White Paper: What You Need to Know About the Administration's Efforts to Prevent States and Bar Associations from Disciplining Government Lawyers for Unethical Conduct and Disobeying Court Orders

TO: All Concerned

FROM: Jon May, Chair Amicus Committee, Lawyers for the Rule of Law

SUBJECT: Analysis of the Trump Administration’s Proposed Regulation Gutting the States’ Ability to Discipline Federal Government Lawyers and Officials for Violating the Rules of Professional Conduct and Disobeying Court Orders

DATE: Tuesday, March 10, 2026

The Trump Administration has proposed a regulation that it contends is intended to prevent the abuse of state disciplinary proceedings for political ends while preserving and codifying existing procedures that allow the Department of Justice to consider complaints against government lawyers while not preventing the states from pursuing their own procedures once DOJ’s review is completed.

If fact, a close reading of the regulation, the history of Congressional actions to prevent abuses of power by the Department of Justice, and a review of government misconduct since the beginning of the Trump Administration, demonstrates that the regulation provides the leadership of the DOJ a chancellors veto over any state investigation of allegations of government misconduct, particularly that misconduct committed by high ranking officials of the DOJ.

It is said that ignorance of the law is no excuse but it is precisely the ignorance of our elected officials, judges, and the public that the Trump Administration is counting upon to avoid close scrutiny of its innocuous sounding proposal.

As the reader will learn in more detail, there are four circumstances arising from the proposed regulation that will derail any meaningful review of allegations of ethical violation by government lawyers.

First. The regulation requires that a state which has received a complaint against a government lawyer or which has otherwise learned of alleged misconduct defer its investigation of the lawyer until the attorney’s conduct is investigated by various components of the DOJ. When that process is complete, the state can take whatever action it deems appropriate whether or not the Department has imposed its own discipline. This deferment is mandatory. If a state attempts to conduct a parallel investigation, the Department will take action to prevent it.[1]

However, there is no limit on the amount of time the various components can take to conduct their investigation, indeed no requirement that they ever reach a decision. Experience with government agencies demonstrates that if there is a will to prevent anything from being done, there is a way to ensure that nothing is done. Fundamentally, this fact alone demonstrates that there will no longer be state discipline of government lawyers no matter what their conduct is.

Second. The memorandum accompanying the proposed regulation relies upon the procedures the Department of Justice created post-Watergate to ensure that there would be meaningful and an unbiased internal review of allegations of misconduct committed by government lawyers.

What this memorandum does not state is that this scheme of review, the authorities that underly it, and entities that are intended to enforce it, and in particular, the lawyers who led the process and had the most experience in administering it, including lawyers appointed during Trump’s last administration, have left or been fired and have not been replaced.

This gives lie to any argument that the Trump Administration is committed to enforcing ethical norms. Indeed, the proposed regulation is designed to look like a robust enforcement mechanism while in fact being a mechanism to avoid any review of government misconduct at.

Third. The Trump Administration has stated openly that it is at war with the courts.[2] And it has demonstrated that it will do anything necessary to advance its interests whether it means lying to the courts or outright disobedience of court orders. It is therefore necessary that it quash any mechanism that might exist that would interfere with its lawyers having a free hand. The threat that a government lawyer might be disbarred if they engage in unethical means to achieve these goals could provide cover for lawyers who refuse to do so and discipline for supervisors who order line assistants to engage in unethical conduct or disobedience of court orders.

There is concrete evidence that the administration has engaged in a pattern of conduct intended to mislead judges or disobey judges who have ruled against them. This evidence comes directly from the statements of various judges, appointed by Democrat and Republican administration, even by President Trump, addressing what they believe was government misconduct in cases before them.

Fourth. The government relies on various authorities to support the proposed regulation which are either suspect or do not stand for the propositions advanced. These will be addressed in detail later in this report, but the most transparent example is the government’s repeated citation of itself to bolster its arguments. Essentially, this is nothing but an attempt to resuscitate Chevron deference which the Supreme Court overruled in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024).

Part 1

A Very Short History of Congressional Efforts

To Prevent Corruption of the Department of Justice for Political Ends

Donald Trump is not the first President to seek to use the Department of Justice to destroy his political enemies. That honor even predates Richard Nixon. But the shock of Watergate led to the first efforts to create an independent Department of Justice free from interference from political intervention. Those efforts were largely successful. A full discussion of that history is beyond the scope of this White Paper. A review of those efforts is detailed in an article published by the Brennan Center for Justice. [3]

However, to facilitate criminal investigations, the Department of Justice tried to stop efforts by state bar associations to hold government lawyers to the requirements of the rules of disciplinary conduct. In 1998, Congress enacted the McDade Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) in response to the Department of Justice’s claim that federal government lawyers were not bound by state ethics rules regarding contacting witnesses represented by counsel.[4] This law binds all federal government lawyers, including the Attorney General. See § 530B(c) (cross-referencing 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(a) (“The phrase attorney for the government means the Attorney General . . . .”).

The Amendment states:

(a) An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State.

(b) The Attorney General shall make and amend rules of the Department of Justice to assure compliance with this section.

(c) As used in this section, the term “attorney for the Government” includes any attorney described in section 77.2(a) of part 77 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations and also includes any independent counsel, or employee of such a counsel, appointed under chapter 40.

