What a post-American Middle East means for Europe

When Oman, Iran, and the US announced that they were close to concluding an agreement for the conflict over the strait of Hormuz, stocks optimistically leaped up in anticipation. By the time of writing and publication of this piece, Iran, Oman, and the US continue to stress that they are “very close”; according to what has been published about the agreement thus far, control over the Strait of Hormuz would be shared between Iran and Oman, yet with significant leverage for Iran to control traffic entering the Strait.

It remains to be seen to what extent the agreement will be implemented and whether it will remain stable. Even without knowing the details of the agreement and its future, the implication of the dynamics in the region, more generally over the past six months and especially over the last days, goes far beyond regional maritime security. Rather, these dynamics indicate a profound regional reshuffling — and the need for Europe to rethink its approach to the region.

The end of US deep engagement and US primacy in the region

Europe could observe from the outside what the US’ partners in the Gulf have experienced firsthand over the past months: that the time of deep engagement is over for good, and that partnership with the United States does not automatically imply that Washington will be willing to protect them or come to their help. The Gulf states were neither protected by Washington when Iran started attacking them, nor were they granted a seat at the negotiation table for the future of the regional order. In other words, they seemed to be useful partners for Washington as long as they served US objectives, whereas the US seemed unwilling or unable to return the favour.

Besides the fact that the end of deep engagement was a policy choice to be expected, it also coincides with a visible demonstration of the limits of US power. The negotiations of the agreement with Iran and Iran’s ability to permanently ask for more concessions from Washington clearly show the limits of US power. Washington has overwhelming material power in terms of economic, military, and technological resources compared to Iran, but it has failed to coerce Iran effectively. Even despite the killing of leading military figures, Iran continued to fight back and leveraged the closure of the strait of Hormuz as a central bargaining chip (more on this below). In theory, one should have expected Washington to use the balance of power, which was disproportionally in its favour, more effectively to obtain the intended objectives, whether it was the total destruction of the nuclear programme, regime change, both of them combined, or something else. However, Iran still seemed to have significant leverage in the negotiations, not allowing Washington to obtain a deal as quickly as desired and clearly not with as much leverage as one could expect from a superpower. This outcome is hence a clear indication that US power in the region is waning, and it would be surprising if this or the next administration did not fundamentally revisit its approach to the region based on the experience of the last few months.

The revelation that US deep engagement and uncontested power in the region are apparently past history now implies the need to adapt strategic thinking about the region for Europe. For a long time, Europe could rely on the US playing the major role as a security provider or an intervener in the region; if goals aligned, Europe could side with the US, or would abstain from doing so if this was fundamentally opposed to European interests (think about the transatlantic tensions over the Iraq war in 2003 or even the fallouts over Iran earlier this year). As the US revisits its approach to the region with an uncertain outcome, Europe cannot rely on bandwagoning with the US as its sole strategy to the region.

Whilst Europe has to redefine its approach to the region, regional players also rethink their relationship with Europe. Strategic convergence between the Gulf states and Europe seems to be growing, and increasingly leads to calls for cross-regional co-construction of security, for example through a Resilience Initiative or addressing shared concerns more generally. As the US withdraws or becomes increasingly unpredictable, there could hence be “a space for Europe” as seen from the region.

Regional reshuffling: the risk of regional security dilemmas and spirals

The news with just as important implications for regional security, which also has to be understood in direct connection to the shifting US posture and the lack of US guarantees for partners, dropped on Friday: the signing of a defence agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan. According to media reports, the so-called Mecca Joint Defence Agreement states that “the agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression, and stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all”. It furthermore aims to enhance defence cooperation among the three participating states. The formulation of collective deterrence strongly reminds European readers of NATO’s solidarity clause, article 5; it is therefore not surprising that Iran has directly sharply criticised the agreement, whereas the participating states emphasise the defensive nature of the agreement.

The agreement is noteworthy from a European perspective for three reasons. First, it adds to the agreement between nuclear-armed Pakistan and regional hegemon Saudi Arabia, which was just concluded in summer 2025. The so-called Mutual Defence Agreement was widely seen as a major step towards connecting Middle Eastern and South Asian security whilst also extending nuclear deterrence to Saudi Arabia. The new agreement now adds another layer of defence cooperation to a space with an increasing number of bilateral and minilateral agreements in the Middle East. It also shows that cross-regional and subregional cooperation increases as the US becomes increasingly unpredictable as a partner in the region, and that states actively look for alternatives.

