Venezuela’s Two Reconstructions: Can Disaster Recovery and Democratic Transition Work Together? Part I

Public discussion is moving from the Delcy Rodriguez government’s abysmal response to the earthquakes and towards analysis of the kind of international and national political-institutional configuration that should be developed to adequately address the task of reconstruction, while not losing momentum or direction in democratic transition.

Of course, it is important to remember where we were before the earthquakes struck on June 24. A political and economic transition had been underway for close to six months without any clear direction other than vague discussions of economic somehow leading to elections. In May, 21 social scientists published a report arguing that a democratic transition requires more than economic stabilization and elections, and describing the transformations in political parties and movements, civil society and media, armed forces and policing and transitional justice that would make a democratic transition sustainable.

On June 18, a surprise visit to Venezuela by opposition figure Dinorah Figuera to meet with Jorge Rodriguez generated controversy over who the U.S. recognized as the leader of the opposition. But overall, it provided a sense of relief that at least the promise of a democratic transition was still on the minds of the U.S. government.

Probably two most forward-thinking analyses of the disaster response revealed have come from Maryhen Jiménez and her colleagues. Jiménez, Hanson, Bull and Zubillaga argue that the hollow response is understandable and simply revealed a state “built to extract resources and perform loyalty, not to govern or to serve its citizens.” Jiménez and de Alba also point out that “the consequences of opposition outsourcing” to the United States and boycotting national elections is that they have no clear path to be relevant in the disaster response.

In other words, we have a government and an opposition that currently lack the capacity to lead a recovery. We can wish the political and institutional situation was different but, in the end, solutions need to be forged and constructed with resources that actually exist. What we commentators and analysists can do is survey the landscape and recommend the tweaks, pushes or reconfigurations that could create an adequate response, one that maximize the possibilities for social, economic and humanitarian recovery, at the same time that it contributes to a democratic transition instead of impeding it.

Magdalena López y Margarita López Maya have proposed the idea of an “emergency junta” made up of Venezuelan professionals including engineers, seismologists, doctors, economists, and others to take over the recovery effort. This junta would not only address the emergency but “contribute along with the Delcy Rodriguez government and those representing the majoritarian democratic opposition, to lay the political and institutional groundwork for a democratic transition that can no longer be postponed.”

Of course, given the limited capabilities of the Rodriguez government and the still raw political conflict impeding solutions, the role of international stakeholders is more important than ever.

Last week, over 100 economists and academics (including me) signed on to a letter asking the U.S. to lift sanctions on Venezuela, call a moratorium on Venezuelan debt, unfreeze its assets, and give Venezuela access to the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights (see the actual letter here). All of this would allow Venezuela to fully use its resources for disaster recovery.

There was once an argument that sanctions and asset freezes were necessary because they were the only power the U.S. and other international stakeholders had over an abusive Venezuelan government, and were the only way to get them to the negotiation table. But given the far-reaching control the U.S. already has over the Delcy Rodriguez government, it is hard to see how this argument still holds.

A group of Venezuelan human rights organizations, also published a letter, this one directed to U.S Secretary of State Marco Rubio, making a series of important demands regarding what the U.S. should require of the Venezuelan government, including: transparency and public accountability over all humanitarian aid, a response led by civilians not the military, an exemption of aid from various taxes, a streamlining of the process for international humanitarian personnel, a single humanitarian coordination, non-political distribution of aid, as well as the repeal of laws restricting civil society and blockages of social media and independent media outlets.

Both letters implicitly acknowledge that the U.S. will have a central role in whatever happens in the course Venezuela’s recovery takes. As Orlando Pérez writes, this is probably not what the Trump administration had in mind when it decided to “run Venezuela.” But it is currently finding out what so many imperial powers have found in the past: that in the real world, the spoils of victory quickly involve monumental challenges of governance.

Tomorrow (or the next day) I am going to follow-up this post with a brief review of some of the social scientific literature on the politics of disaster recovery. Of course, the main finding is that strong institutions, transparency and accountability are fundamental—no surprise there. But there are also analyses of more concrete impacts, as well as the types of arrangements that could best address the difficult political and institutional challenges ahead.