western-led international initiatives of various kinds or regional governance architectures, the overall characteristics have been fragmentation of issues, compartmentalization of fields, and superficiality of governance, making it difficult to respond to compound crises in which multiple deficits overlap and resonate with one another. The four major global initiatives reverse the defects of traditional governance by emphasizing checks and balances over cooperation, the immediate over the long term, the partial over the whole, and response over root cures. They integrate development, security, civilization, and governance into an organic whole that covers all domains, exerts force in the same direction, and treats both symptoms and root causes, achieving a historic leap in global governance from piecemeal measures and passive response to systematic remediation and governance at the source.
Pioneering a new paradigm of interstate relations that discards zero-sum games. Surveying the history of modern and contemporary international relations, whether the balance-of-power games in which European states checked one another, the bipolar confrontation of the era of US-Soviet rivalry, or the international conflicts that have occurred frequently in recent years, international relations have never been able to escape the law of the jungle in which the weak are prey to the strong. Hegemonism and power politics have emerged in an endless stream, bringing humanity ceaseless wars and conflicts. The four major global initiatives conform to the great evolutionary trend of human history from confrontation to cooperation, from division to unity, and from closure to openness. They consistently adhere to not targeting any third party, not forming ‘small cliques’, and not attaching any political conditions, resolving differences through dialogue and consultation, forging consensus through practical cooperation, and achieving win-win outcomes through joint building and sharing. The four major global initiatives have reshaped the underlying logic of interstate relations and made an important contribution to safeguarding international fairness and justice and promoting the building of a new type of international relations.”
四大全球倡议直面百年变局现实困境，针对“四大赤字”分别施策又系统集成，以发展创造合作利益、以安全保障合作环境、以文明凝聚合作共识、以治理健全合作机制，精准回应时代难题，具有极强的现实针对性。这一系统集成的治理逻辑，在治理主体、治理架构、治理范式等维度实现了历史性突破。由发展中国家提出并主导全球治理总体方案。全球治理的理论体系、顶层设计、规则制度长期被西方发达国家把控，服务于少数国家的利益和价值取向。广大发展中国家长期处于规则被动接受、参与严重不足、利益诉求失语的从属地位。四大全球倡议聚焦解决南北失衡、安全失序、文明失和、治理失灵等结构性矛盾，超越西方治理理论体系，突破了“西方主导、世界服从”的旧有格局。从发展、安全、文明、治理四大维度构建系统性全球治理框架。二战以来，无论是西方主导的各类国际倡议，还是区域性的治理架构，总体呈现议题碎片化、领域分割化、治理表面化的特征，难以应对多重赤字叠加共振的复合型危机。四大全球倡议扭转了传统治理重制衡轻合作、重眼前轻长远、重局部轻整体、重应对轻根治的弊端，将发展、安全、文明、治理整合为全域覆盖、同向发力、标本兼治的有机整体，实现了全球治理从零散施策、被动应对到系统整治、源头治理的历史性跨越。开创摒弃零和博弈的国家间交往新范式。纵观近现代国际关系史，不论是欧洲列国互相制衡的均势博弈，还是美苏争霸时期的两极对抗，抑或是近年频繁发生的国际冲突，国际关系始终未能摆脱“弱肉强食”的丛林法则。霸权主义、强权政治层出不穷，给人类带来无休止的战乱冲突。四大全球倡议顺应人类历史从对抗走向合作、从分裂走向团结、从封闭走向开放的演进大势，始终坚持不针对第三方、不组建“小圈子”、不附加任何政治条件，以对话协商解决分歧、以务实合作凝聚共识、以共建共享实现共赢。四大全球倡议重塑了国家间交往的底层逻辑，为维护国际公平公道、推动构建新型国际关系作出重要贡献.
As an Indian reading through this article, I couldn’t help but think that there are so many domains in which India and Germany can do much, much more. Take defense manufacturing, for instance, there’s such a massive scope to do this at scale between private companies in a way that addresses budgetary concerns for Germany and Europe, while building secure supply chains. Skilled manpower is another domain where cooperation is growing, but there’s so much more that can be done together. Anyway, let’s get back to Zheng’s article.
Zheng begins by telling us that The Economist, in 2023, once again labelled Germany as the “Sick Man of Europe”. He then identifies the following as the reasons behind Germany’s economic challenges:
First, in 2023 and 2024 the German economy declined for two consecutive years, contracting by 0.9% and 0.5% respectively, while in 2025 the economic growth rate was only 0.2%, and various institutions forecast that it will remain stagnant in 2026. In terms of weight in the global economy, Germany’s relative share of economic size is shrinking. Calculated at purchasing power parity, Germany’s share of total global economic output is projected to fall from 3.51% in 2019 to 2.88% in 2026.
Second, the driving effect of exports on the economy has weakened. From 2015 to 2023, the average growth rate of German exports fell by approximately two-thirds compared with 2000–2015, while their contribution to GDP growth, measured in percentage points, declined from 1.8 to 0.8, and after 2019 was only 0.3 percentage points. More seriously, after 2023, the scale of exports has been on a declining trend, with growth rates of -1.4%, -2.1%, and -0.9%, respectively, in 2023, 2024, and 2025.
Third, declining international competitiveness. In the global competitiveness rankings, Germany fell from 17th place in 2020 to 23rd in 2026; in the Global Innovation Index rankings, it fell from 9th place in 2020 to 11th in 2025.
其一，经济连年萎缩与停滞。2023年、2024年德国经济连续下行，降幅分别为0.9%、0.5%，2025年经济增长率仅有0.2%，各类机构预测2026年仍将维持停滞状态。从全球经济权重来看，德国经济体量相对份额在缩小。按购买力平价计算，德国经济总量全球占比由2019年的3.51%预计跌至2026年的2.88%。其二，出口对经济的拉动效应走弱。2015—2023年德国出口平均增速较2000—2015年回落约2/3，其拉动国内生产总值的百分点由1.8降至0.8，2019年后则仅为0.3；更为严峻的是，2023年后出口规模呈下降趋势，2023—2025年增速依次为-1.4%、-2.1%、-0.9%。其三，国际竞争力下降。在世界竞争力排名中，德国从2020年居第17位跌至2026年第23位；在全球创新指数排名中，从2020年第9位跌至2025年第11位.
