Welcome to our first newsletter of 2026, featuring updates on organizations working to reduce global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs). We have lots of exciting updates and opportunities to share—let's dive in!
— Anemone and Tessa
The Mirror Biology Dialogues Fund (newsletter) supports efforts to understand risks and develop governance frameworks for mirror biology research before it becomes technically feasible to create mirror life.
UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee recommended a precautionary global moratorium on the creation of mirror organisms, and the UN Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters stated that mirror organisms present “unprecedented, perhaps existential, risks” in its 2025 report to the UN Secretary-General.
Germany’s Central Commission for Biological Safety (ZKBS) issued a statement that mirror bacteria could pose serious risks and that “a broad scientific and societal debate” was necessary.
The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and Renaissance Philanthropy have stated that they will not fund research with the goal of creating mirror organisms.
In September, MBDF co-hosted a technical workshop with Professor Patrick Cai at the University of Manchester, convening over 30 synthetic biologists, mirror biochemists, ethicists, and governance experts. Attendees discussed precursor technologies for mirror life that could potentially be governed to prevent its creation while preserving beneficial research.
The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) is a nonprofit, non-partisan security policy institute devoted to anticipating, analyzing, and addressing core systemic risks to security in the 21st century, with special examination of the ways in which these risks intersect and exacerbate one another.
CSR launched its Global Biosecurity Tracker in December, documenting how countries are working to mitigate biological risks. The launch captures efforts by Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus the European Union. CSR will add additional countries quarterly.
Highlighting US government biodefense efforts, explore our FY26 update to the Biodefense Budget Breakdown and analysis of biodefense in the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act.
CSR’s Christine Parthemore and Andy Weber guest-edited a special “deterrence by denial” edition of the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament focused on addressing biological weapons threats. CSR co-hosted a side event with Nagasaki University at the Biological Weapons Convention Working Group in December to amplify deterrence by denial.
CSR is pushing for biodefense to be quantified in NATO’s 3.5% defense capability spending targets. See the recent Parthemore-Weber op-ed and stay tuned for more.
The Pandemic Center at the Brown University School of Public Health works to reduce vulnerabilities and increase resilience to pandemics, other biological emergencies, and the harms they pose to health, peace, security, and prosperity.
Last quarter, we saw the publication of the HLIP Closing the Deal: Financing Our Security Against Pandemic Threats and public briefing, which highlights ways to secure the world (including manufacturing and distributing vaccines, PPE, tests, and treatments) against major biological threats in an era of diminishing resources. The Pandemic Center’s Senior Advisor, Beth Cameron, operates as a Special Adviser to the HLIP, and Senior Advisor Seth Berkley is an HLIP panel member and spoke at the NAM event. Other Pandemic Center and Brown SPH individuals are associated with the HLIP secretariat and working groups: Sabrina Chwalek, Yuliya Velhan, Gabby Chalker, and Stephanie Psaki.
Pandemic Center Co-Hosted Gabby Stern, Former WHO Communications Chief, in November for an in-person conversation. Read more about that here.
Our Clean Indoor Air team convened state leaders, legislators, researchers, and advocates in Providence (Dec. 8) to advance school indoor air quality legislation (H5597 and S0977), and expanded the Global Pledge for Healthy Indoor Air to 240 organizations and launched Montenegro’s national initiative to deploy clean air technologies across all elementary classrooms.
Senior Advisor Seth Berkley launched his book, Fair Doses, and spoke about it on a webinar with Director Jen Nuzzo.
The Asia Centre for Health Security (ACHS) (newsletter) is a new academic think tank, set up to strengthen Asia’s readiness for biological threats through scientific evidence, building of expertise and capabilities, and the forging of strategic partnerships. Our vision is a united and resilient Asia safeguarded against health security threats for the well-being of future generations.
The quarterly-held Asia Centre for Health Security (ACHS) Webinar Series discusses innovative developments in health security in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The webinars are presented by leaders in the field of biosafety and biosecurity. The next instalment of this Series, “Global Biorisk Index for AI-Powered Biodesign Tools”, will be held on 22 January 2026, Thursday at 5pm (Singapore time, GMT +08:00). It will be presented by Dr Sana Zakaria, Senior Research Leader for Emerging Technology, RAND Europe. Register at https://asia-chs.org/webinar/achs-webinar-series/.
