So you’ll have heard all of your favourite pundits and creators talk about Ronald Araújo this week. Indeed, I dedicated a segment to his strengths and weaknesses on the latest episode of my podcast.
By now, you’ll know he’s fast. You’ll know he’s powerful and good in the air. On the negative end, you’ll be aware of his flaws. That unfortunate ability to set fire to your own house for no obvious reason.
But beyond whether he’s good or bad, I don’t think it’s been stressed enough just how much of an impact his presence could have on Andoni Iraola. His arrival opens up some tactical possibilities.
Last season, one of the main reason why I dedicated so much time to explaining Arne Slot’s struggles was the squad at his disposal. He was given a few £100m worldies, granted. But Richard Hughes left him short of several essential ingredients.
The crucial line that I wanted to push was to do with tactics. Not necessarily quality. It wasn’t so much about the level of certain individuals. It was about the tools afforded to the guy in charge.
Over the course of an entire 60-game campaign, your head coach will be presented with a whole host of different scenarios. Problems to solve, if you want. And well, each problem demands a different tool.
Remember, the head coach never kicks the ball. To change things on the pitch, he’s entirely reliant on the tools at his disposal to have any sort of influence, otherwise he’s largely powerless.
Now, it’s important to note that last season, Liverpool went without a number of valuable profiles. For example, every full-back at the club was offensive and eager to impact the final third.
None of them particularly suited sitting behind the ball. None of them offered an option as a wide centre-back, perhaps in a back three. None of them possessed the qualities to invert into central areas like Trent Alexander-Arnold.
And in a normal scenario, if you wanted something different, maybe you’d field a centre-back out wide instead, right? That would open up the possibility of using a situational back three with possession, allowing at least one full-back to go crazy.
But no, with Giovanni Leoni and Joe Gomez injured all season and Hughes failing to land Marc Guéhi, Virgil Van Dijk and Ibrahima Konaté did all the work. Slot had nothing but wide runners at full-back, and just two options in the centre of his defence. Your hands are well and truly tied.
Liverpool also went without a natural holding midfielder in the squad. No natural pass master, either, just a million carriers. And further forward, only two senior wingers once you exclude Federico Chiesa as a viable option.
Such a tough ask if you’re a tactics guy.
At this point, I’m going to make this piece a bit more miserable by praising Mikel Arteta. Sorry, guys. But over the course of his tenure, the Spaniard has been really eager to add to his toolkit. Almost at the expense of individual quality at times.
The first player Arteta signed was a left-footed centre-back in Pablo Mari, because he didn’t already have one in his squad. And over the course of his tenure, he’s signed a ton of lefties, who are notoriously harder to find. My long-term subscribers will know that by now.
Kai Havertz, Martin Ødegaard, Fabio Vieira, Gabriel Magalhães, Riccardo Calafiori, Piero Hincapié, Jakub Kiwior, Nuno Tavares, Noni Madueke, Oleksandr Zinchenko, Gabriel Jesus. The list is goes on.
Liverpool, for perspective, have a grand total of just four lefties right now. The two left-backs — obviously — Harvey Elliott and Giorgi Mamardashvili, who we’d probably all prefer to be right-footed at this point.

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