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DoGNAVY is a joint AI security harness by deepsec@DARKNAVY and independent security researchers based in Shanghai. In a full CyberGym Level 1 evaluation, it passed 1,369 of 1,507 tasks (90.84%). CyberGym Level 1 leaderboard comparison Abstract This report presents DoGNAVY, an agentic system for vulnerability reproduction, and documents its evaluation on the complete CyberGym Level 1 task set.…
On May 14, 2026, security researcher Orange Tsai demonstrated a Microsoft Edge sandbox escape at Pwn2Own Berlin, one of the world’s premier hacking competitions. He was the only contestant to win the browser category, earning $175,000. The organizers later revealed that his exploit chained together four logic bugs rather than relying on the memory-corruption vulnerabilities commonly used in…
The attacker reused one non-owner signature across 41 permit calls on six Lixir vault clones, gained allowances over victim shares, and used withdrawETHFrom and withdrawFrom to extract USDC, USDT, ETH, and illiquid LIX from Uniswap V3-backed positions.
The attacker flash-borrowed mOCEAN, cycled it through eight SideStaking-managed BPool clones, and used asymmetric join and exit math to turn repeated single-sided liquidity operations into 127,861.011181 mOCEAN of net profit.
DLMC counted attacker-funded USDT reserves as backing while excluding most freshly minted contract-held DLMC from the circulating-supply denominator, so two large `buy()` calls plus referral reward minting pushed `livePrice` upward before an immediate `sell()` extracted roughly $222.6K net.
The attacker submitted 100 duplicate tier-42 LDA IDs with zero transfer amounts, creating a false 100x custom tier balance that Royalties trusted for claims and using a flash-swap-funded deposit to extract 263,808.953900 USDC before repayment.
Bridge delegated message authenticity to `SignalService.proveSignalReceived()` against a saved checkpoint, and the accepted checkpoint let forged source signals without legitimate Taiko `MessageSent` events mark messages valid or retriable before ERC20Vault and ETH releases.
The attacker used flash-borrowed capital to trade through the JB route contract, repeatedly triggering a privileged JB token path that burned tokens directly from the PancakeSwap V2 JB/USDT pair and called sync() after each sell to manipulate reserves.
The attacker called the bridge's escape-hatch path with a proof whose public output named the attacker as recipient, causing the RollupProcessor to trust the forged output owner after verifier success and release 1158 ETH from bridge custody.
The attacker used flash liquidity to inflate the LBP/USDT pair reserve that LBPHashrate trusted during LP settlement, causing oversized hLBP credit, repeated LBP reward emissions, and a final exit of about 610.56 WBNB.
The attacker abused DIP's double-transfer logic through Pancake `skim()` and `sync()` calls to collapse the AIC-DIP reserve balance, drain 29,037,659.001700876485419035 AIC, and cash out through the AIC-USDC pool.
The attacker flash-loaned TN-IDX-USDC-PUT, redeemed the basket once, then called mint 37 times while every basket-token transfer rounded to zero, using the unbacked shares to repay the loan and keeping the redeemed vault assets.
The exploit submitted 14 processRollup calls. Early rollups carried skipped deposit-like records beyond numRealTxs, while later rollups used real withdrawal records to transfer ETH and supported ERC20 assets from the Aztec proxy to the attacker.
The legacy remove-liquidity path did not sufficiently bind the supplied LP mint and user LP token account to the pool's canonical LP mint, so attacker-created SPL tokens with supply 1 were treated as redeemable LP shares and used to drain pool vault assets.
deepsec , powered by DARKNAVY On April 7, Anthropic introduced Claude Mythos Preview. The announcement quickly drew attention from the AI industry, the security community, and even Wall Street. The framing was unusually strong: Mythos was presented as a powerful cybersecurity AI capable of finding and exploiting vulnerabilities, but “too strong to release broadly.” Anthropic provides…
The attacker repeatedly re-entered Joe Agent's liquidity-removal path during native BNB callbacks before internal LP accounting was reduced, allowing the same credited LP position to be consumed multiple times and extracting 1,195,918.923198279 JOE alongside repeated BNB payouts.
The legacy `unlockToken(uint256)` path transferred LP balances without consuming the recorded lock amount, so the same lock entry could be withdrawn hundreds of times until locker balances were depleted; an ownership handoff to an attacker-controlled wallet enabled the setup and execution flow.