Simon Fraser University (SFU) and ACHS will be co-hosting a public lecture on 22 January 2026. Titled “Managing Borders during Global Public Health Emergencies; Lessons Learned from COVID-19”, the lecture will be presented by Prof Kelley Lee, Canada Research Chair Tier I in Global Health Governance from SFU and the University of British Columbia, Canada. This will be followed by a panel discussion featuring Prof Kelley and several experts from the region, including Prof Hsu Li Yang, Director, ACHS. Register for the lecture at https://for.sg/achs-pandemicborders.
The International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS) (news) is a Geneva-based nonprofit that works collaboratively with global partners to strengthen biosecurity norms and develop innovative tools to uphold them.
Launch of Global DNA Synthesis Map: The Global DNA Synthesis Map is the first publicly available global overview of DNA synthesis providers, screening practices, and regulatory frameworks. The tool provides visibility over a complex global industry and offers a fully public view of how DNA-writing capabilities are happening worldwide.
Launch of the DNA Screening Standards Consortium (DSSC): This is a new international, multi-stakeholder initiative focused on strengthening and supporting the implementation of global DNA synthesis screening standards. Building on frameworks such as ISO 20688-2, the DSSC will focus on standards convergence, practical implementation tools, and engagement with policymakers and standards bodies.
Launch of the Sequence Biosecurity Risk Consortium (SBRC): The SBRC maintains a standard definition of “sequences of concern” based on a scientific assessment of biosecurity risk from synthetic nucleic acids. We provide test sets, a clear risk-based rubric for flagging sequences, and a trusted forum for synthesis providers, screening tool developers, and policymakers to address screening standards and vulnerabilities.
The Biosecurity Policy Unit at the Centre for Long-Term Resilience (CLTR) works closely with the UK Government and other stakeholders to reduce extreme biological risks.
We published a cost-benefit analysis demonstrating that mandating screening for synthetic nucleic acid orders is highly cost-beneficial for the UK. We have recommended that the UK Government propose screening legislation by Q4 2026.
We consolidated the evidence gaps on mirror life risks outlined in the 2024 technical report and published a preprint and report on novel molecular dynamics simulations, which suggest that existing antibiotics would fail to bind to mirror bacterial targets. These pieces of work reinforced our conclusion that research directly leading to the creation of mirror life should not be conducted, and policy governance decisions do not need to wait.
We released an independent ‘Two Years On’ assessment of the UK’s Biological Security Strategy. While noting progress in responsible innovation and the Biothreats Radar, we flagged critical delays in the National Biosurveillance Network and recommended an updated outcome-delivery framework to ensure the strategy’s ambitions are fully realised.
The NTI | bio program works to identify gaps and promote lasting systemic change to improve biotechnology governance, strengthen biosecurity and pandemic preparedness, and reduce global catastrophic biological risks.
NTI released a new report highlighting key findings and policy recommendations on safeguarding against risks at the convergence of AI and the life sciences. The report was developed from a tabletop exercise that NTI conducted at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025.
The NTI | bio Next Generation for Biosecurity Competition winners presented their paper, Redefining Biological Weapons: Expanding the BWC to Incorporate Infrastructure Harm and Cyberbiothreats, at a December 2025 BWC Meeting side event. The authors argue that the BWC must evolve to address emerging threats that target not only living organisms, but also critical infrastructure and digital systems.
NTI introduced a new framework—developed by a group of international experts—to help funders assess research proposals for risks of widespread population harm through accidents or deliberate misuse, determine if the risks outweigh the benefits, and build safety and security into the research that is ultimately funded.
CEPI is a global partnership working to accelerate the development of vaccines and other biologic countermeasures against epidemic and pandemic threats.
The Biosecurity Policy has been finalised and is due to be published during the period 27-29th January on the CEPI website with an accompanying Blog and CEPI central post. We will start a series of explainer presentations and share and trial the Biosecurity review processes with awardees and CEPI staff. We are suggesting an active date for the Policy of 1st July.
The Global Health Security Network brings together policymakers, technical experts, and regional partners to strengthen global preparedness through cross-border collaboration, evidence-based policy, and coordinated detection and response to biological threats.
