The Truth About Good And Evil: A Very Concise Summary

Often in my political writings, I connect political community, human flourishing, and virtue. This is largely due to the fact that the classical tradition shapes my political perspective. Classical authors like Plato and Aristotle viewed political life as the primary context for human development, understood with a perfectionist paradigm. In this perspective, human development involves the gradual actualization of inherent capacities and inclinations embedded within human nature. This process leads to a way of life that is complete or excellent for man. This background view of human flourishing is not only important for my own political writing; rather it is the vital background for any compelling form of post-liberalism. Among the various reasons to reject liberalism is that we in fact know the true moral order for man, that is, we have a real but limited form of moral knowledge called the natural law or classical virtue ethics. Hence, postliberal discourse is greatly enriched by a concise understanding of the real human good. Moreover, it is good in itself to understand the law written on the heart.

All human action is for the good. This thesis is at the heart of Aristotelian-Thomist ethics, and it must not be understood as an expression of moral naiveté; it does not mean that all human beings are morally pure. Rather the thesis, “all human action is for the good” is a claim about the motivation of human action. The idea is this: we intend and choose this or that action because we perceive it to be desirable in one way or another. To put it another, the perception of desirability is the controlling motivation of human action. Stated in this way, the classical view of human action is evident to the man of experience. Advantage, attraction, desirability, and benefit are the concepts that energize and orient human behavior. Even when one engages in something like unhealthy action, he does so under the aspect in which the action is attractive. For example, pleasure often inspires gluttony; one does not eat the third donut because he wants to damage his health. Rather, he does so because it elicits sensible pleasure.

However, not everything that is perceived to be desirable really is so; the mere fact of desiring something does not make it actually desirable. The good is neither subjective nor relative. Some actions are truly desirable and others are not. How do we know the difference? The good of a thing is the fulfillment of its specific function. A good eye sees well; a good carpenter shapes wood according to art and purpose; a good marksman hits the target regularly; a good general achieves military victory; a good mind finds the truth; and so on.

The specific function of a thing is its species-specific differentia, which distinguishes the subject from other members of the genus and defines it. As such, the specific function expresses the what-it-is of a thing. To put it another way, the specific function determines the meaning and purpose of a thing. Therefore, when, a given subject fulfills its specific function it acts well and becomes good and desirable according to kind. A good doctor heals effectively and the good eye sees accurately. And it is likewise for the good man.

Good human action actualizes the specific function of man whereas bad actions fail to do so. And it is evident that the specific human function is reason. It follows that action according to reason is good and action contrary to reason is bad.

The evidence regarding man’s specific function is overwhelming. From science and poetry to the typewriter and the existence of philosophy, the reality and preeminence of human reason is abundantly clear. Indeed, man is the rational animal. In saying this, one need not deny that some of the other higher animals enjoy a certain degree of cognition. Yet such flashes of sense knowledge pale in comparison to the depth and complexity of human cognition. Even the ability to argue to the contrary only strengthens the thesis that man’s specific function is reason. Quod erat demonstrandum.

Given that reason is the specific function of man, it follows that it serves as the rule and measure of human action. Accordingly, in order to assess the objective goodness of an action it is necessary to understand the meaning and contours of reason itself.

Narrowly speaking, reason is the capacity to infer one truth from another truth, either inductively or deductively. From the truths that all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, reason rightly deduces the further truth that Socrates is mortal. But more broadly, “reason” signifies man’s complex and subtle power for discovering truth, that is, for understanding and knowing ens reale (real being). This power includes inferential reasoning, but also imagination, memory, intellect and so on. These aspects of rationality are distinct but united in the overarching purpose of finding truth, that is, reality. For this reason, Aristotle famously taught that all men by nature desire to know and understand. Human rationality is not turned in on itself. It is about reality; it is a light in which being presents itself. Truth is the defining characteristic of reason, and it is likewise the criterion for human action. Simply stated, action according to reason means action according to the truth.

The adulterous wife acts badly because she contradicts the truth that she has vowed exclusivity to her husband. Murder is wrong because it is contrary to the truth that the innocent victim, as innocent, did not deserve death. Intoxication is wrong because it is contrary to the truth that such a state inhibits the ability of man — the rational animal — to know the truth. By contrast, the soldier who stands his post acts according to the truth of the primacy of the common good over the individual good. The student who is well-prepared for class, acts well because he has act according to the truth that the function of the student is to learn. Examples of this criterion could multiplied without end.

To recapitulate: the good of a thing is the fulfillment of its specific function. The specific function of man is reason and reason is ordered to truth. It follows that the good of man is to act in accordance with the truth. Of course there are hard cases, but for the most part, the criterion of truth can be applied with precision and clarity. Reason, that is, truth, is the rule and measure of human action. This is born out in experience, and it grounds not only a framework for evaluation but a way of life. If the foregoing is correct, then the desirable life for man is to consistently live in accordance with the truth across the various domains of life. And this life consists primarily in the life of the classical virtues: prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude.

Our lives are shaped and energized by inclinations and habits; good habits are virtues and bad habits are vices; habits are good or bad insofar as they conform to or depart from the truth. The virtues are the driving forces of living a desirable human life.

Prudence is the habit of right reason applied to action; it is the habit of discerning the truth as it concerns action. The prudent man applies deliberation, judgement, and command to action; he deliberates about the end, judges the means, and applies deliberation and judgement to concrete action. Moreover, he considers action not only from the point of view of utility and pleasure, but primarily according to the rightness, the truth, of the action.

Justice is the habit of rendering what is due to another; this virtue is said to shine because it communicates goodness and fulfillment to others. In addition, it makes community possible, which is the natural context of human flourishing. The truth related to justice is based on what is owed to another according to natural or acquired right; it is based on the truth of the object. The just man owes obedience and service to the state because the whole is superior to the part; the teacher owes a prepared lesson to his students because of the nature of their relationship; the state owes to the parts a distribution of welfare based on merit and need because this accomplishes the common good. Similarly, theft is unjust because it treats what belongs to another as if it did not and such action is contrary to truth.

Temperance and fortitude maintain truth with respect to the passions. Temperance is the habit of desiring the sensible good in keeping with decency; the temperate man habitually turns away from over indulgence and deviancy. He seeks the sensible good that is proportionate to the truth of his nature. For example, he eats in a way that is nourishing and pleasant, but in keeping with good health and detachment. He habitually desires intimacy with his own wife, but not with the wife of another. And so on.

Fortitude is the habit of persevering in right judgment despite feelings of fear and pain. Often doing the right thing is involves threats or difficulty. This is clearest in the case of soldierly duty, but it is also present in the witness who speaks an unpopular truth and laborer who provides for his family through painful physical toil.

Altogether, the virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude are called the cardinal virtues, for they are necessary to live a desirable human life. In their absence, one finds undeveloped potential, foolishness, mediocrity, and even, sometimes, great wickedness. The virtuous man avoids this folly; instead, he lives in accordance with the truth. This is the fullness of what it means to act according to reason. Of course, readers of Aristotle know that there is a higher and better good beyond the life of the cardinal virtues. Indeed readers of Aquinas know there is a good even beyond what Aristotle imagined, but that is for another day and another essay.

For now, this is enough: the life of the cardinal virtues is the concrete realization of basic human goodness in this life, and it is the form of human flourishing presupposed in all of the work of the true statesman. For this reason, Aristotle taught that the statesman must have knowledge of the soul above anything else. One can hardly imagine such an expectation of our politicians and this indicates something wrong with all of us, for as Plato insisted, city is the soul writ large.