The Department of Justice sought to characterize the McDade Amendment as simply a codification of existing standards but for the most part DOJ did not challenge the practices that led to its enactment. And when it did, it was stopped dead cold by the courts

In three cases the Department challenged the authority of their state of bar to enforce its ethical rules against them for official conduct. The courts emphatically rejected those challenges. See In re Clark, 311 A. .3d 882, 887-889 (D.C. 2024) (citing the McDade Amendment); Matter of Howes, 940 P.2d 159, 169 (1997) (“Respondent has not cited and cannot point to any federal law which requires him to carry out his duties as an AUSA in an unethical manner or to any intent of Congress that he even be permitted to do so. To the contrary, the intent of Congress still appears to be that respondent and others in his position should adhere to the ethical standards prescribed by their licensing courts.”).

In United States v. Supreme Ct. of New Mexico, 839 F.3d 888, 923 (10th Cir. 2016), the United States argued that “state professional responsibility rule preempted by federal law, notwithstanding the McDade Act.”

The question in United States was whether a specific ethical provision applied to well established procedures before federal grand juries. The government argued the rule which prohibited “a prosecutor from subpoenaing a lawyer to present evidence about a past or present client in a grand-jury or other criminal proceeding unless such evidence is ‘essential’ and ‘there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information,’” was preempted by the Grand Jury Clause of the United States Constitution. While the Court agreed that the rules was preempted in the context of the grand jury, the court reaffirmed its previous holding that the ethical provision was not preempted as applied to subpoenas issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17. Id. at 930, a traditional prosecutorial function.

Once again, the Trump Administration seeks to ignore these decisions in the hope that no one will catch on to their evasions.

.

Part II

Past and Present Efforts to Evade the

McDade Amendment

The Department of Justice was never happy with the McDade Amendment and sought to dismiss it as just a codification of existing practice. That effort failed, but the Trump Administration now seeks to rely upon past DOJ statements post McDade to support the proposed regulation.

Those assertions then and now would nullify the protections Congress enacted. Indeed they are an absurd interpretation of the law. Congressional instruction to the DOJ to enact regulations to enforce this new law, could hardly have been intended to permit DOJ to enact regulations that would nullify the law. But that is precisely what the regulations would do.

Part III[5]

Unethical Conduct by Government Lawyers

Recognized by the Courts

On her first day as Attorney General (February 5, 2025), Ms. Bondi issued a memorandum to all Justice Department employees entitled General Policy Regarding Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of the United States. It states in part

It is the job of an attorney privileged to serve in the Department of Justice to zealously defend the interests of the United States. Those interests, and the overall policy of the United States, are set by the Nation’s Chief Executive, who is vested by the Constitution with all “[E]xecutive Power.” More broadly, attorneys are expected to zealously advance, protect, and defend their client’s interests. Department of Justice attorneys have signed up for a job that requires zealously advocating for the United States.

The responsibilities of Department of Justice attorneys include not only aggressively enforcing criminal and civil laws enacted by Congress, but also vigorously defending presidential policies and actions against legal challenges on behalf of the United States. The discretion afforded Department attorneys entrusted with these responsibilities does not include latitude to substitute personal political views or judgments for those that prevailed in the election.

When Department of Justice attorneys, for example, refuse to advance good-faith arguments by declining to appear in court or sign briefs, it undermines the constitutional order and deprives the President of the benefit of his lawyers. It is therefore the policy of the Department of Justice that any attorney who because of their personal political views or judgments declines to sign a brief or appear in court, refuses to advance good-faith arguments on behalf of the Administration, or otherwise delays or impedes the Department’s mission will be subject to discipline and potentially termination, consistent with applicable law.

At the time, no one knew what this meant. The nation soon found out.

A. Kilmar Garcia Litigation

Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia is an El Salvadoran citizen. He entered the United States around 2011.[6] In 2019, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) instituted removal proceedings against him. In response, Garcia sought a “withholding of removal” order preventing the United States from removing him to El Salvador. That order was issued in October 2019 after the immigration judge agreed it was more likely than not that Garcia would be persecuted by gangs if he were forced to return to his home country. The government did not appeal that order, so it became effective.

In March of this year, Mr. Garcia was detained by ICE and, without notice or legal process, flown to El Salvador and placed in the notorious “Terrorism Confinement Center” (CECOT).[7] On March 24, his family filed suit in federal district court in Maryland against several federal defendants, including the Secretary of Homeland Security and Ms. Bondi. They also sought an emergency temporary restraining order asking the court to order the defendants to request the government of El Salvador to return Mr. Garcia.

The government filed its response on March 31, arguing principally that the district court lacked jurisdiction for several reasons, and that it was not likely that El Salvador would respond positively to a request from the United States.[8] Critically, the response conceded that, “[o]n March 15, although ICE was aware of his protection from removal to El Salvador, Abrego Garcia was removed to El Salvador because of an administrative error.”[9]

At the April 4 hearing on the TRO motion, the government was represented by Erez Reuveni, the Acting Deputy Director of DOJ’s Office of Immigration Litigation and one of the DOJ lawyers who signed the March 31 response. As such, Mr. Reuveni had no option but to say at the outset, consistent with the Department’s March 31 response, “we concede the facts. This person should—the plaintiff, Abrego Garcia, should not have been removed.”[10] In an exchange with the court, he explained why: there was a withholding of removal order, now final, that forbade the government from returning Mr. Garcia to El Salvador. As a result, he acknowledged, “[t]here’s no dispute that the order could not be used to send Mr. Abrego Garcia to El Salvador.”[11] When the court pressed him on what document the government had relied upon to initiate Mr. Garcia’s removal in 2025, Mr. Reuveni again had no option but to concede [t]hat is not in the record, and the government has not put that into the record. And that’s the best I can do.”[12]