Second, the agreement between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia could confirm the assumptions of hegemonic stability theory and the balance of power. When a leading power (in this case, the US) shifts towards a more restrained posture and commitments in a region or fully withdraws, regional powers will have to adapt their strategies to establish a new balance of power. This rebalancing between regional powers can stop if deterrence works and states do not see the strategic adaptations of others as a threat. However, if these adaptations through external balancing, namely the formation of new alliances and partnerships, or through internal balancing (aka rearmament) are seen as a threat by other states in the region, these dynamics can lead to a regional security dilemma and trigger spiral dynamics. It remains to be seen how Iran will react to the new security agreement and how the regional dynamics between particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran play out, but Europe will have to clarify its relationship with the different sides respectively. In the past, Europe’s Middle East policy was anything but coherent, so European policymakers would be well advised to coordinate on their respective stances and positioning in case regional rivalries and potentially conflict intensify. More structurally, Europe needs to brace for more instability and volatility in the region, with ripple effects for Europe regarding global commons like the freedom of navigation, energy, and humanitarian challenges. The attacks by the Houthi rebels, widely known as proxies of the Iranian regime, on an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia will provide first indications of how the agreement works and to what extent it leads to more offensive dynamics or restraint.

Third, the membership of Türkiye in the new defence agreement also implies new questions for NATO and particularly European NATO allies. As Ankara is now included in collective deterrence organisations in Europe and the Middle East, Türkiye becomes an even more relevant bridge between the two regions. At the same time, it remains to be seen to what extent the agreement alters Türkiye’s political attention, shifting it from the Mediterranean potentially further East. Due to the new agreement, Türkiye now seems to be part of two alliances with similar guarantees but not necessarily the same political objectives — which is a key question to be addressed within NATO. Ankara will probably have to explain this choice to its European partners and clarify its strategic trajectory to provide NATO allies with predictability. Especially Italy, which has taken over the NATO Joint Force Command in Naples earlier this year, can play an important role leading these conversations, especially when it comes to regional security in the Mediterranean.

Weaponisation becomes the norm on global commons

The events of the past six months have reinforced a trend that has become increasingly visible over the past years: weaponisation of non-military assets as a tool of coercion in international affairs. It almost seems like the US strikes on Iran have made Iran (re)discover the immense leverage it can exert through the control of the Strait of Hormuz.

The fact that the possibility of ad hoc weaponisation of the Strait of Hormuz is almost codified in the agreement between Iran, Oman, and the US should make European states approach the question more strategically. The consequences of regional tensions in the Middle East and potential closures or security threats in the Strait will be directly felt in Europe, and European states will need to mitigate the ramifications. Discussions on connectivity and economic security also need to go beyond the Middle East — including in order to find ways to “crisis-proof” the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), as the East Corridor connects India to the Arabian Gulf.

From a broader perspective, this trend of weaponisation confirms what sets the tone in Brussels today: that diversification and increasing economic sovereignty are not a “nice to have” but essential to secure Europe’s prosperity.

Known unknowns and volatility

The agreement between Iran, Oman, and the US is certainly a major breakthrough, but it also comes with a lot of new questions for Europe. Overall, it indicates that Europe needs to brace for more volatility in the region and in US foreign policy more generally.

Beyond the Middle East, the central question for Europe is also to what extent the ripple effects of the war on US defence policy will affect the transatlantic relationship. The war was extremely costly for Washington, leaving DC with estimated expenses of more than 37 billion USD and increasingly depleted stockpiles. The latter has already led to delays of the delivery of key systems to European allies and Ukraine, and the US partners in Asia equally question to what extent the war will affect the US ability and willingness to support them in case of a regional contingency.

The key lesson for Europe here is that more individual strategic thinking and more European strategic autonomy is long overdue; the Covid-19 pandemic, the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the re-election of Donald Trump as US President have all already clearly indicated this. While strategic autonomy should not mean “Europe alone” or a rupture of the transatlantic relationship, it requires recalibration. In Europe, European states are working on this through burden-shifting in NATO and through taking more responsibility for their own security. However, the transatlantic relationship defines European security beyond the border of the European continent, and rethinking the relationship therefore also needs to focus on other theatres, including the Middle East.