Walter Veit is Morally Confused.

“Many people may hate intellectuals for their arrogance, lack of curiosity in nonsense, mocking tone, and so forth. But these are essential to being an intellectual.”
—Walter Veit

For those who don’t follow the general kerfuffle that attends philosophy Substack, Philosophy lecturer at the University of Reading Walter Veit has recently taken to the platform in earnest and has, well, here is a brief summary:

1. Writes an article about how we need to get rid of moral language like “right” or “wrong” or “duty” because it causes people to become “hooligans,” is responsible for the culture wars, all of which is because it reflects moral realism and “intuitions.” Says we need to be “moral nihilists” and utilitarians. Compares people who use these words to religious people who believe in myths and unicorns.

2. Claims the reasons his arguments in the above article are insult ridden and appear insubstantial is because it’s a “polemic” and you shouldn’t judge polemics for not being substantial.

3. Declines to respond to multiple people, even other antirealists pointing out what are actually empirical claims in his polemic are unclear and unsubstantiated and instead moves on to more articles taking swipes at other people (probably Philip Goff, again)

4. In spite of claiming the culture wars are bad because they lack pragmatic conflict resolution, publishes another article claiming the reason New Atheism was good was not because of its intellectual achievements but precisely because they mocked and insulted people, and claims we should revive that aspect of it.

5. Publishes an article condemning philosophers who paywall past articles or appeal for paid subscribers (including Philip Goff, if you haven’t worked out by now Veit doesn’t like Philip Goff) and uses what certainly appears like an appeal to the moral language he claims to want to banish, essentially arguing they are not fulfilling their duty, are doing something wrong and are, quote, “downright unethical.”

I made the mistake last week of thinking Veit was interested in any substantive engagement, which turns out to not be the case, so I’m afraid I may now be a little more blunt. There are two problems going on here, the first is with Veit’s actual arguments and what certainly appears to be hypocrisy and confusion, the second is with Veit’s attitude and engagement. These problems are connected because it is harder than it should be to work out what Veit is actually claiming, since, as his love of New Atheism makes clear, and as the above epigram states, he seems to believe polemics are the means by which a philosopher should engage with the public. The problem, as it happens, is that unlike someone like Christopher Hitchens who at least had a piercing wit, Veit is just not very good at polemics. He may imagine he sounds like an erudite philosophy professor dispensing cutting remarks for public consumption, but the reality is his points are often muddled and he reads more like a fourteen year old on r/atheism at 2am.

So let’s take Veit’s article on moral nihilism. A big problem here is Veit is completely unclear about what he even means in his hurry to condemn people he disdains. He claims we need to banish moral language, but the only examples he gives are “rights,” “wrongs,” and “duties,” and importantly, the reason he wants rid of them is not just the words but that the words signify moral realism. He doesn’t explain how or why, he just compares them to unicorns and myths, implying they reflect silly and false beliefs.

Yet it’s hard to see a difference in actual practice and implication between saying something is “wrong” and saying something is “downright unethical,” which Veit directly says about professional philosophers paywalling articles. He certainly implies they have a duty to act a certain way. No doubt he would protest that he only uses “ethical” to refer to the position of his subjective values, but so what? How is someone not versed in his views meant to pick up on that? Is it clear? Why can’t I use “right” or “wrong” and say it merely reflects subjective values? in fact, where is the evidence in the first place that right or wrong actually signify that a person is claiming to have intuited a stance independant moral fact such that a clear difference could be established between “so and so is wrong” and “so and so is downright unethical” such that we can say the former is moral language signifying moral realism and the latter is moral nihilism signifying antirealism and merely expressing a subjective value? I would bet if you ask a bunch of people to clarify the difference between “morally wrong” and “downright unethical” the last thing any of them would say is that one means there are things that are right and wrong and the other doesn’t.

Not only that, one can give many examples of words like “duty” being used in a way that doesn’t imply moral realism at all. I don’t think the idea that I have duties at work does, and one could argue the idea that I have a duty to my country doesn’t necessarily. Part of the interest of any serious discussion would be to consider what you think people mean by such words, not assert what you think they mean and call them stupid. It is plainly just as definsible to say “philosophers have a duty to the public good” while only implying a duty according to the values of the role they have taken rather than referring to absolute realism, as it is to call people “unethical.” In fact, I would argue the former is less in line with realism and the latter implies it more. Let us be blunt: This is an unsubstantiated, confused, hypocritical claim, especially when it is used to mock people as if they believe in unicorns.

But this seems to be Veit’s modus operandus. It’s pretty clear across Veit’s positions that many of his claims are those of mere convenience, held when it suits him, discarded when it doesn’t. In any given context, he wants to be able to imply the rightness of certain things, and in any given context he wants to be able to screw pragmatism, engage in polemics and insult people. He wants to condemn metaphysics and expects everyone to assume his metaphysical assumptions. He wants to sweepingly condemn people for using moral terms, without examples, specifics, or any empirical evidence to support what are empirical claims but he wants to be able to claim people should do things. He is allowed to refer morally without implications but act pompously towards others as if their language and their language alone reflects “intuitions” and somehow he is morally superior because he is purporting to be expressing the far more noble “subjective values,” even though in practice there seems to be little difference, since Veit certainly seems to believe with a fairly absolute conviction that his subjective values are better than everyone else’s.