“From the external perspective, Germany’s previous long period of economic prosperity depended on three favorable factors: relying on the US for security guarantees, it was able to reduce defense spending and devote more fiscal resources to domestic economic development; relying on stable and inexpensive energy supplies from Russia, it was able to effectively control industrial costs and consolidate the comparative advantage of its export-oriented manufacturing sector; and relying on China’s vast market, it was able to continuously expand foreign trade channels and unlock high-end manufacturing capacity. However, after the process of economic globalization, the free-trade system, and even the peaceful and stable international order came under strain, these favorable factors gradually weakened. In terms of security, the US has accelerated the shift of its strategic focus from Europe to the Asia-Pacific, and, using withdrawal from NATO as leverage, has pressured its European allies led by Germany to shoulder the main responsibility for regional defense. To this end, Germany has continually raised defense spending in recent years, with its share of total economic output rising rapidly from less than 1.2% at its lowest point this century to 2.69% in 2026, gradually increasing domestic fiscal pressure In terms of energy, since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, the EU has imposed 21 rounds of sanctions on Russia, while Germany has decoupled itself from Russian energy, causing energy costs to rise sharply. In 2022, the inflation rate reached a temporary high of 6.9%. Meanwhile, the US-Israel-Iran conflict has caused significant turbulence in international oil and gas markets. Energy prices, which had previously begun to ease, have rebounded again, weighing on Germany’s economic recovery. In terms of markets, rising domestic energy costs in Germany have weakened the market competitiveness of its products. This, combined with the government’s pursuit of a ‘de-risking’ policy, tightening technology export controls and foreign investment reviews while guiding domestic enterprises to diversify their global supply chain and production capacity layouts, has created difficulties for enterprises seeking to cultivate overseas markets deeply.
从外部看，德国之前经济长期繁荣有赖于三个有利因素：依托美国的安全保障，得以压缩国防开支，将更多财政资源投向本土经济建设；依托俄罗斯稳定廉价的能源供给，得以有效控制工业成本，巩固出口制造业的比较优势；依托中国庞大的市场，得以持续拓展外贸渠道，释放高端制造产能。但是，在经济全球化进程、自由贸易体系乃至和平稳定的国际秩序遭到破坏后，这些有利因素逐渐弱化。安全方面，美国战略重心加速由欧洲转向亚太，并以退出北约为筹码，要挟以德国为首的欧洲盟友扛起地区防务主要责任。为此，德国近年不断抬升防务支出，其占经济总量比例从本世纪最低时不到1.2%迅速提高到2026年2.69%，国内财政压力逐渐加大。能源方面，自2022年俄乌冲突爆发以来，欧盟已对俄罗斯实施21轮制裁，德国对俄能源脱钩，能源成本大幅攀升，2022年通胀率创下6.9%的阶段性高点。而美以伊冲突又对国际油气市场造成显著震荡，此前有所缓和的能源价格再度反弹，拖累德国经济复苏。市场方面，德国本土能源成本攀升，削弱产品市场竞争力，叠加政府推行“去风险”政策，收紧技术出口与外资审查，同时引导本土企业分散布局全球供应链与产能，给企业深耕海外市场造成困扰.
External shocks have accelerated Germany’s economic downturn, but the structural problems accumulated domestically over the long term are the fundamental source constraining its growth. Germany’s Council of Economic Experts pointed out in its Spring Report 2026 that Germany’s weak economic growth since 2019 stems, at a deeper level, from internal structural contradictions.
First, the advantages of traditional manufacturing are fading, while industrial restructuring has lagged behind. The industrial sector has been weighed down by high energy prices, heavy tax burdens, and stringent regulation, while weakening global demand and intensifying geopolitical tensions have added further shocks, resulting in consecutive declines in industrial output. The manufacturing production index fell from a peak of 110 points in 2018 to 93.2 points in June 2024, with energy-intensive industries such as chemicals and metallurgy particularly badly affected. To avoid high domestic costs, many companies have chosen to relocate production capacity abroad. According to surveys, between 2021 and 2023, the rate of industrial relocation among companies with more than 50 employees reached 2.2%, with destinations mainly including other European countries, North America, and Asian countries such as India. Germany’s green transformation of industry has also progressed slowly. Take the transition from fuel-powered vehicles to electric vehicles as an example. Germany has long specialized in internal-combustion-engine technology, and its industrial chains, technological systems, and business models have become highly tied to fuel-powered vehicles. This path dependence has resulted in the lagging development of its battery-electric vehicle industry.
Second, infrastructure is aging, while long-term investment has been lacking. For decades, Germany has seriously underinvested in public infrastructure. Shortcomings in power grids, gas networks, hydrogen networks, and digital infrastructure are particularly pronounced, making it difficult to meet the demands of the energy transition and digitalization. For example, Germany’s fiber-broadband coverage rate is far below the average level among OECD countries.
Third, administrative approval procedures are cumbersome, imposing a heavy compliance burden on businesses. On the one hand, the EU’s detailed regulatory requirements continue to expand; on the other, Germany has gone further in implementing and adding to EU regulations, further increasing the burden on businesses, with administrative pressure particularly pronounced in the tax field. Over the past three years, German companies have had to create an additional 325,000 positions to deal with the complicated administrative work generated by data-protection requirements and various regulations. OECD data show that Germany’s administrative approval procedures are the most cumbersome among EU member states.
Fourth, the labour supply gap is pronounced, while the efficiency of matching labor supply and demand has declined. At present, more than 530,000 skilled positions in Germany remain unfilled, placing considerable recruitment pressure on businesses and exposing serious skills mismatches in the labour market. Estimates suggest that by 2035, Germany could face a shortage of as many as 7 million skilled workers.
外部环境冲击加速德国经济下行，但本国长期累积的结构性顽疾才是制约其增长的核心根源。德国经济专家委员会在《2026年春季经济景气报告》中指出，2019年至今德国经济增长疲软，深层症结在于内部结构性矛盾。一是传统制造业优势消退，产业结构转型滞后。工业部门受高能源价格、重税负、严苛监管的拖累，加之全球需求走弱、地缘矛盾激化冲击，工业产值连年下滑。制造业生产指数自2018年110点的高点回落至2024年6月的93.2点，化工、冶金等高耗能行业受损尤为突出。为规避本土高成本，大量企业选择向外转移产能，据调查，2021—2023年，规模50人以上企业产业外迁率达2.2%，主要迁往欧洲其他国家、北美以及印度等亚洲国家。工业绿色转型推进迟缓，以燃油车向电动汽车转型为例，德国长期深耕内燃机技术，产业链、技术体系与商业模式高度绑定燃油车，这种路径依赖导致其纯电电动车产业发展步伐滞后。二是基础设施老化，长期投资缺位。数十年来，德国公共基建投入严重不足，电网、燃气、氢能管网及数字基建短板突出，难以适配能源转型与数字化需求，如德国光纤宽带覆盖率远低于经合组织国家的平均水平。三是行政审批流程冗杂，企业合规成本负担沉重。一方面欧盟监管细则持续扩容，另一方面德国过度加码落实欧盟法规，进一步加重企业负担，尤以税务领域行政压力最为突出。近3年德国企业不得不新增32.5万个岗位以应对数据保护与各类法规带来的繁杂行政工作。经合组织数据显示，德国企业的行政审批是欧盟成员国中最烦琐的。四是劳动力供给缺口突出，岗位供需匹配效率走低。当前德国国内有超53万个专业岗位无人填补，大量企业招募承压，暴露劳动力市场存在严重的技能错配问题。据测算，2035年德国专业技术人才缺口或将高达700万人。
Zheng then discusses the churn in German politics, identifying three trends:
First, public trust in the governing capacity of mainstream political parties has eroded…A poll conducted in June 2026 showed that the incumbent government, after only one year in office, had seen public satisfaction fall to 12%, the lowest level ever recorded by the survey.