GHSN is thrilled to serve as a member of the WHO civil society task force on antimicrobial resistance (AMR). We look forward to providing key insights into the converging risks and growing stressors that influence antimicrobial resistance, challenge drug development pipelines, and global health inequities that fuel transmission.
The GHS2026 conference is soon approaching in June - we look forward to sharing the results of our Scientific Review Committee’s efforts in abstract review and programme development. The Global Health Security Conference in Kuala Lumpur brings together the world’s leading experts to tackle the most pressing health threats of our time, from outbreak response to biosecurity and resilience. Join us to connect, learn, and help shape the future of global health security!
SecureBio (newsletter) is a nonprofit research organization working on new technologies and policy proposals to delay, detect, and defend against catastrophic pandemics.
The Nucleic Acid Observatory (NAO) substantially scaled its pathogen-agnostic biosurveillance to 31 wastewater sampling sites across 19 US cities, enabling early detections of measles (Hawaiʻi) and West Nile virus (Missouri). The team published peer-reviewed work in The Lancet Microbe. Zephyr, our pooled individual sampling program, scaled to 100-200 daily swabs in Boston, improved pathogen recovery and resolution, and began laying the groundwork for bacterial sequencing. The Zephyr team’s work was covered in the Boston Globe. We also renewed and expanded our biodefense partnership with PHC under the DIU Anti-Dote program, redesigned our alerting and analysis pipelines, and advanced automation to increase sensitivity while reducing human review bottlenecks.
The AI-Bio team expanded its portfolio of biosecurity evaluations and mitigation work and delivered or licensed multiple benchmarks, evaluation tools, and newly designed bio-misuse filters to various frontier labs. The team has also started bio-evaluation projects for the European Commission as well as for NIST’s Center for AI Standards and Innovation. Team members advised governments, frontier AI labs, and research organizations and presented their ABLE and ABC papers at NeurIPS. The team’s director was cited in a piece by NBC on AI-bio risks.
Panoplia Laboratories is a nonprofit organization that evaluates the risks and capabilities of AI-driven biology through wet lab research.
We will release the results of our AI/bio novice uplift study in mid February and plan on repeating the study this summer with new LLMs.
Sentinel Bio is a non-profit philanthropic fund focused on eliminating pandemic risks.
Team: Dr. Toby Webster joined to lead our AIxBio program.
AIxBio:
We’re supporting Epoch AI to expand their database tracking biological AI models, their technical specifications, and safeguards, building on our 2024 collaboration
We supported RAND, who are researching early warning systems for dangerous capabilities in frontier AI-enabled biological design tools
Nucleic acid synthesis security:
We’re wrapping up a project with the MITRE Corporation on mechanisms for aggregating data across the DNA synthesis industry, aiming to address the “split-order problem,” where bad actors might order fragments short enough to fall below screening thresholds.
We are preparing to launch a wet-lab study to assess the difficulty of assembling DNA fragments at different lengths.
Other biotechnology security chokepoints:
We wrapped up our investigation into other physical access controls for biosecurity and hope to publish our findings soon.
SecureDNA offers free, ultra-fast, and privacy-preserving DNA synthesis screening to detect regulated, controlled, or hazardous sequences; it is the only system that also screens millions of predicted functional variants to prevent evasion.
Over the past months, SecureDNA continued to engage with the global biosecurity and synthetic biology communities through a series of technical and policy-focused forums. In October, we participated in the iGEM Grand Jamboree in Paris, meeting with student teams, academic mentors, and organizers to discuss practical approaches to sequence screening and emerging risks in distributed synthesis.
In November, SecureDNA contributed to expert discussions at Engineering Biology Research Consortium meetings in Singapore, focusing on implementation realities for robust nucleic acid screening across diverse regulatory and infrastructure environments. We also participated in SynbiTECH in London, where conversations increasingly focused on the emerging challenges posed by AI-assistance and nontraditional synthesis pathways.
Alongside these engagements, SecureDNA continues to work with providers, researchers, policymakers, and other industry stakeholders to support practical adoption of DNA synthesis screening.
Blueprint Biosecurity is a nonprofit dedicated to achieving breakthroughs in humanity’s ability to prevent, mitigate, and suppress pandemics.
