The Trap of Binary Thinking

I was recently invited by the Polish Mieroszewski Centre to write about the idea of the Global East. This edition of the newsletter offers a condensed version of that piece, focusing on what the concept can tell us about the South Caucasus.

The countries of the South Caucasus are rarely seen as authors of their own foreign policy. More often, it is someone else’s sphere of influence, a theatre of geopolitical rivalry, or a proving ground for the ambitions of Russia, the European Union, Turkey, Iran, China, and the United States.

The region is almost always described in terms of in-betweenness. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are supposedly caught between Russia and the West, between Europe and Asia, between democracy and authoritarianism, and between war and peace. It is a neat narrative, but misleading. It assumes the real question is where these countries belong.

The reality is more complex. In the South Caucasus, no choice guarantees either security or acceptance. Few policymakers across the region still believe that adopting the West’s institutions and political vocabulary is enough to earn a seat at its table. Yet neither do they accept being reduced to Russia’s backyard. Between those two poles lies the political reality they must navigate.

The concept of the Global East offers a better way of understanding the South Caucasus than the familiar label of post-Soviet. The latter says more about where these states came from than where they are today. Their defining condition is not geography but what scholars describe as liminality - a permanent state of being not yet: not democratic enough, not European enough, not stable enough, not independent enough from Russia. They are judged less for what they are than for what they have yet to become.

That is what sets them apart from both the Global North and the Global South. They are too European to be treated as distant peripheries, yet too peripheral to be accepted as full participants in shaping Europe’s political order. They sign agreements, implement reforms, and adopt the language of European integration, yet often remain stuck in a permanent waiting room - assessed, benchmarked, and encouraged, but rarely treated as strategic actors in their own right.

Viewed through this lens, the EU and Russia appear less different than they often claim. Moscow speaks the language of history, protection, and privileged interests; Brussels speaks of reforms, standards, and accession. Both expect the region to adapt to their rules. In both cases, the countries of the South Caucasus are more often treated as objects of policy than as its authors.

The South Caucasus also shows that the Global East is far from homogeneous. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia differ in almost every respect, from their political systems and relations with Russia to their European ambitions and experiences of war. What unites them is not identity but constraint. As small states in a difficult neighbourhood, they cannot set the rules of the geopolitical game. Instead, they try to make themselves indispensable.

That is why each has built a different narrative of strategic relevance. Armenia promotes the Crossroads of Peace as a vision of regional connectivity. Georgia has long marketed itself as a key transit hub along the Middle Corridor linking Central Asia and Europe. Azerbaijan combines its role as an energy supplier with ambitions to become a crucial transport hub across the Caspian, the Caucasus, and Turkey. These are not simply infrastructure projects. They are strategies designed to convince larger powers that these countries are not just geopolitical objects, but partners that cannot easily be bypassed.

Yet even these efforts are usually reduced to a familiar question: whose interests do they really serve - Russia’s, the West’s, or those of the ruling elite?

The biggest obstacle to understanding the South Caucasus is not geography but habit. Too often, every political decision is read as a declaration of allegiance. Criticising Brussels becomes a turn to Moscow. Distancing oneself from Russia is treated as an embrace of the West. Yet politics in the region is rarely about choosing sides. It is about preserving room for manoeuvre.

This is precisely what the Global East helps explain. The countries of the South Caucasus are not simply choosing between competing powers. They are navigating structural constraints while trying to maximise their own agency.

The Global East rejects a familiar assumption: that the South Caucasus exists only as someone else’s periphery. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are not waiting to become the West or struggling to leave Russia behind. They are states pursuing their own interests in a neighbourhood where every choice carries costs.

Their strength lies not in escaping great-power competition but in learning how to use it.

Postscript. After finishing this edition, I came across a new commentary by former Georgian defence minister Tinatin Khidasheli. It begins by celebrating Nikol Pashinyan’s ability to chart Armenia’s own course. Yet by the end, the central question is no longer what Armenia or Georgia will do, but what Washington should do. That is precisely how persistent these frames are.

Perhaps that says something about how powerful these narratives are. Even voices from the region can end up telling the story through the choices of larger powers rather than their own.

This edition draws on Louise Amoore’s Living in the Split: The Agency of Armenia and Georgia In-Between Russia and the EU and the growing scholarship on the Global East. It is also an attempt to avoid the familiar framing of the South Caucasus as permanently “in between”, while recognising how difficult it is to escape that language altogether.

In a region where alliances shift with circumstance, the coming weeks may prove decisive. Don’t miss the next newsletter. Subscribe now:

If you’re looking for in-depth reporting, analysis, and webinars on the South Caucasus, find my channel on WA.