Second, right-wing populist forces are expanding…In the 2025 federal election, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 20.8% of the vote, making it the second-largest party in the Bundestag. Several recent opinion polls show that the AfD’s support at the federal level has now risen to first place. At the state level, its momentum has been even stronger. In the 2024 Thuringia state election, it won the largest number of seats in the state legislature.
Third, the stability of governing coalitions has weakened. Mainstream parties have imposed a ‘ban on cooperation’ with the AfD, but the current German party landscape displays a fragmented character in which ‘the large parties are not large and the small parties are not small’, and this ‘firewall’ mechanism for quarantining the populist party has substantially raised the threshold for forming a stable coalition government/ Following the September 2021 federal election, Germany formed its first-ever three-party governing coalition at the federal level, with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens, and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) forming a government. However, sharp policy disagreements and public infighting within the coalition ultimately led to the government’s premature collapse. At the state level, the strong pressure exerted by the AfD has left the eastern German states mired in difficulties in forming governments, with three-party coalitions becoming the norm. In Thuringia, mainstream parties could form a government only with the support of the Left Party. Even when these governing parties joined forces, they were unable to command a majority in the state legislature, leaving the government’s foundations extremely weak.
经济萎靡引发一系列社会和政治问题。一是民众对主流政党执政能力的信任流失。主流政党主导的政府在多重危机下难以出台、落地行之有效的治理方案，即使政党轮替、政府更迭也未能扭转困境，各类社会经济矛盾不断积压，民众的包容度随之走低。2026年6月的一份民调数据显示，现任政府执政仅一年，其民众满意度已跌至12%，创下该调查支持率的历史新低。二是右翼民粹主义势力扩张。2013年成立的德国选择党以疑欧主义为核心主张，在欧洲难民危机发酵背景下，主打移民难民牌，以强硬排外政策为显著特征，精准吸纳对政府移民治理成效不满的选民。在2025年联邦议院选举中，该党获得20.8%的选票，一跃成为德国联邦议院第二大政党。近期多项民调结果显示，德国选择党在联邦层面的支持率已跃居首位。地方层面，其势头更为迅猛，在2024年图林根州议会选举中拿下议会第一大党席位。三是执政联盟稳定性弱化。主流政党对德国选择党采取“合作禁令”，但当前德国政党格局呈现“大党不大、小党不小”的碎片化特征，这套隔离民粹政党的“防火墙”机制，大幅抬高了组建稳定联合政府的门槛。2021年9月联邦议院选举后，德国诞生史上首个联邦层级三党执政联盟，由社民党、绿党与自民党联合组阁，然而联盟内部政策分歧突出且公开内斗，最终导致联合政府提前垮台。在地方政坛，受德国选择党强势挤压，东部联邦州深陷组阁困境，三党联合执政已成常态。在图林根州，主流政党只能在左翼党的支持下才得以组建政府，这些执政党联合起来都无法掌握州议会多数席位，执政根基十分薄弱.
“Germany’s governing parties can form only limited consensus on reform, with the deeper constraints existing mainly in two areas.
First, the parties’ inherent ideological divergences make it difficult to implement major reforms of an overall nature. Broadly speaking, the centre-right CDU/CSU places its policy emphasis on homeland security and macroeconomic stability, while the centre-left SPD takes social equity as its core demand. In fiscal and tax policy, the CDU/CSU advocates tax cuts for residents and enterprises and continued adherence to fiscal discipline, resisting expansion of government debt; the SPD proposes raising tax rates on high-income groups, levying a wealth tax, and relaxing the constraints of the ‘debt brake’ mechanism. In social welfare, the CDU/CSU holds that the current welfare system is unsustainable and advocates developing privately funded, capital-based pension provision and extending weekly working hours; the SPD pushes hard for a universal insurance system and firmly opposes cutting existing welfare guarantees. Under this pattern of opposition, the CDU/CSU and the SPD can reach compromise only through difficult concessions and give-and-take, and many key reforms that urgently need to be advanced have been broken down into fragmented, piecemeal adjustments, substantially weakening the effectiveness of policy implementation.
Second, the operating mode of coalition government obstructs rational consultation and effective compromise. The previous three-party coalition collapsed prematurely amid frequent conflicts between the parties and incessant public disputes. Learning from this experience, the CDU/CSU and SPD, which currently govern in coalition, have declared that they will draw lessons from the past and pursue mutually trusting, pragmatic, and constructive cooperation. Yet in practice, the two parties have frequently aired their policy differences publicly, leaving a deeply negative impression on the public. The underlying reason is primarily that each governing party hopes to emphasize its refusal to yield on core policy positions, thereby shifting the blame for failed policy compromises onto the other side in an effort to reverse its continuing decline in public support. This not only damages the government’s image in the eyes of the public, but also erodes the foundation of mutual trust and the cooperative environment on which coalition governments depend.”
德国各执政党仅能形成有限的改革共识，深层掣肘主要存在于两方面。其一，政党固有理念分歧，致使全局性重大改革难以落地。整体来看，偏中右翼的联盟党政策重心落在国土安全与宏观经济稳定，中左翼社民党则将社会公平作为核心诉求。在财税领域，联盟党主张面向居民与企业实施减税，继续恪守财政纪律、抵制扩大政府债务；社民党则提议上调高收入群体税率、开征财产税，并主张放宽“债务刹车”机制的约束。在社会福利领域，联盟党认为现行福利体系难以为继，主张发展资本积累式私人养老保障、延长每周工作时间；社民党则力推全民保险制度，坚决反对削减现有福利保障。在此对立格局下，联盟党与社民党仅能通过艰难折中让步达成妥协，许多亟待推进的关键性改革被拆分为零碎的局部调整，政策实施效果大打折扣。其二，联合政府的运作模式，阻碍理性协商与有效妥协。此前三党联盟因政党间冲突频发、公开论战不休而提前破裂，基于这一前车之鉴，当前联合执政的联盟党与社民党宣称将吸取教训，开展互信、务实的建设性合作。但从实际施政表现来看，两党频繁对外公开政策分歧，给民众留下深刻负面印象。其根源主要是各执政党派希望通过凸显自身在核心政策主张上寸步不让的立场，把政策妥协失败的责任归于对方，以此扭转持续走低的民意支持率。此举不仅损害政府在公众心中的形象，更消解了联合执政赖以存续的互信基础与协作环境。
In the final section, he focuses on Germany’s policy shifts in terms of security, trade and geopolitics, arguing that there are deep challenges that will inhibit Berlin.
