Beyond Myanmar?

Hello friends.

Sorry for another lengthy pause. I aim to start posting more regularly, at least for a while.

Today, I’m sharing summaries of two recent publications:

1. Revolutionary Regimes: Emerging Forms of Governance in Post-Coup Myanmar, with Ardeth M. Thawnghmung (ISEAS Singapore, March 2025)

&

2. Failing Assumptions and the “Post-Myanmar Turn” (‘Journal of Contemporary Asia’, February 2025)

Next week I’ll post a short follow–up essay, exploring some of these issues in relation to bottom–up federalism in Burma, and the concept and practices of Confederationism. These are some of the main themes of the new book I’m working on – so hoping to get some feedback.

The first article is co-authored with my dear friend Thramu Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung. It explores persisting and novel forms of governance and administration (including services delivery) which have emerged (or achieved renewed relevance) in non-junta areas of Burma since the coup. A variety of governance forms bring together established Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) with dynamic new actors from a broad spectrum of elected lawmakers, youth, women and civil society in Myanmar’s “Spring Revolution” against the 2021 coup and military rule.

Experiments with new forms of governance have had varying degrees of success, with wide swathes of territory across the country coming under the control of groups opposed to the State Administration Council (SAC). Governance in non-SAC areas ranges from union-level claims, through regional, township and village tract arrangements.

We identify five main types of governance in non-SAC areas:

1. Direct EAO governance—generally a one-party state, in the name of a specific ethnic group (e.g. UWSA, AA).

2. Emergent (post-coup) state or area-based governance with more inclusion of civilians and local minorities, in a specific area (e.g. KSCC-IEC).

3. Transitional governance arrangements, moving from model 1 to model 2 (e.g. KNU and Kawthoolei Governing Body, PSLF-TNLA and TPCC) - not necessarily a transitional period, but a transitional type.

4. Local resistance administrations in non-EAO areas - often aligned with the NUG (the Pa Ka Pha, Pah Sa Pha and Pa La Pha, in the ‘Anyar’ and beyond).

5. Indigenous local governance - organic village/community-level, but also radical initiatives such as the Salween Peace Park.

These developments have significant implications for democratic practices, national reconciliation and intercommunal relationships in Myanmar, serving as “bottom-up building blocks” for a new federalism aspired to by many ethnic minority (ethnic nationality) groups. However, they remain vulnerable to junta attacks, including air-strikes, and are potentially subject to conflict due to overlapping territorial claims and the unsettled nature of territorial control by competing armed groups.

You can buy hard copies of the paper from the Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS) bookshop at – 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore 119614

http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

Or download the PDF here.

My second offering this week is an essay published in February in the Journal of Contemporary Asia.

With ethnic states (or nations) at the forefront of the new politics in Burma, it’s time to examine some basic assumptions.

“Myanmar” is an increasingly problematic signifier. A post-Myanmar turn is gaining traction in Burma studies and policy circles, primarily because of the changing empirical situation. The ‘assumption of Myanmar’ – that the country may be damaged but still makes sense as a coherent entity – is increasingly unviable.

Analysts are beginning to acknowledge the ‘post-Myanmar turn’ in political ontology – for example, Kyaw Hsan Hlaing (2023, Pedersen (2024), International Crisis Group (Horsey 2024), Thurein Naing (2025). However, most academic, international and developmental narratives fail to appreciate the consequences of recent and near-future events in Burma. This is also the case with the majority of political agendas – including the SAC junta and the National Unity Government, and most of the international community.

However, “Myanmar” is a failing concept, and a corresponding failed state. The post-Myanmar turn rests on four related theses:

1. Historically the state was forged by violence. Especially since the imposition of military rule a decade after independence and since the 2021 coup, the central government has been experienced by large numbers of purported citizens as illegal and illegitimate.

2. The existence of numerous ethnic nationality communities achieving de facto autonomy – with Ethnic Armed Organisations providing a range of state-like administrative functions and services, and local communities engaging in indigenous governance practices – demonstrates credible rivals to the state of Myanmar.

3. The post-2021 coup collapse of basic central state functions and services across much of the country undermines the remnants of central state performance legitimacy.

4. The devastating future impacts of climate change will increasingly drive the disarticulation of the central state.

Burma was a colonial construction. Notwithstanding the founding myths of Pagan and the fourteenth- to fifteenth-century Kingdom of Ava, the territories that have constituted Burma were forcibly combined in the mid-eighteenth century with King Alaungpaya’s founding of the Konbaung Dynasty. The state was reformulated and consolidated under British rule, doing violence to indigenous polities and political cultures. Authoritarianism and militarisation were reinforced during the Japanese interregnum and World War II. General Aung San made promises of “internal autonomy” for ethnic nationality polities on the eve of independence at the second Panglong Conference (February 1947) – but following his assassination later that year, these were never realised.

Since the 2021 coup, the ‘post-Myanmar turn’ (resting on these four related theses) has become more apparent. Given the failures of Myanmar as both a state and an organising concept, sovereignty reverts to and resides with those societies which were incorporated (or yoked) into the colony of Burma (until 1937, as a province of British India). This association with the state of Burma (later, Myanmar) was not asked for by most ethnic communities or elites, and has often been strenuously resisted ever since. The project of Myanmar was probably always doomed, given the failures of urban (predominantly Burman) elites to recognise or address ethnic grievances and aspirations. Whatever ‘limited sovereignty’ may inhere in Myanmar through the international states system (and the interests and positions of neighbouring countries), the centralized state will not recover as a coherent entity before the ravages of climate change drive further destabilization.

Given the collapse of credible central authority in Myanmar following the coup, any future union will likely be based on the voluntary association of independent - even sovereign - entities (or state units). While the future of Myanmar is questionable, Kawthoolei, Kachinland, Monland, Karenni and other ethnic nations may be more resilient.

The article can be downloaded here (sorry: it’s behind a paywall) -

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00472336.2025.2463524

(… or you could drop me a line …)

Next week, I will explore some of these issues in relation to ground-up – or ‘bottom–up’ (or ‘emergent’) - federalism and confederation in Burma.

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Anyone wanting to donate to locally-led, trusted and capable earthquake relief efforts in Mandalay and Sagaing, please drop me a line - or give to the Free Burma Rangers:

https://www.freeburmarangers.org/donations/

Watch ‘Myanmar Army on the Ropes’, produced by me, Yan Naing and Tom Sheahan on the Al Jazeera YouTube channel.

These episodes and reflections will remain free to all Substack subscribers. I’m eventually going to start serializing Nancy and the Count, book one – the novel which predicted 1027! - and will ask for paid subscriptions.

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