Similarly, Mr. Reuveni had to concede that the withholding of the removal order meant that, as a matter of law, Mr. Garcia could not be removed to El Salvador,[13] and that there was “no case directly on point to Your Honor’s question.”[14] The court thanked Mr. Reuveni, no less than three separate times, for his “candor.”[15] Mr. Reuveni did point out where there was a “dispute” between the parties,[16] and he argued at some length why the government believed the court had no jurisdiction in the case.[17]

And yet, the very next day, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche placed Mr. Reuveni on administrative leave for failing to “follow a directive from your supervisors,” “engaging in conduct prejudicial to your client” and not “zealously advocat[ing] on behalf of the United States.”[18] And the next day, Ms. Bondi appeared on “Fox News Sunday” and made it clear that Mr. Reuveni’s suspension was a direct consequence of her February 5 “zealous advocacy” memorandum:

He was put on administrative leave by Todd Blanche on Saturday. And I firmly said on Day 1, I issued a memo that you are to vigorously advocate on behalf of the United States. Our client in this matter was Homeland Security—is Homeland Security. He did not argue. He shouldn’t have taken the case. He shouldn’t have argued it, if that’s what he was going to do. He’s on administrative leave now. . . . You have to vigorously argue on behalf of your client.[19]

The Fox host, Shannon Bream, twice pointed out that “the government ha[d] admitted there was an error in deporting him.”[20] Neither time did Ms. Bondi dispute that assertion; nor did she explain how Mr. Reuveni could have done so. Rather, she simply said that Mr. Reuveni’s conduct “would be a defense attorney walking in conceding something in a criminal matter. That would never happen in this country.” [21]

Ten days later, Mr. Reuveni was fired by Mr. Bove at Ms. Bondi’s direction.[22] Mr. Blanche also suspended Mr. Reuveni’s immediate supervisor, August Flentje, for failure to supervise Mr. Reuveni.[23]

B. EPA Clean Energy Contract Investigation

Denise Cheung served for over 24 years in the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the District of Columbia.[24] She was most recently the Chief of the Criminal Division of that office. On February 17, 2025, the Department’s Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) (then headed by Mr. Bove in an acting capacity) instructed Ms. Cheung to open a criminal investigation into whether EPA had unlawfully awarded a clean energy project contract, and to issue grand jury subpoenas pursuant to the investigation. She was instructed to take that action by close of business that evening to prevent contract awardees from drawing down contract funds held by Citibank.

Ms. Cheung conferred with colleagues with substantial white collar criminal prosecution experience, reviewed documentation provided by ODAG, and concluded that the documents on their face did not provide the predicate for opening a criminal investigation. After much internal debate, ODAG said a “freeze letter” requesting that the bank freeze the funds would be adequate. Ms. Cheung contacted the FBI’s Washington Field Office to start that process. Ms. Cheung also viewed a Project Veritas video that ODAG claimed provided probable cause.

Ms. Cheung sent a draft freeze letter to the Principal Deputy U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia (PAUSA). The PAUSA proposed inclusion of language stating that the government had probable cause to believe that contract funds held by the bank were subject to seizure and forfeiture. Ms. Cheung said the language was not appropriate, based on evidence she had reviewed. Ms. Cheung provided the FBI with alternative language that said “there may be conduct that constitutes potential violations of [the federal criminal code] that merits additional investigation.” The FBI issued the letter to Citibank at 7:28 pm.

The PAUSA and Interim U.S. Attorney Martin called Ms. Cheung shortly afterward, objecting to the language of the freeze letter and directing Ms. Cheung to immediately send a second letter to the bank, signed by herself and Mr. Martin, announcing the commencement of a criminal investigation and ordering the bank not to disburse any funds. Ms. Cheung responded that she continued to believe there was insufficient evidence to issue such a letter, including insufficient evidence to tell the bank there was probable cause to seize the accounts that had been identified. Because Ms. Cheung believed she did not have legal authority to send the letter, she told Mr.Martin she would not send it. Mr. Martin then asked for her resignation, which she submitted the following day.Mr. Martin then personally submitted an application for a seizure warrant, not signed by any other prosecutors in his office.[25] A U.S. magistrate judge rejected it on the grounds that the application (which included an affidavit from an FBI agent) failed to establish a reasonable belief that a crime had occurred. Mr. Bove then approached at least one other U.S. attorney’s office in the southeastern United States about launching a grand jury investigation of the same contract and seeking a court-ordered bank freeze, but prosecutors in that office also refused to do so.