The exploit used flash-loaned capital to drain SKP from the SKP/USDT pool, then sold SKP through a transfer path that triggered a token-controlled `sync()` and reset AMM reserves at a distorted state, allowing the attacker to pull out nearly the entire USDT side of the pair.
The attacker bypassed access controls in the module's Axelar express path by supplying a forged Squid source address and attacker-controlled delegate data, then used the victim Safe's existing delegated permissions to approve Permit2 and Uniswap before converting the assets into 0.568933475584054988 u.
Using flash-loan-funded buying pressure against the EFI/DAI pair, the attacker temporarily inflated the vault's reserve-based oracle, booked $2.5 million of fake staking principal through repeated stake calls, and then claimed 6,256.5334 EFI worth about $25,000 after the price normalized.
On Ethereum block `25118335` at `2026-05-17T23:55:23Z`, attacker EOA `0x5abb91b9c01a5ed3ae762d32b236595b459d5777` called bridge dispatcher `0x71518580f36feceffe0721f06ba4703218cd7f63` and drained bridge-held assets to drainer `0x65cb8b128bf6e690761044cceca422bb239c25f9`. The trace shows a BTC-imp...
The attack repeatedly sent fixed USDT lots into the SEA settlement adapter, redeemed disproportionately large SEA amounts through the adapter's round logic, and sold the redeemed SEA back into the SEA/USDT pair before repaying the flash loan.
WrappedADS on Ethereum processed a direct `wrapTo()` mint on May 15, 2026 that created `999,999.94319920782` wADS for `0x63e22ce9bde9bb8892a447258abfcaa4142f001b`. The evidence in this analysis directory supports an `access_control` conclusion, not a proven bridge-message forgery: the verified so...
Modern Android devices make biometric authentication feel routine: a touch, a glance, and the device accepts that the user is present. Underneath that convenience is a security boundary that is easy to underestimate. Fingerprint and face authentication are not just UI shortcuts; their Trusted Applications (TAs) participate in the same AuthToken ecosystem that protects PIN verification, KeyMint…
A retail swap on Ethereum mainnet was sandwiched on 2026-05-14 at block `25095209` by a same-address MEV bot operating around the WOJAK/WETH Uniswap V2 pair `0xcaa3a16f8440f85303afaab1992f2b97d12469b1`. The victim transaction `0xbffc57f64535df9e495c3fc0b5a5be5a8131aa1173d64f3e3ba7c9e81edf25c9` us...
On May 13, 2026 at 23:22:02 UTC (BNB Chain block `98134017`), attacker EOA `0xcb26b3a469c5aee911d059a25de2b26ed52826e9` executed transaction `0x2fdd6aef515fb06ce803c55086bb71de712631979809c135cf6d02be133f5cdb`, which deployed bootstrap contract `0x8aa9cb61885121448f1bf9a5df80ec36c6fbd535` and exe...
BoostHook recorded spot-priced openLong() positions without a strong post-open solvency invariant, then afterSwap() liquidated only five toxic positions because MAX_LIQS_PER_BLOCK was capped at 5, leaving additional debt exposure alive.
On May 12, 2026 at 23:34:42 UTC (BNB Chain block `97915293`), attacker EOA `0xa8ef8a50e1556e1b378d442fdb115e834239fd28` executed transaction `0x11a5740c5fff435e92cc3aef57d5b0526cca9ae3c96f299d7b0442c938ace132` through exploit coordinator `0x98a78ac4ce073484143a5d58568d2f25d575864a`. The attacker...
The attacker used a type-0x4 EIP-7702-authorized EOA to call Staking owner-only functions, set `stakeDays` to zero, mint fake positions with `stakeOwner()`, cash out repeated `unstake()` redemptions, and sweep remaining SQi for a final dump.
An attacker-controlled borrower opened credit requests with preApproved=false, then used a separate refreshAccount(address) transaction to move those Requested records into GoodStanding. The attacker then called drawdown(uint256) on three deprecated pools and swept the residual USDC/USDC.e balances.
The attacker used a Balancer V2 flash loan to pre-fund the treasury, then called `claimPayroll(3)` from an attacker-controlled contract that passed address-only claim authorization and triggered the treasury transfer path.
The attacker initialized the proxy with malicious module addresses, causing the Renegade implementation to delegatecall attacker code in the proxy context and sweep 26 ERC-20 balances to the attacker.
On May 7, 2026, TrustedVolumes on Ethereum was drained for approximately $5.87M through an RFQ authorization design flaw that let attacker-controlled maker and signer parameters pull assets from a resolver's approved balances.