“Germany has long sought to play a leading role in Europe and to assume greater international responsibilities in global affairs. Against the backdrop of the current US administration pursuing a ‘new Monroe Doctrine’, reducing its security commitments to Europe, and geopolitical conflicts returning to the European continent, Germany is gradually breaking with its long-standing tradition of military restraint and promoting a shift in its foreign and security strategy. It is attempting to respond to the major challenges of the profound changes unseen in a century through a mindset of confrontation, trade protectionism, and power politics.” 德国长期谋求在欧洲发挥领导作用，并在全球事务中承担更多国际责任。在现任美国政府奉行“新门罗主义”，减少对欧洲的安全保障承诺，以及地缘冲突重回欧洲大陆的背景下，德国逐步打破长期以来的军事克制传统，推动外交与安全战略转向，试图用对抗思维、贸易保护、强权政治来应对百年变局的重大挑战.
“As security policy shifts, fiscal constraints are becoming increasingly pronounced. Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, Germany identified Russia as Europe’s primary security threat, abandoning its long-standing conception of cooperative European security in favour of a confrontational security approach centered on defense and deterrence. Its security strategy is centered on strengthening NATO’s ‘European pillar’, while advancing European autonomous defense capabilities on the basis of maintaining transatlantic alliance relations. To this end, Germany has implemented a series of accompanying security-policy adjustments, such as supplying Ukraine with heavy weapons and deploying permanently stationed troops in Lithuania; amending the ‘debt brake’ mechanism, establishing a dedicated defense fund, and exempting the portion of defense spending exceeding 1% of GDP from the mechanism’s constraints; and, in April this year, issuing Germany’s first national military strategy since the end of World War II, emphasizing that it would build the Bundeswehr into Europe’s most powerful conventional armed force. But as the effects of the conflict continue to ferment, multiple blowback effects on the economy are gradually appearing. For instance, an economy dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises is the greatest characteristic of the German economic model, and the sharp expansion of defence spending crowds out funds urgently needed for people’s livelihoods and industrial development, which is particularly disadvantageous to SMEs. The advantage of many years of low-debt fiscal policy has disappeared and fiscal sustainability is under pressure; some rating agencies have already warned that Germany’s debt rating may be downgraded. Over the coming period, how to balance defence investment, livelihood guarantees, and investment in science, technology and innovation will become a severe test that Germany cannot avoid.” 实现安全政策转向，财政约束愈发突出。2022年俄乌冲突爆发后，德国把俄罗斯确定为欧洲首要安全威胁，其长期秉持的合作式欧洲安全观，全面转向以防御、威慑为核心的对抗性安全理念。其安全战略路径是以强化北约“欧洲支柱”为核心，在维系跨大西洋同盟关系的基础上推进欧洲自主防务建设。为此，配套落地多项安全政策调整：向乌克兰输送重型军备、在立陶宛部署常驻军队；修改“债务刹车”机制，设立专项国防基金，并把国防开支超过国内生产总值1%的部分豁免于该机制约束；今年4月，德国发布二战结束以来的首份国家军事战略，强调将把联邦国防军建设成欧洲最强大的常规军队。但随着冲突影响持续发酵，对经济的多重反噬效应逐渐显现。比如，中小企业为主的经济是德国经济模式的最大特点，而国防开支急剧扩张挤占民生、产业发展刚需资金，对中小企业特别不利；多年来低负债的财政政策优势消失，财政的可持续性承压，有的评级机构已经预警，德国的债务评级可能会下降，等等。未来一段时期，如何平衡国防投入、民生保障与科创投资，将成为德国难以回避的严峻考验.
“As protectionism rises, Germany is wavering between openness and closure. Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Germany has increasingly come to regard the mutually cooperative relationships that historically contributed to its economic prosperity as forms of one-sided strategic dependence. It has consequently formulated a national security strategy, worked to implement the European Economic Security Strategy, and strengthened its comprehensive ‘de-risking’ policy. As a major exporting country, Germany continues to advocate open markets and free trade. For example, in the China-EU electric-vehicle dispute, it opposed imposing additional tariffs and supported reaching a negotiated solution based on minimum price levels. Regarding the EU’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act, it criticized the European Commission’s planned minimum ‘Made in EU’ threshold, arguing that protectionism would hinder European companies from accessing cutting-edge technologies globally and encourage foreign investment to leave the EU. But as the economy remains persistently sluggish and competitive pressure on manufacturing continues to rise, domestic voices calling for a tougher external stance have begun to grow, and Germany has shifted to a supportive attitude toward the EU introducing more trade protection instruments, raising its bargaining chips proactively in order to achieve protectionism and to treat internal ailments by external means.” 贸易保护主义抬头，在开放与封闭之间摇摆不定。俄乌冲突爆发后，德国越发将历史上促成经济繁荣的相互合作关系视作单方面的战略依附，并为此制定国家安全战略，配合落实欧洲经济安全战略，强化全方位“去风险”政策。作为出口大国，德国依然主张开放市场和自由贸易，例如在中欧电动汽车争端上，反对加征关税，支持协商达成最低限价解决方案；在欧盟出台《工业加速器法案》问题上，批评欧盟委员会计划推出的“欧盟制造”最低比例门槛，认为保护主义将妨碍欧洲企业获取全球尖端技术，并促使外资撤离欧盟。但随着经济持续低迷、制造业竞争压力不断上升，其国内呼吁对外采取更强硬立场的声音开始增大，对欧盟出台更多贸易保护工具转为支持态度，通过主动抬高博弈筹码，达成保护主义和内病外治的目的.
