Why Israel Cannot Win the Iran War

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly made central to his strategy a core proposition: that Israel can continue military pressure until Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities are sufficiently destroyed. In May on 60 Minutes, Netanyahu said the war was not over until Iran’s highly enriched uranium was removed and enrichment facilities dismantled. He explicitly said there was still “work to be done,” strongly implied Israel would ensure this happens.

For decades, Israel has operated on a powerful strategic assumption that overwhelming military superiority can ultimately solve even the most difficult security threats through repeated application of force.

For decades, the idea that overwhelming Israeli military superiority has meant that Israel can ultimately solve threat through continued application of force.

But, what if this theory of victory is fundamentally wrong when it comes to Iran ?

Israel can badly damage Iran. It can destroy nuclear facilities, kill commanders, cripple missile launchers, and demonstrate extraordinary airpower.

Those are battlefield achievements. They are not victory.

The strategic question that now matters is whether Israel can compel Iran to accept a political order that leaves Israel more secure after the bombing stops.

I do not see a credible path.

The reason is not that Israel lacks military power. It is that the military problem Israel faces has become larger than the force Israel can sustainably apply.

Israel has demonstrated that it can launch devastating attacks on Iran. What it has not demonstrated is that it can sustain such a war while independently absorbing Iran’s retaliation. The United States has carried a major share of Israel’s missile-defense burden, while Iran can distribute the conflict across multiple theaters, including Lebanon and Yemen.

And Israel’s nuclear arsenal can deter an Iranian attempt to destroy Israel conventionally. It cannot erase Iran’s underlying capacity to rebuild.

But none of Israel’s tactical achievements answers the strategic question that now matters most: Whether Israel can compel Iran to accept an Israeli-preferred regional order?

This is the standard by which Israel’s strategy should be judged

The result is a strategic paradox:

Israel may be able to win every major battle and still lose the war.

If that is right, the consequences extend far beyond Israel. They reach the future of American power in the Middle East, the global economy, and the emerging balance of power with Iran.

If Israel cannot end the conflict through military pressure, the consequence is not simply another Middle Eastern war; it is the prospect of a prolonged conflict involving Iran, the Gulf, and global energy markets – even if the United States pulls back from escalation.

Plainly, Israel can strike Iran again. The question is whether another strike can solve the strategic problem that the last one did not: producing a durable political settlement on terms Israel can accept.

Here is my analysis.