LOOK BEFORE YOU VOTE: JUNGLE PRIMARIES BALLOT QUESTION!

IMC-CAN Team Weekly Action August 12, 2026

This summer and fall, the IMC-CAN will be looking at each of the Ballot Questions in the upcoming November election.

Question 3 deserves especially careful scrutiny because it would fundamentally change how Massachusetts chooses candidates, and it has generated significant debate even among progressives and Democrats.

Supporters present the all-party, top-two primary as a pro-democracy reform that would broaden participation, reduce party gatekeeping, increase competition, and give progressive and other grassroots candidates access to a larger electorate.

The proposal, however, is strongly opposed by a coalition of progressive groups across Massachusetts. Critics point to California’s experience and research findings that when two candidates from the same party reach the general election, the system can favor the more moderate candidate, who can build a winning coalition that includes independents, voters from the opposing party, and more moderate/conservative members of their own party. Worse, the top-two system leaves open the possibility that a broad field of Democratic candidates in a blue-leaning state could split the vote and enable two Republican candidates to advance to the November general election!

Because Question 3 is being promoted as a democratic reform while raising legitimate questions about representation, strategic voting, and who gains influence over the selection of Democratic candidates, voters should understand both the case for the proposal and the evidence and arguments against it before deciding how to vote.

Question 3 would eliminate Massachusetts’ separate Democratic and Republican primaries for most state and federal offices and replace them with a single “top-two” primary open to all voters and candidates. Every candidate, regardless of party, would appear on the same ballot. The two candidates receiving the most votes would advance to the November general election, even if both belong to the same party.

Often described as a “jungle primary,” the system would apply to races including Governor, U.S. Senator and Representative, state legislators, Attorney General, Secretary of State, and other state and county offices, but not the presidential primary. California and Washington currently have a similar system, as do some other jurisdictions with similar-but-different setups (e.g., Louisiana, Alaska).

A YES vote adopts the new system beginning in 2028. A NO vote keeps Massachusetts’ current party-primary system.

Supporters of Question 3 argue that Massachusetts elections are unusually uncompetitive and give too much power to party insiders and the relatively small number of voters who participate in partisan primaries: they note that 52% of covered races from 2014–2024 were uncontested and that roughly 65% of Massachusetts voters are unenrolled. They argue that an all-parties, top-two primary would give every voter the same ballot and allow everyone to choose among all candidates, producing more meaningful competition, higher participation, and greater accountability because candidates would have to appeal to a broader electorate rather than primarily to a party’s most active voters. They also contend that the system would reduce party gatekeeping, give independent, minor-party, and less-established candidates greater visibility, encourage broader electoral coalitions, and ultimately produce elected officials who are more responsive and representative of their districts.

Partners in Democracy and the Coalition for a Healthy Democracy are spearheading this ballot initiative.

Progressives in Massachusetts voice grave concerns about how an open primary system would function. The open primary system is being promoted as a pro-democracy initiative, but it also has the financial backing of wealthy donors.

Although the stated objective is to encourage a more diverse slate of candidates outside of the two-party apparatus, several related mechanisms could disadvantage progressive candidates that lack corporate backing and big donors:

1. Moderation Effect: The decisive election moves from the party electorate to the whole electorate. Imagine a Massachusetts district that is 70% Democratic. Under the current system, a progressive candidate could win the Democratic primary 55–45 and then be overwhelmingly favored in November. Under a “jungle primary” model, a progressive and a moderate Democrat might finish first and second. In November, Republican voters would have no Republican candidate, so many may naturally vote for the more conservative Democrat. The progressive candidate would have effectively won the Democratic contest but would lose the general election. A scenario such as this could result in a more right-leaning candidate winning out in a predominantly blue-leaning state.

2. Vote Splitting: If five progressives or liberals divide essentially the same pool of Democratic voters, one well-known more conservative candidate could consolidate Independent/Republican support and displace the more progressive candidates from the November election. In the worst-case scenario, the vote-splitting bumps all of the Democratic candidates off of the November ballot, leaving only two Republican or Independent candidates in the general election.

Groups like Fair Vote and Voter Choice Massachusetts argue that Ranked Choice voting is a much more democratic and pluralistic approach to voting. Ranked-choice voting works differently: voters can rank those candidates, allowing support to transfer rather than simply being divided. California has repeatedly experienced the possibility of one party being shut out because too many candidates from that party divided its vote. In 2020, a Ballot Initiative to institute Ranked Choice Voting in Massachusetts failed.

3. Money Talks: Money and name recognition can have an outsized influence in an open primary system. A candidate has to survive a multicandidate primary and potentially fight another expensive campaign against a member of their own party. Research reviewed by New America found that California’s switch to top-two was associated with increased campaign contributions and concluded that money can become particularly important when voters must distinguish among multiple candidates carrying the same party label. A well-funded incumbent or establishment candidate can, therefore, have an advantage over a lesser-known ideological challenger.

4. Strategic voting: A voter may decide not to vote for their favorite candidate because they are worried about which two candidates will survive (i.e., that their vote will contribute to the vote-splitting phenomenon noted in #2 above). The scenario is that Democratic voters seeing six Democrats and two Republicans might feel pressure to consolidate behind whichever Democrat appears most likely to prevent a Republican-Republican vote in the November election, rather than voting for the candidate they genuinely like the most. California Democrats confronted precisely that concern in the 2026 governor’s race.

No on 3, Progressive Mass

Vote No on 3 Coalition is opposing this measure. Thus far, this broad, progressive coalition includes Progressive Mass, Progressive Dems of Massachusetts, Mass Alliance, MassDems, and several major unions.

Progressive Mass’s Guide to 2026 Ballot Initiatives

“The Nation’s Most Democratic State Might Elect a Trump-Friendly Governor” The American Prospect, 2/9/26

“AP Decision Notes: What to expect in California’s state primary” AP News, 6/1/26

“The top-two primary was supposed to change California politics. Did it flop?” CalMatters, 6/4/26

“The Right Voting Reforms—and the Wrong Ones” The American Prospect, 6/10/26

“Is California’s top-two system working? Crowded primary for governor’s race brings renewed scrutiny.” ABC7/KGO, 6/13/26

“Why Hasn’t the Top-Two Primary Been More Transformative?” New America

“Top Four” Fair Vote

Have a good idea for the CAN? You can suggest action items! Each week, the IMC-CAN Team receives suggested actions from a wide range of activists through its CAN Team Action Submission Form.