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Napoleon Bonaparte famously said “When your opponent is making a mistake, do nothing to interfere.” : « N’interrompez jamais votre ennemi lorsqu’il fait une erreur. »
This explains why we are taciturn about statement regarding a current conflict or even a potential conflict. Why tip your hand?
Why Telegraph your Hits?
Iran is expanding the war horizontally through proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and militias in Iraq. Iran’s aim is to overextend US and Israeli defensive capabilities, reasoning that interceptors are more expensive than drones. Consequently, Iran will keep striking at US allies in the Middle-East. However, instead of victory that that will lead to backlash. Continued attacks will increasingly lead US allies to cooperate militarily with the USA and ultimately
uniting coalition allies with the USA to strike back at Iran together.
Increasing military cooperation and joint retaliatory strikes are already occurring. In response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the US and UK launched airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. Likewise, Saudi Arabia responded militarily to Houthi attacks, striking Houthi-held Hodeida after Houthi attacks on Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia has also launched strikes against militias in Iraq. Furthermore, Ukraine sank an Iranian ship in the Caspian Sea that was carrying military cargo bound for Russia. Ukraine is more than willing to escalate against Iran, a fact that may explain Laura Loomer’s Ukraine pivot.
The USA can and likely will attract an increasing number of coalition partners in its war against Iran.
With its back to the wall, Iran’s government correctly understands that it cannot de-escalate this time, even if it wished to do so. Battlefield pressure, internal factionalism, and leadership losses have made Iranian restraint far less likely, if not impossible. In plain terms, Iran’s newly minted inexperienced leaders lack the diplomatic acumen, institutional coordination, and political skill to pull back, especially since a sword of Damocles hangs over their necks.
Moreover, Iran lacks any credible path toward imposing a durable regional peace because its leadership remains fundamentally committed to opposing Israel while simultaneously competing with Türkiye and Saudi Arabia for leadership of the Islamic world. This is why Iran’s government, such as it is, is willing to to attack almost all Iran’s neighbors. Likewise, given repeated decapitation strikes against its senior leadership, Iran’s rulers they have little to lose and no realistic alternative to continued confrontation. Consequently, Iran’s leadership is willing to try to impose a transit tax on oil shipments through the Persian Gulf, even though doing so further augments tensions. Even if such a transit tax were somehow acceptable to the United States, it would almost certainly be unacceptable to most other countries dependent on Gulf shipping, thereby increasing international support for American military action.
Iran’s leadership also appears to believe that the United States cannot simply de-escalate or ignore Iranian actions. They are mistaken if they in fact so believe. First, the strategic balance is asymmetrical. The United States can inflict far greater economic costs on Iran than Iran can impose on the United States. Second, Washington could simply disengage from the Persian Gulf altogether, relying on alternative energy supplies and domestic production. Such a withdrawal would primarily harm states that remain heavily dependent on Gulf oil rather than the United States itself. The USA is simply not dependant on Iranian oil.
Perhaps surprisingly, the PRC is also not dependent on Iranian oil. China sources crude from a diversified set of suppliers and maintains substantial strategic and commercial petroleum inventories. China’s energy system is, moroever, largely based on renewable energy. In 2024, wind and solar met 84% of the growth in Chinesew electricity demand, and China added 277 GW of solar capacity and 79 GW of wind capacity, bringing cumulative solar and wind capacity to about 1,407 GW. In 2025, about 42% of China’s electricity was generated from clean sources, while fossil fuels still supplied 58%; wind and solar together reached 22% of electricity generation. China also holds very large oil reserves: roughly 360 to 400 million barrels in government-held inventories. China was Iran’s biggest oil buyer: was. By stockpiling heavily, China turned cheap Iranian crude into a buffer that makes China effectively independant of Iranian oil.
Neither the USA nor PRC are “trapped” or “compelled” by energy. China can always burn more coal, source oil from other countries, and liquefy coal into synthetic oil. It is Iran, not the USA or PRC that is trapped in an inescapable escalation cycle.
Given these facts, I expect the conflict in Iran to continue, and even intensify, as the erosion of oil revenues exacerbates economic hardship and fuels domestic unrest in Iran. Iran’s inability to sell oil will mean a lack of oil revenues that will increasingly impoverish the Iranian people. Historically, economic distress has been a potent catalyst for political instability, and Iran’s reliance on oil exports makes it especially vulnerable to such pressures. Iranians will consequently become increasingly restive and opposed to their own government. As Iranian living standards continue to decline, public discontent will likely escalate into defections and rebellions, creating opportunities for external actors to exploit internal divisions. The USA can and probably will intervene to foment and support such rebellions. It may well have partners for such interventions.
The United States, with its long-standing opposition to Iran’s theocratic regime and its history of supporting opposition movements in adversarial states, is well-positioned to foment and back rebellions in Iran. US intervention could take the form of covert support for dissident groups, arms supply, training, economic incentives, and diplomatic pressure, possibly in coordination with regional or global partners.
The ideological disconnect between Iran and China is under-appreciated. Iran is an Islamist theocracy with a history of suppressing secular and leftist movements, including the execution of Iranian communists, many of whom were Maoists, following the 1979 revolution. China, in contrast, is a secular state governed by an atheist political party.
Remember: Iran is an Islamist state, a sponsor of terrorism, and a theocracy. China is a secular state led by an atheist political party with a large Moslem population in its West, where some Islamists have brought terrorism before. Thes PRC and Islamic Republic of Iran (IRR) have a transactional relationship, not one bound on common beliefs or goals. So for example, in 1980, when the Islamists in Iran took power, they promptly executed all the Iranian communists, including the Maoists.
The PRC and IRR have hard history and incompatible ideologies. Conseqeuently, China may remain neutral or even tacitly accommodate US efforts, especially if a post-revolutionary Iranian government resumes oil exports to China at favorable prices. Ideas do matter, more than most people suppose. The lack of ideological alignment between Tehran and Beijing may limit China’s willingness to counter US actions in Iran.
However, whether the USA persists and succeeds in regime change in Iran remains to be seen. The outcome is far from predetermined. The Iranian regime has demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of internal and external pressures, leveraging its security apparatus to suppress dissent and maintain control. Moreover, China’s foreign policy is often guided by pragmatism rather than ideology. If Beijing calculates that a destabilized Iran would disrupt its energy security or embolden US influence in the region, it may adopt a more active role in supporting the status quo or mediating to prevent a collapse.
The US does face constraints: Domestic war-weariness, the risk of escalation with Iran’s regional proxies, and the potential for unintended consequences may temper Washington’s approach. The Iranian opposition remains fragmented Competing factions may struggle to present a united front, which is required to effectively oppose the Iranian regime.
Ultimately, the conflict in Iran will be shaped by the interplay of economic pressure, ideological splits, and strategic calculation. While the US may see an opportunity for regime change, the success of such efforts will depend on the cohesion of foreign opposition to the Iranian government, China’s actions or inaction, and the ability of the Iranian domestic opposition to coalesce around a viable alternative to theocracy. The situation remains fluid, and the resolution of these tensions will have significant implications for the broader Middle East and global energy markets.
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