C. Dismissal of Eric Adams Prosecution[26]

In September 2024, the Department indicted Eric Adams, the Mayor of New York City, on five counts arising from his alleged solicitation of illegal campaign contributions from foreign nationals. Shortly after the election, Mr. Adams and his defense team initiated contact with Trump staff and ultimately met with the President-Elect himself. On January 31, 2025, Mayor Adams’ counsel met with then-Acting Deputy Attorney General Bove and the prosecutors working on the case, led by Danielle Sassoon, the Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. At that meeting, as documented by Ms. Sassoon, the Mayor’s counsel indicated that he could be helpful to the Administration’s immigration enforcement priorities if he was no longer facing prosecution. Also, as reported by Ms. Sassoon in her resignation letter, Mr. Bove “admonished a member of my team who took notes during that meeting and directed the collection of those notes at the meeting’s conclusion.”[27]

On February 10, Mr. Bove sent a memorandum to Ms. Sassoon, stating that he was acting pursuant to the authorization of the Attorney General. The memorandum instructed her to dismiss the indictment after obtaining Mr. Adams’ consent to dismissal of the indictment without prejudice to it being refiled. Mr. Bove’s memorandum provided two grounds for dismissal: (1) doing so would enable Mr. Adams to assist in immigration enforcement; and (2) Damian Williams, Ms. Sassoon’s predecessor, improperly “weaponized” the prosecution. Mr. Bove’s memorandum also stated that the decision to dismiss had been reached without consideration of the merits of the prosecution.

Ms. Sassoon wrote Ms. Bondi on February 12 to request a meeting and express her grave misgivings about this memorandum. She expressed concern that the agreement with Mayor Adams to consent to dismissal had been “negotiated without my office’s awareness or participation.” She explained that offering to drop a prosecution in exchange for a promise of assistance violated the Department of Justice Manual and the Rules of Professional Conduct, and would constitute prosecutorial misconduct. She also explained that Mr. Williams had very little involvement in the investigation, that the decision to indict originated with career staff, and that Mr. Williams’ public statements were typical for a U.S. Attorney. “Moreover,” she added, “dismissing without prejudice and with the express option of again indicting Adams in the future creates obvious ethical problems, by implicitly threatening future prosecution if Adams’s cooperation with enforcing the immigration laws proves unsatisfactory to the Department.”

Ms. Sassoon said “I am mindful of your recent order reiterating prosecutors’ duty to make good-faith arguments in support of the Executive Branch’s positions. See Feb. 5, 2025 Mem. ‘General Policy Regarding Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of the United States.’ But because I do not see any good-faith basis for the proposed position, I cannot make such arguments consistent with my duty of candor.” She offered to resign if Ms. Bondi chose not to meet with her or to reevaluate the dismissal directive.

Mr. Bove responded on February 13, “accepting” Ms. Sassoon’s resignation and placing the two lead prosecutors on administrative leave, pending an investigation of all three attorneys’ “insubordination” by the Office of Attorney General and the Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility.[28] The letter quoted from the “zealous advocacy” memorandum and added: “Your Office was not exempted from . . . the Attorney General’s memorandum.” That same day, Mr. Bove transferred the Adams prosecution from the office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York to the Department’s Public Integrity Section. The two leaders of the Public Integrity Section and three other lawyers there promptly resigned rather than participate in dismissing the case.

Ms. Sassoon resigned on February 14, along with one of the two lead prosecutors.[29] Also that day, Mr. Bove held a conference call with the remaining lawyers in the Public Integrity Section, stating that two of them would need to sign the dismissal motion—or it was strongly implied, they would all be fired. He gave them one hour to decide. A senior Section lawyer offered to sign the motion “to protect the other lawyers,” and it was ultimately filed that day with the additional signatures of Mr. Bove himself and the then head of the Department’s Criminal Division.

On April 22, three of the prosecutors who had been placed on administrative leave resigned. They explained that Mr. Blanche, newly appointed as the Deputy Attorney General, had conditioned their return to service on expressing regret and admitting misconduct in connection with refusing to dismiss the Adams case. They resigned rather than “abdicate our legal and ethical obligations in favor of directions from Washington.”[30]

On April 2, Judge Dale Ho reluctantly dismissed the indictment, although he did so with prejudice, declaring that “everything here smacks of a bargain: dismissal of the Indictment in exchange for immigration policy concessions.”[31] Judge Ho also rejected the Department’s claims of misconduct by Southern District prosecutors: “There is no evidence—zero—that they had any improper motives.”[32]

D. Numerous Cases Where Courts Stated that the Trump Administration had Failed to be Candid, Evaded Answering the Courts Questions, Lied to the Court, and Disobeyed Court Orders.

Georgetown Professor and a team of associates conducted a review of allegations of government misconduct and obtained transcripts from those matters where the judges made findings. Their findings were published in an issue of Just Security.[33]

What follows is a list of some of the cases discussed. For the convenience of the reader, the number next to each paragraph is the number for the paragraph they will find in the report.

Chapter Two, beginning p. 49.

3. Providing “highly misleading, if not intentionally false” sworn declaration to the court; “so disingenuous that the Court is left with little confidence that the defense can be trusted to tell the truth about anything.” Judge Amy Berman Jackson (Obama appointee), National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought, 1:25-cv-00381 (D.D.C.).

4. “Defendants’ plea for a presumption of good faith rings hollow when their own actions contradict their representations.” Judge Loren L. Alikhan (Biden appointee), National Council of Nonprofits v. Office of Management and Budget, 1:25-cv-00239-LLA (D.D.C.)

5. Providing false sworn declarations about “hotly contested” material fact; “The Court was given false information, upon which it relied, twice, to the detriment of a party at risk of serious and irreparable harm.” Judge Brian E. Murphy (Biden appointee), D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-10676 (D. Mass.)