What’s so absurd about all this is that none of it is really about either metaethics or about pragmatism. Whether or not moral language really reflects non naturalist realism, whether or not moral language really causes conflict as opposed to allowing a common vocabulary by which we express values: these are both interesting and empirical questions within philosophy. The absurd irony is that Veit condemns philosophers in another article for engaging in flights of fancy instead of doing essentially scientific work. Yet Veit has done none here, here’s offered no empirical support for any of his assertions, has declined to provide any when criticized, and is by any measure behaving and arguing in a way that is driven by something one might as well call “intuitions” if we are throwing the word around, and is being obstinately unscientific. If I wanted to make an argument that we changed the colour of all the road signs because it would make people drive better, I’d expect to have to make a case that a) current signs are causing problems in the first place, with specifics, and b) the proposed change, with specifics, would solve anything. If I just smear people for not accepting my view what have I achieved?

Then, most importantly in all this, we come to the issue of philosophical reputation. One of Veit’s themes is sanctimoniously condemning huge swathes of philosophers for various crimes that are apparently violating their duty as servants to “objective truth.” (Sorry, not duty, “subjective values,” but if you haven’t worked out by now there’s no discernible difference.) In a lengthy article, Veit condemns all philosophers using paywalls on articles or even asking for support because to do so is “unethical;” he condemns the “unethical behaviour” of people like Philip Goff for daring to have a footnote where they ask for paid subscribers, saying it is “dangerous for the public reputation of academia as a whole” calling it “hypocrisy” and in order to “preserve the integrity of academia itself” he is going to donate his tiny amount of paid subscriber money to shrimp charities. Yet I don’t see how this could even be hypocrisy in the first place, if Goff or someone had condemned other people for asking for subscriptions then did it then maybe, but he hasn’t so even were it to be unethical I think the accusation of hypocrisy is wrong. Also it’s not unethical anyway, writers can do what they want, we know nothing about their personal financial circumstances and can only judge their motives on what they say and do and write, and I for one see nothing incongruous or questionable about Goff’s motives at all. If you want a related case that is more significant to public philosophy, arguing peer reviewed papers shouldn’t be behind an academic paywall would actually be a much better case to pursue.

So let us genuinely ask a question. Which is doing more damage to the reputation of philosophy: Philip Goff, who engages with good humour, responds to criticism, and who just happens to have a sentence at the end of his articles asking for subscriptions; or Walter Veit, who pumps out insult riddled polemics, engages without any charity whatsoever and with no attempt to consider any position but his own, who appears to disdain both the public and other philosophers, and whose arguments give the appearance of someone with a grasp of their subject as shallow as a children’s paddling pool in a heatwave, and thinks we should celebrate that arrogance and mocking approach? It seems to me pretty obvious it is Veit who is doing damage to philosophy and soiling its reputation, and I say that as someone who has no conviction whatsoever that there is something it is like to be an electron.

And I actually think this last point is a real problem. Let’s say Veit really does believe moral language causes conflict, culture wars and hinders problem solving, and humanity and society would be better without it. This is in some degree and empirical claim he has not evidenced, but let’s say he has some evidence. How do you go about it? Again: just make a clear case. For example, Veit in another article says things like “for knowledge is a common good that humanity should share.” He repeatedly uses the word “should,” to demand what other academics should do, which I submit no ordinary person would read any differently from him saying he thinks it is right. How, in his view, is this any different in actual practice? His articles seem to be merely creating conflict rather than solving it, so how can it be claimed to be pragmatically or practically different?

Note he has also said nothing about context. Does this refer to ordinary people? Policy makers? can Veit even show that in those contexts people are using moral language? If you consider many of the debates in UK parliament over assisted dying for example, the appeals are to the implications of the policy as much as to generic “its wrong” appeals. Of course people have emotional convictions about it, but often in such contexts we seem to recognise that to cross bridges and persuade the other side we have to make practical arguments, so to what and to where is this condemnation being applied? If it is to all values as a whole can he defend the idea his own don’t at some point ground out at a just so we must assert or believe or smuggle in under the pretence of objectivity? I doubt it.

If he did explain, this would offer clarity, define his position, and if he believes it would make the world better, actually provide practical solutions. Instead, he compares moral realists to dogmatic religious people, claims the only reason philosophers don’t agree with him is they are clinging to their careers, claims without evidence realism and moral language makes people hooligans, then moves on. Who does this help? Who is this for? The public? The public would be none the wiser, so other philosophers? Even other antirealists have since distanced themselves from Veit’s view and the rest have just been insulted, so who?

In one of Veit’s articles he claims there are two type of philosophers: swallows, who fly around in metaphysical flights of fancy and achieve nothing, and moles, who diligently help the work of science and actually achieve stuff. Let’s say this were true. I submit that in spite of Veit believing himself to be a mole, in this metaphor Veit is neither of these. Veit is, in fact, a third part of the metaphor I have just added: a pigeon. Pigeons achieve neither the vast migratory scale of the swallow or the solitary tunnelling of the mole, but instead they flap around and crap on stuff. Like the pigeons that flock in many of our cities, the end result is just an annoying mess that someone else has to come and clear up. So much for the public reputation of philosophy. I hope this foray will become an example of how the public, certainly in contexts like Substack, are actually far more read and have a far bigger appetite for substantive content than it might superficially appear. There are clearly philosophers or even scientists on this platform who have earned respect with how they have engaged, some of whom I have learned from and who have benefitted the general engagement on the platform. Sadly Walter Veit is not one of them. In this case “stick to your day job” may well be the best response.