Received initial high-level insights from studies funded earlier in 2025. You can read more in our newsletter.
Launched new research and funding opportunities:
New RFP to support research on glycol vapors, an abundant and often overlooked option for rapid air disinfection during health emergencies.
Expressions of Interest for funding to develop clinical trial protocols evaluating far-UVC’s effectiveness in preventing respiratory infection transmission in congregate settings
Engaged at leading biosecurity and indoor air conferences, with Blueprint leadership presenting and participating at AAAR, ASHRAE-AIVC IEQ, the Hoover Institution, and the Biosecurity Game Changers Workshop.
The Frontier Model Forum (FMF) are looking for an AI Biosecurity Manager to advance their workstream on frontier AI and biosafety and biosecurity threats. Apply by February 16 here.
Amodo are looking for a Field Lead to own and drive their biosecurity engineering workstream. Apply here.
The Mirror Biology Dialogues Fund is currently hiring for multiple roles - learn more at mbdf.org/jobs.
Blueprint Biosecurity is seeking a full-time PPE Program Officer. Apply here by February 11.
Blueprint is also currently accepting expressions of interest and will be posting a variety of programmatic and operations roles in Q1.
RAND is hiring multiple AI & Biosecurity Research Residents at the Associate and Specialist levels of experience.
Panoplia Laboratories are hiring for a head of operations! Over the next few months, they also plan on hiring for additional roles, including scientists, research associates, lab operations specialists, and trial operations associates.
You can find more job opportunities at the 80,000 Hours job board.
BlueDot is piloting a fellowship for builders who want to move fast and tackle concrete biosecurity problems. The pilot program is two weeks, with daily check-ins, stipends, and intros to the people you need to move fast. Interested? Reach out to jonah@bluedot.org
Apply to the ICGEB Fellowships for Scientists in Biosecurity by March 31st.
Apply to the 2026 NIH Office of Science Policy Summer Internship Program by February 27.
The National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology is seeking spring Policy and Operations Interns with at least 20 hours of in-person availability per-week.
Apply to the Next-Gen BioLeaders Program at SynBioBeta 2026 by February 1st.
BlueDot is running multiple rounds (intensive and part-time options) of the biosecurity course this quarter.
The Introduction to Biosecurity course is looking for people to run local versions of the 4-week facilitated course. These local versions can be in person or online, with a specific country or regional focus. Apply here by 27th March
Cambridge Biosecurity Hub’s AI × Biosecurity Symposium will take place on Monday, 16th March 2026, in Cambridge. They are in the early stages of planning this event and are coordinating with potential speakers from leading AIxBio organisations. They invite early expressions of interest to help guide content and share timely updates. For questions, email grace@cambiohub.org.
DNA Screening Standards Consortium (DSSC): IBBIS is inviting expressions of interest from organisations and experts who can contribute to the Consortium’s technical drafting, piloting, and global alignment efforts. Learn more here, and please contact Sophie Peresson: sophie@ibbis.bio for more information.
Sequence Biosecurity Risk Consortium (SBRC): In 2026, IBBIS will continue to grow its SBRC membership with global experts, with an additional focus on the Asia and European regions and expanding its technical goals. Learn more here and please contact Rassin Lababidi rassin@ibbis.bio for more information.
Sentinel Bio is looking for advisors and part-time collaborators with expertise at the intersection of law enforcement, counterterrorism, and biosecurity.
SecureDNA is interested in hearing from individuals who have experience in B2B sales, strategic communications, and growth marketing, especially in the biotech space.
Oxford Biosecurity Group has launched a talent database for people interested in leading projects and starting organisations in biosecurity. Apply here by 27th February to be included in the next review round.
We regularly solicit updates from a group of organizations that we believe are doing impactful work to reduce GCBRs in order to improve transparency, facilitate collaboration, and otherwise accelerate progress in our community. Do you have any opportunities (jobs, events, etc.) you would like to share with our network? Please use this form to submit them.
Did you find this newsletter helpful? Do you have ideas on how we could improve it? Please fill out this brief feedback form or email hello@tessa.fyi.
Cover image credit: The National Library of Medicine, https://collections.nlm.nih.gov/catalog/nlm:nlmuid-101398617-img
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