“Germany is actively participating in great-power competition, but there is a clear gap between its ambitions and its actual capabilities. Germany believes that the world has entered an era of great-power politics and that Europe must make effective use of the logic of power politics. To avoid becoming a pawn in great-power competition, Germany seeks to act as a leading middle power, deepen coordination with so-called ‘like-minded’ middle powers, and expand cooperation with countries of the Global South in areas such as trade and economic affairs, critical minerals, and supply chains. For example, it has actively promoted the conclusion of FTAs between the EU and Mercosur, India, and others. However, diplomatic results have fallen short of expectations. The clearest example came in the June 2026 election for non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council, when Germany failed to secure a seat in the first round of voting. These developments indicate that Germany is no longer content with its existing status as a participant in the international system and intends to reshape the international order on the basis of its own interests and values. However, the ‘principled realism’ foreign-policy approach pursued by the current German government has, in practice, struggled to balance the tensions between interests and values.” 主动参与大国博弈，但其力量与现实存在明显差距。德国认为当今世界已进入大国政治阶段，欧洲必须善用强权政治逻辑。为避免沦为大国博弈棋子，德国谋求担当领导型中等强国，深化与所谓“志同道合”中等强国的行动协同，并在经贸、关键矿产、供应链等领域拓展同全球南方国家合作，例如积极推动欧盟与南方共同市场、印度等的自贸协定落地。但外交成效不及预期，最典型的体现是，在2026年6月联合国安理会非常任理事国改选中，德国在第一轮投票中落选。种种态势显示，德国不再安于现有国际体系参与者身份，意欲依托本国利益与价值观重塑国际秩序。不过现任德国政府践行的“有原则的现实主义”外交路线，在实际操作中并不能平衡好利益与价值观之间的矛盾.
“At present, Germany stands at a critical turning point, with reform at a crucial juncture. For reform to succeed, it will be necessary to discard partisan divisions and build domestic consensus, use external competition to force through domestic reform, eliminate the various stubborn ailments obstructing economic growth, and at the same time to coordinate and balance national security with long-term development interests, upholding and safeguarding the multilateral cooperation system so as to build a stable external environment for economic recovery and sustained improvement. Whether the current German government can push the economy out of its prolonged slump as soon as possible bears not only on this government’s political survival, but will also profoundly influence the future direction of German politics; it also bears on whether Germany, as a core country of the EU, can lead Europe in achieving strategic autonomy and play an important role in the process of world multipolarisation.” 当前，德国处在了一个关键的转折点，改革也来到了攻坚的关口。改革要想取得成功，需要摒弃党派分歧、凝聚国内共识，用外部竞争倒逼国内改革，破除阻碍经济增长的各种顽瘴痼疾，同时统筹平衡国家安全与长远发展利益，坚守并维护多边合作体系，为经济复苏与长期向好构筑稳固的外部环境。现任德国政府能否推动经济尽快走出长期低迷，不仅关系本届政府的执政存续，更将深刻影响德国未来政局走向，同时关乎身为欧盟核心国家的德国能否引领欧洲实现战略自主，并在世界多极化进程中发挥重要作用。
Finally, I am covering a piece by Zhang Zhongjun, Deputy Director of the Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, Central Party School and the Vice President of the Central Party School. The piece talks about the significance of strengthening the “political character of loyalty to the Party.”
Zhang argues:
“Loyalty to the Party is a political quality that Communists must possess. In the Rules of the Communist League, Marx and Engels set out the basic conditions for becoming a member, including that one must ‘recognize communism,’ ‘submit to all the decisions of the League’, and ‘keep secret all the affairs of the League’. In the course of creating a new type of proletarian political party, Lenin regarded the loyalty of Party members as the ‘fundamental condition for implementing and maintaining our strictest discipline’. The CPC has always emphasised that individual Party members must be loyal to the Party. The first programme adopted at the Party’s First National Congress clearly stipulated that the prerequisite for joining the Party was to be a person ‘who acknowledges this Party’s programme and policies and is willing to become a loyal Party member.’ Over the course of more than a century of struggle, loyalty to the Party has long since been integrated into the spiritual bloodline of generation after generation of Chinese Communists, inspiring the broad ranks of Party members and cadres to keep the founding aspiration and mission firmly in mind and to be resolutely committed to bringing benefit to the people.” 对党忠诚是共产党人必须具备的政治品格。马克思、恩格斯在《共产主义者同盟章程》中提出成为盟员的基本条件，包括必须“承认共产主义”、“服从同盟的一切决议”、“保守同盟一切事务的秘密”等。列宁在创建新型无产阶级政党过程中，将党员的忠诚看作“实行和保持我们最严格的纪律的基本条件”。中国共产党历来强调党员个体要做到对党忠诚。党的一大通过的第一个纲领明确规定，入党的先决条件是“承认本党纲领和政策，并愿成为忠实党员的人”。在百余年奋斗历程中，对党忠诚早已融入一代代中国共产党人的精神血脉，激励着广大党员、干部牢记初心使命、矢志为民造福.
“Emphasising loyalty to the Party is an important element of Xi Jinping’s thought on Party building. General Secretary Xi Jinping has expounded on loyalty to the Party on many occasions, pointing out that ‘our Party, all along its journey, has undergone countless perils and tribulations, but no difficulty has crushed us and no enemy has been able to defeat us; what we relied on was precisely the loyalty of many millions of Party members’. He has stressed that the Party spirit of Communists ‘focuses on firming up ideals and convictions, forging strong loyalty to the Party, deepening a sense of devotion to the people, purifying moral character, and maintaining honesty and integrity’. He has required that all Communist Party members be forever loyal to the Party, share its worries, fulfil their responsibilities for the Party, and make contributions to the Party, and, at all times and under all circumstances, ‘never change their hearts, waver in their aspirations, or compromise their integrity’, and so forth. Studying and implementing in depth the spirit of the General Secretary’s important expositions, and accurately grasping the basic connotations, measuring standards, and practical requirements of loyalty to the Party, are of very great significance for Party members and cadres in continually correcting their ideological coordinates and forging strong loyalty to the Party.” 强调对党忠诚，是习近平党建思想的重要内容。习近平总书记多次围绕对党忠诚作出阐释，指出“我们党一路走来，经历了无数艰险和磨难，但任何困难都没有压垮我们，任何敌人都没能打倒我们，靠的就是千千万万党员的忠诚”；强调共产党人的党性“重点是坚定理想信念，铸牢对党忠诚，厚植为民情怀，纯正道德品质，保持清正廉洁”；要求所有共产党员都要永远对党忠诚、为党分忧、为党尽责、为党奉献，任何时候任何情况下都不改其心、不移其志、不毁其节；等等。深入学习贯彻总书记重要论述精神，准确把握对党忠诚的基本内涵、衡量标准和实践要求，对党员、干部不断校正思想坐标、铸牢对党忠诚，具有十分重要的意义.
The next bits are really important:
“What is loyalty to the Party? It is both a solemn political commitment and a political obligation that must be fulfilled—a concrete political yardstick.
First, loyalty to the Party’s political requirements. It is necessary to unswervingly uphold and strengthen the Party’s overall leadership, resolutely safeguard the authority of the Party Central Committee and its centralised and unified leadership, firmly support the ‘Two Establishments’ and resolutely achieve the ‘Two Safeguards’ through practical action, and consciously maintain a high degree of alignment with the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core in political stance, political direction, political principles, and political path.