6. Providing the court with “the sorriest statement I’ve ever seen;” “This is a terrible, terrible affidavit. If this were before me in a criminal case and you were asking to get a warrant issue on this, I’d throw you out of my chambers.” Judge Leonie M. Brinkema (Clinton appointee), Sanchez Puentes v. Charles, 1:25-cv-00509 (E.D. Va.)

7. “This Court takes clear offense to Respondents wasting judicial resources to admit to the Court it has no evidence;” “contradict[ing] themselves throughout the entire record;” providing “shoddy affidavits and contradictory testimony.” Judge David Briones (Clinton appointee), Sanchez Puentes v. Garite, 3:25-cv-00127 (W.D. Tex.).

8. (b) Government submitted “underinclusive” RIF figures in response to the court’s order; three declarations claiming months of background work on potential RIF plans were deemed contrary to the “factual record” Judge Susan Illston (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Trump, 3:25-cv-03698 (N.D. Cal.) and American Federation of Government Employees, AFL CIO v. United States Office of Management and Budget, 3:25-cv-08302 (N.D. Cal.) (related cases).

9. “Flip-flopping—in sworn declarations—rais[ing] severe concern,” “consistently refused to give … the full story,” providing “cagey answers,” “omitting key information,” and “repeated[ ] represent[ations]” that “strain credulity.” Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Abramowitz. v. Lake,1:25-cv-00887 (D.D.C.) and Widakuswara. v. Lake, 1:25-cv-01015 (D.D.C.) (related cases).

10. “The ‘administrative record’ submitted by the government is a sham. It does not facilitate judicial review: It frustrates it;” judge calls out government for “lie” in termination letters, and for DOJ preventing testimony because “afraid … would reveal the truth.” Judge William Alsup (Clinton appointee) American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 3:25-cv-01780 (N.D. Cal.).

11. (a) DOJ counsel in transgender military ban warned for treating the judge “like… an idiot” and attempting to “gasli[ght]” her. Judge Ana Reyes (Biden appointee), Talbott v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00240 (D.D.C.).

12. Providing false and incomplete information concerning DOGE’s leadership and authorities. Judge Theodore D. Chuang (Obama appointee), J. Doe 4 v. Musk, 8:25-cv-00462 (D. Md)( Defense counsel is reminded of their duty to make truthful representations to the court). Judge Tanya Chutkan (Obama appointee), New Mexico v. Musk, 1:25-cv-00429 (D.D.C.). Judge Kollar-Kotelly (Reagan appointee; Clinton appointee), Alliance for Retired Americans v. Bessent, 1:25-cv-00313 (D.D.C.).

13. Failing to “to offer any explanation, let alone one supported by the record;” court saying “can’t get a straight answer from you.” Judge Amir H. Ali (Biden appointee), AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. U.S. Department of State, 1:25-cv-00400 (D.D.C.) and Global Health Council v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00402 (D.D.C.).

16. Making “patently incredible” claims; Government “switching arguments at will,” a “totally inconsistent” case; and Government witness “knows nothing … less than nothing.” Judge Paula Xinis (Obama appointee),Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-00951 (D. Md.)

17. Providing an “explanation [that] is riddled with inconsistencies” Judge Jeanette A. Vargas (Biden appointee), State of New York v. Trump, 25-cv-01144 (S.D.N.Y.).

18. Making representation that “does not reflect the level of diligence the Court expects from any litigant—let alone the United States Department of Justice;” “The contradiction between [Government’s] factual representations and the facts on the ground is particularly striking.” Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly Clinton appointee), League of United Latin American Citizens v. Executive Office of The President, 1:25-cv-00946 (D.D.C.), Democratic National Committee v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00952 (D.D.C.), and League of Women Voters Education Fund v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00955 (D.D.C.) (consolidated cases)

19. Unrebutted claim that the government created a record as a “contrivance” to avert court ruling. Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump appointee) J.O.P. v. DHS, 8:19-cv-01944-SA (D.Md.).

20. Offering an “official justification … [that] is not plausible.” Judge Dabney L. Friedrich (Trump appointee), National Endowment for Democracy v. United States, 1:25-cv-00648 (D.D.C.).

21. Admission of making a false statement to the court. Judge Timothy James Kelly (Trump appointee), L.G.M.L v. Noem, 1:25-cv-02942 (D.D.C.)

22. ICE mask testimony deemed “disingenuous.”Judge William G. Young (Reagan appointee), American Association of University Professors v. Rubio 1:25-cv-10685 (D. Mass).

23. ICE statistics “concealed more than they disclosed, despite the availability … of much more illuminating data” and “gives no confidence that the defendants are seriously interested in making a full disclosure” Judge Lewis A. Kaplan (Clinton appointee), Barco Mercado v. Noem, 1:25-cv-06568 (S.D.N.Y.).

24. (a) President’s determination to federalize National Guard to Portland “simply untethered to the facts” and not “conceived in good faith.” Judge Karin J. Immergut (Trump appointee), State of Oregon v. Trump, 3:25-cv-01756 (D. Or.).

25. The “perceptions” of three government declarants “are not reliable,” and their declarations contain “unreliable information” that reflects “a potential lack of candor” and “call[s] into question their ability to accurately assess the facts.” Judge April M. Perry (Biden appointee), Illinois v. Trump, 1:25-cv-12174 (N.D. Ill.).