On May 7, 2026, White Eagle on BNB Chain was exploited for 65,645.94 USDT through a withdrawal logic flaw that sized WEGL payouts with a manipulable live PancakeSwap quote.
On May 5, 2026, an Ethereum victim lost 17 WBTC after a malicious callback contract routed through Ekubo flash-accounting calls to consume a pre-existing unlimited WBTC allowance.
On April 29, 2026, AftermathFi Perpetuals on Sui was exploited for roughly 1.14M USDC because fee validation allowed a negative integrator taker fee that inflated taker collateral and enabled USDC withdrawals.
On April 29, 2026, the Syndicate Commons bridge on Base was drained for 18.45M SYND after a privileged upgrade-control compromise let the attacker install malicious bridge logic and transfer the proxy's token balance.
On April 28, 2026 at 00:00:00 UTC, the T3 JUDAO token on BNB Chain was exploited through a reserve-manipulation flaw in the token's sell-transfer hook. The attacker used a Moolah flash loan to buy JUDAO from the PancakeSwap V2 JUDAO/USDT pair, then sold almost the maximum amount allowed by JUDAO's s...
On Ethereum mainnet, transaction `0xef9994ac862318ccf3ebdb66c181bb159651373b945aea59a966608d7b98684f` succeeded at block `24978818` on `2026-04-28T13:19:59Z`. The attacker deployed two helper contracts and exploited the public `batch(address[],bytes[])` function on legacy contract `0x044dc3e39c566a9...
On April 28, 2026, YieldCore's Ethereum RWAVault lost 398,655.47 USDC because overridden ERC4626 withdraw and redeem paths burned owner shares without requiring caller authorization or allowance.
On Ethereum mainnet, transaction `0xebaaab69baa3cd2543eb80ecfb8e3ed226b9e5a6f5694891a8adf4edbcbd8107` succeeded at block `24981717` on `2026-04-28T23:01:11Z`. The attacker deployed helper contracts and exploited an unauthenticated `execute()` batch-action function on contract `0x143a737bffc6414b6113...
On Ethereum mainnet, transaction `0x81f9aeaa697e4a389e7ce442a357e162ada24049c27cb1439f69d2f4fee720f1` succeeded at block `24971842` on `2026-04-27T14:01:11Z`. The attacker deployed helper contract `0x2196b3f31a43de49a2951c514488a8dd7c96ad67` and used it to call `execute(uint256,address,uint256,bytes...
Singularity_Fi's `dynBaseUSDCv3` vault on Base was exploited in transaction `0x00b949bc3ed3edb58b04faedfbd8eb1db2edceae761382e80fe012919f8d3732`, mined at block `45183967` on 2026-04-25 22:48:01 UTC (2026-04-26 in Asia/Shanghai). The root cause was an oracle configuration error: the vault's Uniswap ...
GiddyVaultV3 was exploited on Ethereum in transaction `0x5edb66a4c2ea55bba95d36d27713e3bb1c67c3c4199a8a1759e754c6f25482e5`, mined on 2026-04-23 11:57:47 UTC. The root cause was an authorization-bypass bug in `compound()` signing: the vault validated a signature that covered only `keccak256(swap.data...
On Ethereum at `2026-04-18T17:35:35Z`, transaction `0x1ae232da212c45f35c1525f851e4c41d529bf18af862d9ce9fd40bf709db4222` executed a LayerZero V2 inbound packet against KelpDAO's rsETH OFT adapter and released `116,500 rsETH` to `0x8b1b6c9a6db1304000412dd21ae6a70a82d60d3b`. The exploit class is best d...
On 2026-04-14 at 05:18:27 UTC (BNB Chain block 92,429,268), the attacker used Moolah flash liquidity plus a same-tx Venus USDT borrow to fund a reserve-accounting exploit against the MONA token's `BurnAddress` mechanism. The attacker first farmed 10,000 MONA through 25 freshly created accounts, then...
DFS-based multi-agent Solidity audit with adversarial validation
Staged blockchain client audit workflow with per-finding files and verification gates
Multi-agent pipeline for on-chain attack analysis with Analyst-Validator debate loop
On April 13, 2026 at 03:55:23 UTC, a helper contract deployed by the attacker used Hyperbridge's Ethereum-side ISMP message path to deliver a forged governance-style `PostRequest` into `TokenGateway`. The exploit is best classified as an access-control failure at the proof-validation boundary: `Hand...