Second, loyalty to the Party’s faith. This requires having not only simple feelings toward the Party but also rational consciousness, and through deeply studying, closely examining oneself against, and earnestly practising Marxism and the Party’s theoretical innovations, continually firming up faith in Marxism, conviction in socialism with Chinese characteristics, and confidence in realising the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-style modernisation.
Third, loyalty to the Party’s organisation. This requires keeping firmly in mind that one’s first identity is that of a Communist Party member and one’s first responsibility is to work for the Party; being mindful at all times that one is the Party’s person and a member of the organisation; never forgetting one’s obligations and responsibilities; identifying with the organisation ideologically, relying on the organisation politically, obeying the organisation in one’s work, and trusting the organisation emotionally; consciously accepting the organisation’s arrangements and the constraints of discipline; and always safeguarding the Party’s unity and solidarity.
Fourth, loyalty to the Party’s standpoint and purpose. This requires putting the interests of the Party and the people first; forever maintaining flesh-and-blood ties with the masses of the people; practising the people-centred development philosophy; adhering to the principle that development is for the people, relies on the people, and has its fruits shared by the people; walking the Party’s mass line well in light of new circumstances and new tasks; and continually realising, safeguarding, and developing the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people.
Fifth, loyalty to the Party’s cause. This requires always keeping firmly in mind the fundamental question of what the CPC is and what it is to do; implementing the Party’s line, principles, and policies to the letter; struggling valiantly on the magnificent journey of building a strong country and rejuvenating the nation; and creating real achievements that can withstand the test of practice, of the people, and of history.
Loyalty to the Party concentratedly embodies the political identification, ideological identification, theoretical identification, and emotional identification of Party members and cadres with the Party organisation, and is an important guarantee that the whole Party will be united and unified and possess powerful creativity, cohesion, and fighting capacity.”
什么是对党忠诚？它既是庄严的政治承诺，也是必须履行的政治义务，是具体的政治标尺。其一，忠诚党的政治要求。要坚定不移坚持和加强党的全面领导，坚决维护党中央权威和集中统一领导，以实际行动坚定拥护“两个确立”、坚决做到“两个维护”，自觉在政治立场、政治方向、政治原则、政治道路上同以习近平同志为核心的党中央保持高度一致。其二，忠诚党的信仰。要求对党不仅要有朴素的感情，还要有理性的自觉，通过深学、细照、笃行马克思主义和党的创新理论，不断坚定对马克思主义的信仰、对中国特色社会主义的信念、对以中国式现代化实现中华民族伟大复兴的信心。其三，忠诚党的组织。要求牢记自己的第一身份是共产党员、第一职责是为党工作，时刻想到自己是党的人，是组织的一员，时刻不忘自己的义务和责任，做到思想上认同组织、政治上依靠组织、工作上服从组织、感情上信赖组织，自觉接受组织安排和纪律约束，始终维护党的团结统一。其四，忠诚党的立场宗旨。要求把党和人民利益放在第一位，永远保持同人民群众的血肉联系，践行以人民为中心的发展思想，坚持发展为了人民、发展依靠人民、发展成果由人民共享，结合新形势新任务走好党的群众路线，不断实现好、维护好、发展好最广大人民根本利益。其五，忠诚党的事业。要求始终牢记中国共产党是什么、要干什么这个根本问题，不折不扣执行党的路线方针政策，在强国建设、民族复兴伟业的壮阔征程中奋勇拼搏，创造经得起实践、人民、历史检验的实绩。对党忠诚集中体现着党员、干部对党组织的政治认同、思想认同、理论认同、情感认同，是全党团结统一、具有强大创造力凝聚力战斗力的重要保证。
How is loyalty to the Party to be tested? In different historical periods, there have been objective and clear standards for testing whether Party members and cadres are loyal to the Party. In the revolutionary years, it was mainly a matter of whether one could charge into battle and brave death without regard for one’s own life for the cause of the Party and the people; such a test was very direct. In peacetime, it is mainly a matter of whether one can uphold the Party’s leadership and in particular the centralised and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee; whether one can resolutely implement and carry out the Party’s theory and its line, principles, and policies; whether one can strictly observe the Party’s political discipline and political rules; whether one can hold the cause of the Party and the people above all else; and so forth. Such a test cannot be met merely by going through one or two matters or by hearing a few declarations of position/public pronouncements. In the final analysis, it depends on what the long-term, consistent practical actions of Party members and cadres are like, on whether they have genuinely been open-hearted and candid, and whether their outward words and actions accord with their inner convictions. 如何检验对党是否忠诚？在不同历史时期，党员、干部对党是否忠诚，有着客观明确的检验标准。在革命年代，主要看能不能为党和人民事业冲锋陷阵、舍生忘死，这样的检验很直接。在和平时期，主要看能不能坚持党的领导特别是党中央集中统一领导，能不能坚决贯彻执行党的理论和路线方针政策，能不能严守党的政治纪律和政治规矩，能不能坚持党和人民事业高于一切，等等。这样的检验并非经历一两件事、听几句表态的话就能达成，归根到底要看党员、干部长期一贯的实际行动怎么样，是不是真正做到了襟怀坦白、表里如一.
“Since the new era began, the broad ranks of Party members and cadres have been of one heart and one mind with the Party, embodying loyalty to the Party in the practical actions of properly implementing the decisions and arrangements of the Party Central Committee. Thinking in one direction and exerting effort in one direction, they have injected inexhaustible motive force into advancing the cause of the Party and the people. At the same time, however, as the complexity of society continues to deepen, as various interest relationships become intricately entangled, and as temptations and tests of every description emerge in an endless stream, some Party members and cadres have seen their political immunity decline and have developed deviations in respect of loyalty to the Party.
First, deviating from the track of ideals and convictions. Some have unsound ideological roots and a ‘master switch’ has been left un-repaired for years on end; they harbour doubts about communism, do not believe in Marx and Lenin but believe in ghosts and spirits, and are keen to seek spiritual sustenance in feudal superstition, seriously damaging the Party’s image. Some have not laid a solid foundation in the basics of Marxism and have not firmly grasped the Party’s theoretical innovations; their sense of urgency about ‘making up whatever is lacking’ is weak, and the structure of their knowledge and competence is poorly matched to promoting high-quality development. Some even treat theoretical study as a burden, unable to engage in it with their minds, hearts, and full attention, allowing it to become a mere formality that floats on the surface, so that the foundation of their faith and convictions lacks solid support.