26. Affidavit supporting criminal complaint told a “largely fictional” story of the stop, including “blatant misstatements;” AUSA conceded the affidavit “misrepresented what was going on;” Judge Xavier Rodriguez (W. Bush appointee), United States v. Jaime Alberto Quintanilla-Chavez, 5:25-CR-388 (W.D. Tex.).

27. DHS/ICE “inaccurately describ[ing] the facts,” advancing a “decidedly incorrect” account of events, and “‘incorrectly describ[ing] the procedural posture of the case’” in immigration detention habeas case. Judge Leo T. Sorokin (Obama appointee), Shinwari v. Hyde, 1:25-cv-12021 (D. Mass.)

28. “Court does not credit” ICE official’s “assertion” of § 1225(b)(2)(A) detention because it is “contradicted by the Notice of Custody Determination.” Judge Julia E. Kobick (Biden appointee), Gomes v. Hyde, 1:25-cv-11571 (D. Mass.)

29. “Court cannot credit” DHS/ICE’s post-hoc “new position … raised for the first time in this litigation” asserting § 1225(b) immigration detention, given “the record is devoid of any reference to § 1225” and “indisputable” evidence of § 1226 treatment. Judge Dale E. Ho (Biden appointee), Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 1:25-cv-05937 (S.D.N.Y.).

30. “Court cannot credit” DHS/ICE’s post-hoc claim that immigration detention fell under § 1225(b)(2)(A), “despite clear indication” the detention was not under that statute. Judge Brandy R. McMillion (Biden appointee), Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2:25-cv-12486 (E.D. Mich.)

31. ICE Deputy Field Director declaration “contradicted pretty thoroughly” by migrants. Judge Robert W. Gettleman (Clinton appointee), Moreno Gonzalez v. Noem, 1:25-cv-13323, (N.D. Ill.)

32. DOT’s “nakedly misleading characterization” of immigration-enforcement grant conditions. Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), State of California v. United States Department of Transportation, 1:25-cv-00208 (D.R.I.)

34. CBP Commander “admitted that he lied;” CBP/ICE/DHS portrayal of Chicago unrest lacked credibility, “belie[d]” by own evidence; “Overall, this calls into question everything that defendants say they are doing” Judge Sara Lee Ellis (Obama appointee), Chicago Headline Club v. Noem, 1:25-cv-12173 (N.D. Ill.).

35. USDA’s assertion it could do “nothing more” to act “expeditiously” on November SNAP benefits “carries no weight.” Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), Rhode Island State Council of Churches v. Rollins, 1:25-cv-00569 (D.R.I.).

36. USDA’s Nov. 8 SNAP letter calling States’ actions “unauthorized” was “untethered to the factual record” and government “conceded” notice was “erroneous on its face ” Judge Indira Talwani (Obama appointee), Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. United States Department of Agriculture, 1:25-cv-13165 (D. Mass.)

Point IV

The Government’s Citation to Authorities is Either Incomplete, Inaccurate, Misleading, False, or Findings in Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States

The argument advanced by the Trump Administration ignores decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States that refute its bottom line position that its authority to regulate the conduct of its attorneys is superior to that of the states. This is what the Supreme Court said:

Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia within their respective jurisdictions. The States prescribe the qualifications for admission to practice and the standards of professional conduct. They also are responsible for the discipline of lawyers.

Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979). This is a powerful a articulation of an originalist repudiation of the government’s position. Full stop.

In Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court of the United State recognized the critical role states play in enforcing the lawyer’s obligations as officers of the court:

The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been “officers of the courts.” See Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123-124 (1961); Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, [*793] 157 (1971).

Id. at 792.

The government’s failure to acknowledge Leis and Goldfarb, is a further comment on the extent to which the government is willing to go to fool all the people all of the time. But as President Lincoln once pointed out, can’t be done.

In addition to ignoring these pronouncement by the SUPREME COURLT OF THE UNITED STATES, it asserts that it’s own interpretation of McDade constitutes authority that can be relied upon. Thus, it interprets McDade to provide it with superior authority to determine whether its lawyers have acted unethically.

This is not only contrary to plain intent of the Amendment to stop the Department of Justice’s from determining for itself what ethical rules to follow, it is contrary to the very text of the statute itself, which the government seeks to avoid by claiming that it is ambiguous. This a bizarre argument, asserted as if the United States were unaware of its victory in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, supra.

Point V

The Administration’s Contention that Existing Department of Justice Components Provide Robust Mechanisms to Ensure that Lawyers Engaged in Misconduct Are Disciplined is a Chimera

The Trump Administration contends:

The Department has long been committed to upholding the highest standards of ethics among its attorneys. On October 21, 1998, the President signed the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681. Division A, section 801 of that statute, also known as the McDade Amendment, is enacted at 28 U.S.C. 530B and became effective on April 19, 1999. See generally Charles Doyle, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL30060, McDade-Murtha Amendment: Ethical Standards for Justice Department Attorneys. It does not apply to attorneys in Federal government agencies other than the Department, unless they are appointed as Special Assistant United States Attorneys. See id.c[34]

While this was true in the past, it is manifestly not true today.

Previously the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) would review allegations of misconduct by Department lawyers. Where ere an OPR investigation concluded with a finding of intentional misconduct and that finding is approved by the Deputy Attorney General, OPR’s practice is to notify the relevant state bar. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-00-187, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: INFORMATION ON THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY’S OPERATIONS (2000). It is also unclear whether OPR is even functional at the moment.

