Hello everyone,
I sincerely hope you’re all doing well. Now that I’ve finally wrapped up a very taxing applications season, I wanted to share some of the work I’ve managed to publish this year after returning from Taiwan.
I hope you enjoy reading it.
Best,
Suyash.
Cold Start - China’s New-Evolving Operational Military Posture - CSIS ChinaPower
Central Arguments:
1) The PLA is moving towards a new Cold-Start Style Operational Military Posture
2) Tibet, Xinjiang, and Western Theatre Commands (India-facing theatres and military districts) have taken a lead on implementing the Cold-Start style operational military posture.
China’s operational military posture is evolving. The PLA is heading towards a Cold-Start style operational military posture. The pivot is a part of the PLA’s larger mobilisation reforms, which China initiated in 2017-18. However, it was not until 2022, spurred by the visit to Taiwan by former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, that the PLA began implementing these reforms in real-time military exercises and drills.
Since then, the PLA has begun conducting advanced exercises around Taiwan, focusing on a Cold-Start military operational posture and capabilities. Notably, unlike other experiments and reforms, which are generally first implemented in the Eastern Theatre Command (ETC)—a laboratory of implementation of the Chinese military reforms - the PLA has better managed to achieve its cold start posture in Tibet, Xinjiang, and possibly the entire Western Theatre Command (WTC), which is responsible for an India contingency.
I have used 4 variables to prove these claims:
Chinese Texts: Almost all Chinese military texts I managed to collect and read from multiple libraries, think tanks, universities, shops, etc., across Taiwan highlighted that the PLA aims to adopt a Cold-Start operational military posture. Of course, the term “Cold-Start” is not used; there are multiple ways to say the same thing in Chinese.
Speeches: Multiple speeches by Xi himself and other top-ranking military officers in the CMC, Commanders of Theatre Commands, and more have highlighted this during their inspection visits over the past 3-4 years. Also, these speeches reveal a typical typology of China’s political-military system: Once the General Secretary issues a directive—whether in a public address or in talks with a foreign leader—it is swiftly echoed at every echelon, from the Vice-Chairmen down to the most remote battalion commander in Tibet.
Institutional Changes: Institutional reforms, including streamlining command structures, personnel policy changes, educational policy reforms for the army, and others, have aimed to shorten decision-to-action timelines, among other things.
Finally, results are visible in multiple military exercises the PLA conducted over the past 3-4 years around Taiwan, in Tibet, and in Xinjiang.
Please feel free to read the entire article on CSIS ChinaPower’s website.
Forging India-Taiwan Engagement: Theoretical Foundations, Policy Debates, and Pragmatic Pathways - Foreign Policy Research Institute and Observer Research Foundation
On the occasion of completing 30 years of informal relations between India and Taiwan, the United States’ Foreign Policy Research Institute and India’s Observer Research Foundation join hands to collaborate on understanding the theoretical foundations, policy debates, and pragmatic pathways for forging India-Taiwan relations. In this peer-reviewed Occasional Paper, Prof. Harsh V. Pant and I try to develop a dual-track framework—proactive engagement and selective geoeconomic soft balancing—to explain the India-Taiwan partnership. Under this framework, we explore the pillars of cooperation (trade, economy, digital and technological verticals) and potential areas of collaboration (China’s misinformation and disinformation warfare, understanding China’s military mobilisation, Chinese language learning, and space technology). Furthermore, we employ structural realism and asymmetric interdependence theories to highlight the limitations within our own framework, and, recognising the partnership’s limitations, recommend policy measures to enhance the bilateral relationship.
On the PLA, we realise the limitations of PLA studies - both academic and policy specific - which is a huge area of concern. In India, very unfortunately, the PLA studies is equal to the India-China border problems. Before going to Taiwan, I was excited about understanding the PLA through Taiwanese experiences. But apart from one or two think tanks and a handful of scholars, the PLA studies in Taiwan is limited to the cross-Strait tensions. Thus, the study of the PLA as a body polity is outsourced to the United States, which has its own set of problems. We realised there’s huge potential for collaboration here!
In the paper, we have highlighted these two or three aspects, but there are many others.
You can access this paper on both FPRI’s and ORF’s websites.
Some Other Outputs Include:
In 2024, Carnegie India brought together a group of young Indian China Scholars to present their observations at the Carnegie Security Dialogue. Under Amb Vijay Gokhale’s guidance, we have managed to put our thoughts on paper this year by publishing this compendium on multiple aspects of the People’s Republic of China - my essay is, of course, on the PLA. Carnegie India
Earlier this year, while I was still in Taiwan, I realised that China is slowly but steadily developing the capabilities to conduct a forceful cross-strait campaign. With all its limitations, the PLA is taking measures to be capable of conducting a cross-strait campaign - they are still far away from being ready for it.
These are a few indicators (measures):
Recent Civil-Military Measures (Institutional and On-ground)
Changing Nature of Coercion
Standardisation
Resource Stockpiling
Re-enlistment
You can read the full article on FPRI’s website
India’s Operation Sindoor
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