Second, disregarding the Party’s political discipline and political rules. Some lack basic political discernment and political judgement and go wrong in their political words and deeds, resulting in an appalling social impact. Some adopt an ambiguous attitude on major questions of principle, sitting on the fence and wavering, or even acting as they please without any sense of awe, making irresponsible remarks about the major policies and principles of the Party Central Committee and undermining the Party’s unity and solidarity. Some develop an opportunistic mentality, seeking to gain advantage through clever or expedient means, engaging in factionalism, political attachment, and the exchange of interests, and transforming relations among Party comrades into relations of personal dependence, thereby seriously polluting the political ecosystem.
Third, departing from the fundamental purpose of serving the people wholeheartedly. Some are severely divorced from the masses and from reality; they lack genuine feeling for the masses, keep their eyes turned only upward and never downward, are unwilling to go deep into the grassroots to understand the demands of the masses, and even do foolish things that disappoint the masses, seriously eroding the Party’s foundations of governance. Some pick the light tasks and shrink from the heavy ones in their work, bargaining with the organisation, unwilling to work in arduous places and posts, hesitating and calculating this way and that when faced with assignments arranged by the organisation, and lacking even the minimum spirit of responsibility and sense of duty. Some speak constantly of loyalty to the Party when the going is smooth, but the moment they meet a ditch or a bump, or someone moves their ‘cheese’, they grumble and give voice to resentment, some even going so far as to place personal interests above the interests of the Party and the people.
Fourth, incomplete implementation of the major decisions and arrangements of the Party Central Committee. Some are absent-minded about ‘matters of the greatest national importance’, fixing their gaze only on their own ‘one mu and three fen of land’; in ordinary times they discount implementation, work around the rules in execution, and, when a matter arises, they first engage in their personal self-interested calculations. Some are quick to declare their position in front of others and pitch their tone high, but when it comes to grasping implementation they recite the ‘delay’ formula, so that ‘you only hear the stairs creaking, but no one comes down’, leaving the policies issued by the Party Central Committee for the benefit and welfare of the people suspended in mid-air and unable to touch the ground.”
新时代以来，广大党员、干部与党同心同德，把对党忠诚体现到贯彻落实好党中央决策部署的实际行动上，心往一处想、劲往一处使，为推动党和人民事业发展注入了不竭动力。但与此同时，随着社会复杂程度不断加深，各种利益关系盘根错节，形形色色的诱惑考验层出不穷，有的党员、干部政治免疫力下降，在对党忠诚方面出现了偏差。一是偏离理想信念轨道。有的思想根子不正、“总开关”常年失修，对共产主义心存怀疑，不信马列信鬼神，热衷于从封建迷信中寻找精神寄托，严重损害党的形象；有的马克思主义基本功打得不扎实，对党的创新理论掌握得不牢，“缺什么补什么”的紧迫感不强，知识素养结构同推动高质量发展适配度不高，甚至把理论学习当成负担、不能上心走心用心，仅仅流于形式、浮在表面，信仰信念的底座缺少坚实支撑。二是漠视党的政治纪律和政治规矩。有的缺乏基本的政治鉴别力和政治判断力，在政治言行上出问题，造成恶劣社会影响；有的在重大原则问题上态度暧昧、骑墙摇摆，甚至自行其是、心无敬畏，对党中央大政方针说三道四，破坏党的团结统一；有的生出取巧之心，搞拉帮结派、政治攀附、利益勾兑，将党内同志关系异化为人身依附关系，严重污染政治生态。三是背离全心全意为人民服务的根本宗旨。有的严重脱离群众和实际，缺少对群众的真挚感情，眼睛只向上看不向下看，不愿深入基层了解群众诉求，甚至干出令群众失望的蠢事，严重侵蚀党的执政根基；有的工作上拈轻怕重，跟组织讨价还价，不愿到艰苦地方和岗位工作，在组织安排的工作面前犹犹豫豫、想这想那，缺乏起码的担当精神和责任心；有的顺风顺水时张口闭口对党忠诚，但一遇沟坎、动到自己“奶酪”就牢骚满腹、心生怨言，甚至不惜把个人利益凌驾于党和人民利益之上。四是贯彻落实党中央重大决策部署不彻底。有的对“国之大者”心不在焉，只盯着自己的“一亩三分地”，平时落实打折扣、执行搞变通、遇事先盘算个人“小九九”；有的在人前表态快、调门高，但抓落实便念“拖”字诀，“只听楼梯响，不见人下来”，使党中央出台的利民惠民政策悬在空中、难以落地.
“These problems seriously depart from the Party’s nature and purpose and from its founding aspiration and mission, and run counter to the requirements of loyalty to the Party. That they exist to varying degrees is due, on the one hand, to the fact that in some Party members and cadres selfish motives and impure thoughts are at work: their political stance is not firm, their Party-spirit principles are not strong enough, they cannot steady their minds or withstand tempering, and their own line of defence is easily breached by negative factors and by ‘sugar-coated bullets’. On the other hand, there are still shortcomings in the mechanisms of education, management, and supervision. For example, the mechanism for regularised and long-term education in loyalty to the Party is not yet well developed; the full-cycle management of Party members and cadres, from joining the Party and taking up a post through to retirement, does not form a closed loop; the ideological dynamics of key targets such as ‘top leaders’, newly promoted cadres, young cadres, and cadres in key posts are not grasped in a timely manner; and incipient and tendentious problems are not detected, flagged, or corrected in good time.” 这些问题严重背离党的性质宗旨和初心使命，与对党忠诚的要求背道而驰。之所以不同程度地存在，一方面是有的党员、干部私心杂念作祟，政治立场不坚定，党性原则不够强，稳不住心神、经不起磨砺，自身防线容易被消极因素和“糖衣炮弹”所攻破；另一方面是教育管理监督机制仍有短板，比如，对党忠诚的常态化长效化教育机制还不完善，对党员、干部从入党、入职直至退休的全周期管理不闭环，针对“一把手”、新提拔干部、年轻干部、关键岗位干部等重点对象的思想动态掌握不及时，对苗头性、倾向性问题未能及时察觉、提醒和纠正，等等.
“Loyalty to the Party does not arise out of thin air, nor does it stay fresh of its own accord; it must undergo continual self-cultivation and the tempering of practice before it can grow firmer with the passage of time. At present, the environment for our country’s development faces profound and complex changes, and the task of advancing the building of Chinese-style modernisation is arduous and heavy. This requires the broad ranks of Party members and cadres to further forge strong loyalty to the Party, dare to charge into the breach, be adept at fighting hard battles and winning them, and to transform loyalty to the Party into practical results in promoting development, serving the overall situation, and benefiting the people.” 对党忠诚不会凭空产生，也不会自然保鲜，必须经历不断的自我修炼和实践淬炼，方能历久弥坚。当前，我国发展环境面临深刻复杂变化，推进中国式现代化建设任务艰巨繁重，需要广大党员、干部进一步铸牢对党忠诚，敢于冲锋陷阵、善打硬仗胜仗，把对党忠诚转化为推动发展、服务大局、造福人民的实际成效.