These components still exist, but are not functioning.

AG Bondi fired the head of the Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”), Jeffrey Ragsdale, in early August. OPR handles internal ethics investigations. Despite the fact that Mr. Ragsdale was ousted more than seven months ago, OPR’s website does not identify anyone as having replaced him as head of the Office. All it states under the heading “Leadership” is “Counsel”.

Former Acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove installed two political appointees at OPR, with no prior DOJ experience, to make final determinations on adverse personnel actions, bar referral matters, and ethics recusals and waivers. Its budget for FY 2026 was cut by 26%.

Stacy Ludwig, formerly the Director of the Department’s Professional Responsibility Advisory Office, left her position at the Department of Justice in March. The purpose of this Office is “The mission of the Professional Responsibility Advisory Office (PRAO) is to ensure prompt, consistent advice to Department attorneys and Assistant United States Attorneys with respect to professional responsibility and choice-of-law issues.” justice.gov/prao.

Conclusion

The Trump Administration relies on components and practices followed by prior Administrations—including its own first administration—that in fact it has actively worked to destroy. It hopes that if it tells a lie often enough, and loud enough, it will be sufficient to fool to just enough people to put this measure into effect. We say, ENOUGH!

APPENDIX

Text of Proposed Regulation

Revise § 77.1 to read as follows:

§ 77.1 Purpose and authority.

(a) The Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that its attorneys perform their duties in accordance with the highest ethical standards. The purposes of this part are to implement 28 U.S.C. 530B, to provide guidance to attorneys concerning the requirements imposed on Department attorneys by 28 U.S.C. 530B, and to fulfill the Attorney General’s obligation to assure Department attorneys comply with these requirements.

(b) Section 530B requires Department attorneys to comply with state and local federal court rules of professional responsibility but should not be construed in any way to alter federal substantive, procedural, or evidentiary law or to interfere with the Attorney General’s authority to send Department attorneys into any court in the United States.

(c) Section 530B imposes on Department attorneys the same rules of professional responsibility that apply to non-Department attorneys, but should not be construed to impose greater burdens on Department attorneys than those on non-Department attorneys or to alter rules of professional responsibility that expressly exempt government attorneys from their application.

(d) Section 530B requires the Attorney General to assure Department attorneys comply with applicable rules of professional responsibility.

(e) The regulations set forth in this part provide guidance to Department attorneys in determining the rules with which such attorneys should comply.

(f) The regulations set forth in this part establish a process for the Attorney General or her designee to review bar complaints and allegations against Department attorneys.

§ 77.5 [Redesignated as § 77.6]

Redesignate § 77.5 as § 77.6.

Add new § 77.5 to read as follows:

§ 77.5. Review of state bar complaints and allegations against current and former attorneys for the government.

(a) Before the bar disciplinary authorities of the States, the Territories, or the District of Columbia undertake any investigative steps that seek information or otherwise require participation from an attorney for the government in response to allegations that a current or former attorney for the government violated a rule of ethical conduct while engaging in that attorney’s duties for the Department, the Attorney General shall have the right to review the allegations in the first instance. The Attorney General shall have this right whether the allegations are made in a complaint filed by a third party or the bar disciplinary authorities open an investigation into the allegations without a complaint. The Attorney General or her designee shall notify the appropriate bar disciplinary authorities whether she intends to exercise her right to review the allegations and, if she does, she or her designee shall request that the bar disciplinary authorities suspend any parallel investigations or disciplinary proceedings until the completion of the review. If the Attorney General decides not to complete her review, she or her designee shall notify the appropriate bar disciplinary authorities so they may resume their investigations or disciplinary proceedings. The Attorney General or her designee shall inform the appropriate bar disciplinary authorities of the completion of her review. As appropriate, the Attorney General or her designee shall also inform the appropriate bar disciplinary authorities of the results of her review, including if the review finds that the attorney for the government did not violate any rule of ethical conduct while engaging in that attorney’s duties.

(b) Should the relevant bar disciplinary authorities refuse the Attorney General’s request, the Department shall take appropriate action to enforce this regulation or to prevent the bar disciplinary authorities from interfering with the Attorney General’s review of the allegations.

[1] “If finalized as proposed, whenever a third party files a bar complaint alleging that a current or former Department attorney violated an ethics rule while engaging in that attorney’s duties for the Department, or whenever bar disciplinary authorities open an investigation into such allegations without a complaint having been filed, the Attorney General will have the right to review the complaint and the allegations in the first instance.”

[2] Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche stated at the Annual Convention of the Federalist Society that the government is at war with “activist rogue judges.”

43:04 to 44:37.

[3] Joe Gaeta, The Department of Justice’s Broken Accountability System, October 20, 2025 https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/department-justices-broken-accountability-system.

[4] See Levin, Leslie C., The Use of State Discipline to Sanction Attorneys General and Other High-Ranking Legal Officers (November 15, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5753303 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5753303; Nina Marino and Richard Kaplan, Moving Towards a Meaningful Limitation on Wrongful Prosecutorial Contact with Represented Parties, 4 PUB. INT. L. REV. 36 (1999); Stephen Gillers, Because They Are Lawyers First and Foremost: Ethics Rules and Other Strategies to Protect the Justice Department from a Faithless President, 57 GA. L. REV. 163, 199-200 (2022).