“Only with clarity in theory and firmness in conviction does loyalty to the Party have a solid ideological foundation. This requires Party members and officials to persistently strengthen their theoretical grounding, continuously raise their level of Marxist theory and their ability to apply it, be adept at finding direction, ideas, and methods in the Party’s theories of innovation, draw from them the rich political wisdom and nourishment for Party spirit contained therein, and transform the results of study into a powerful force for strengthening ideals, tempering Party spirit, guiding practice, and advancing their work. In light of new conditions of the times, they should absorb the beneficial nourishment of China’s fine traditional culture, serve as faithful inheritors of the Party’s glorious traditions and fine work style, and continually raise their spiritual plane and moral level. Education in loyalty to the Party must be vigorously strengthened, giving full play to the advantages of ‘red resources’ and thoroughly carrying out activities such as revisiting the Party membership oath, applications for Party membership, and the family letters of revolutionary martyrs. The deterrent force of cautionary education must be enhanced, guiding the broad ranks of Party members and cadres, especially young cadres, to take forebears and martyrs as their mirror and negative examples as their warning, continually building a firm foundation of faith, replenishing the calcium of the spirit, and holding steady the rudder of thought, so as to hone a heart of crimson loyalty to the Party through firm ideals and convictions.” 理论上清醒、信念上坚定，对党忠诚才有牢固思想根基。这就要求党员、干部坚持不懈强化理论武装，不断提升马克思主义理论水平和运用能力，善于从党的创新理论中找方向、找思路、找方法，汲取蕴含其中的丰富政治智慧和党性滋养，把学习成效转化为坚定理想、锤炼党性和指导实践、推动工作的强大力量。结合新的时代条件吸收中华优秀传统文化中的有益养分，当好党的光荣传统和优良作风的忠实传人，不断提升精神境界和道德水平。大力加强对党忠诚教育，充分发挥红色资源优势，深入开展重温入党誓词、入党志愿书及革命烈士家书等活动，提高警示教育震慑力，引导广大党员、干部特别是年轻干部以先辈先烈为镜、以反面典型为戒，不断筑牢信仰之基、补足精神之钙、把稳思想之舵，以坚定的理想信念砥砺对党的赤诚忠心.
Political life within the Party is a ‘great furnace’ for tempering Party spirit and raising the degree of loyalty to the Party; if the furnace goes long without a fire lit in it, or if the fire is lit but the temperature is insufficient, good steel cannot be smelted. Party members and cadres must be educated and guided, in serious and earnest inner-Party political life, to take criticism and self-criticism as a powerful weapon for protecting themselves and curing their ailments, and through positive and healthy ideological struggle to correct their understanding and purify their souls. They should regularly measure themselves against the Party Constitution, Party rules, and Party discipline, examine their own political stance and their every word and deed, diligently sweep away the ‘dust’ on their thinking, and forever preserve the political character of Communists. Values such as loyalty and honesty, fairness and uprightness, seeking truth from facts, and probity and integrity must be promoted, while the vulgar and decadent political culture of ‘relationship studies’ (关系学), the ‘thick black theory’ (厚黑學), officialdom stratagems (官场术), and hidden rules (潜规则) must be resolutely resisted and opposed, so as to continually enrich the soil of a sound political ecology. In selecting and employing personnel, discernment of Party spirit must be strengthened and penetrating insight improved, with attention paid to examining the vision and breadth of mind, the degree of loyalty, and the degree of integrity of Party members and cadres, so that good cadres who are genuinely loyal and reliable, the same on the outside as within, and willing to shoulder responsibility and fulfil their duties are put to use.” 党内政治生活是锤炼党性、提高对党忠诚度的“大熔炉”，炉子长期不生火或者生了火温度不够，都炼不出好钢。要教育引导广大党员、干部在严肃认真的党内政治生活中，把批评和自我批评作为防身治病的有力武器，通过积极健康的思想斗争端正认识、净化灵魂。经常对照党章党规党纪，检视自己的政治站位和一言一行，勤扫思想上的“灰尘”，永葆共产党人的政治本色。弘扬忠诚老实、公道正派、实事求是、清正廉洁等价值观，坚决抵制和反对关系学、厚黑学、官场术、潜规则等庸俗腐朽的政治文化，不断培厚良好政治生态的土壤。选人用人应加强党性鉴别、提高穿透力，注重考察党员、干部的境界格局和忠诚度廉洁度，把真正忠诚可靠、表里如一、担当尽责的好干部用起来.
“Interpreting loyalty to the Party and utter sincerity toward the people must ultimately come to rest in practical actions of knowing the weight of one’s burden and bearing it, and of tackling the toughest tasks and overcoming difficulties. The broad ranks of Party members and cadres must firmly establish a view of political achievement centred on bringing benefits to the people, consciously deliver achievements for the people and achieve results through solid work, make decisions and handle affairs according to objective laws, take on and shoulder responsibilities based on their positions and duties, guard against complacency and impatience, and devote themselves single-mindedly to advancing Chinese modernization. They should go more often deep into the front lines at the grassroots to listen to the voices of the people, observe their conditions, resolve their worries, and relieve their hardships—not detouring around contradictions when they meet them, not bowing their heads when they encounter difficult problems, not shrinking back when they see risks, and daring to draw the sword at critical moments—so that good deeds and practical work are done in a way that reaches into the hearts of the masses. They should strengthen their tempering through practice, taking the initiative to go to the front lines of reform, development and stability, to the very forefront of major tasks and major struggles, and to hardship-stricken and remote areas and key, demanding posts in order to be honed, sharpening their character, tempering their work style, and increasing their abilities amid the heat of practice.” 诠释对党的忠诚和对人民的赤诚，最终要落脚到知重负重、攻坚克难的实际行动中。广大党员、干部要牢固树立造福人民的政绩观，自觉为人民出政绩、以实干出政绩，按规律作决策、办事情，立足岗位职责担事扛事、戒骄戒躁，心无旁骛地投身中国式现代化建设。多深入基层一线听民声、察民情、解民忧、纾民困，遇到矛盾不绕道、碰到难题不低头、见到风险不缩身、关键时刻敢亮剑，把好事实事做到群众心坎里。强化实践历练，主动到改革发展稳定第一线、重大任务重大斗争最前沿、艰苦边远地区和关键吃劲岗位去磨炼，在火热实践中砥砺品格、锤炼作风、增长才干.
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