[5] Part III previously appeared in the Complaint filed against Attorney General Pamela Jo Bondi filed with The Florida Bar and was written by a team of lawyers including Professor Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, Jamie Conrad, Stephen Marcus, John T. Montgomery, and Professor Abbe Smith.

[6] All the factual statements in this and the following paragraph are drawn from the complaint in Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-00951, (D. Maryland Mar. 24, 2025) ECF No. 1.

[7] Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-00951, (D. Maryland Apr 06, 2025) ECF No. 31, at 1.

[8] Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-00951, (D. Maryland Mar. 31, 2025) ECF No. 11. The Department’s opposition was signed by Yaakov M. Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney General – Civil Division, Mr. Reuveni, and Christopher I. Pryby, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation.

[9] Hr’g Tr. No. 8:25-cv-00951, 19 (D. Maryland Apr. 4, 2025) (on file with the author).

[10] Id. at 21.

[11] Id. at 25.

[12] Id. at 21.

[13] Id. at 23-25.

[14] Id. at 28.

[15] Id. at 20, 35-36, and 50.

[16] Id. at 40-41.

[17] Id. at 42-49.

[18] Glenn Thrush, Justice Dept. Accuses Top Immigration Lawyer of Failing to Follow Orders, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 5, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/05/us/politics/justice-dept-immigration-lawyer-leave.html?searchResultPosition=7.

[19] Video posted by Fox News (@FoxNews), FACEBOOK, AG Pam Bondi accuses district court judges of playing ‘whack-a-mole’ (Apr. 6, 2025), https://www.facebook.com/FoxNews/videos/ag-pam-bondi-accuses-district-court-judges-of-playing-whack-a-mole-with-anti-tru/672899485221131/

[20] Id.

[21] Id. In fact, Rule 4-3.3 applies equally in civil and criminal cases, except where a client in a criminal case insists on

presenting false testimony. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3(b). That is obviously inapplicable to Mr. Reuveni.

Also, Ms. Bondi’s statement that a defense attorney would never “concede something in a criminal matter” isincorrect. Criminal defense attorneys often concede facts or points of law if they are undisputed and it is in the interest of their client to do so.

[22] See Glenn Thrush, As White House Steers Justice Dept., Bondi Embraces Role of TV Messenger, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/us/politics/pam-bondi-trump-justice-dept.html?smid=url-share.

[23] Thrush, supra note 18.

[24] The facts in this section are drawn from Read the resignation letter by Denise Cheung, a veteran D.C. federal prosecutor, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2025), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2025/02/18/read-resignation-letter-denise-cheung/.

[25] The facts in this paragraph are drawn from Spencer S. Hsu, Maxine Joselow & Nicolás Rivero, FBI takes up EPA probe amid pushback from judge, prosecutors, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2025), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2025/02/27/trump-fbi-epa-grant-investigation/.

[26] Except as otherwise noted, the facts in this section are drawn from Lola Fadulu & Alyce McFadden, A Timeline of Eric Adams’s Indictment, and What Came Next, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/article/eric-adams-indictment-timeline.html; Letter from Danielle Sassoon, Fmr. U.S. Att’y S.D. N.Y. to Pamela Bondi, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Feb. 12, 2025) (on file with the author); Read the letter from Emil Bove accepting Danielle Sassoon’s resignation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/02/13/nyregion/memo-from-bove-1.html; and E-mail from Hagan Scotten, Asst. U.S. Att’y S.D. N.Y. to Emil Bove, Princ. Assoc. Dep. U.S. Att’y Gen. (on file with the author).

[27] Letter, supra note 26, at 3.

[28] Read the letter from Emil Bove accepting Danielle Sassoon’s resignation, supra note 36, at 1-2 and 5. Mr. Bove placed Hagan Scotten and Derek Wikstrom on administrative leave. Two other prosecutors, Celia Cohen and Andrew Rohrbach, were also placed on leave sometime later.

[29] The resignation email that the lead prosecutor, Mr. Scotten, sent to Mr. Bove is particularly scathing:

No system of ordered liberty can allow the Government to use the carrot of dismissing charges, or the stick of threatening to bring them again, to induce an elected official to support its policy

objectives. . . . [O]ur laws and traditions do not allow using the prosecutorial power to influence othercitizens, much less elected officials, in this way. If no lawyer within earshot of the President is willing togive him that advice, then I expect you will eventually find someone who is enough of a fool, orenough of a coward, to file your motion. But it was never going to be me. E-mail, supra note 26, at 1.

[30] Jonah Bromwich & William Rashbaum, Adams Case Prosecutors Resign Rather Than Express Regret to Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/22/nyregion/eric-adams-prosecutors-resign.html.

[31] Read the ruling dismissing corruption charges against Eric Adams, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/04/02/nyregion/adams-charges-dismissed-ruling.html

[32] Id., slip op. at 2.

[33] Ryan Goodman, Siven Watt, Audrey Balliette, Margaret Lin, Michael Pusic and Jeremy Venook, The “Presumption of Regularity” in Trump Administration Litigation, November 20, 2025, https://www.justsecurity.org/120547/presumption-regularity-trump-administration-litigation/

[34] The assertion that McDade is limited to lawyers working for the Department of Justice is without support, other than the government’s wishful thinkings. It contrary to the express language of the statute as any textualist would recognize.

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