Three Days Late and Short One Opinion

These are the eleven twelve products CRS published on August 14. I obviously did not get to them on the 15th, and they grew by one since then anyway.

One change you will notice immediately: there is no Commentary in this post. I am unable to give this batch the kind of thorough reading that earns commentary. In lieu, I attempted to end each entry with a few questions for readers, but the LLM and I couldn’t get on the same page.1 As many products as there are for the 14th however, less coverage is probably for the best.

This is also the last day of a one-week experiment I was undertaking, with a focus on less sharply focused writing. If you have reflections, I’d love to hear them. I see pros and cons. I’m currently leaning towards the thought that it should be a per-product decision versus a publication-wide choice how each product gets covered.

Title: Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2026 Provisions

Report No. R48705 | Type: Report | Date: August 14, 2026, version 6
CRS Author(s): William L. Painter, Specialist in Homeland Security and Appropriations | Official Congress.gov copy

Congress does two things when it funds an agency. It hands over the money, and it attaches rules to the money: do this, do not do that, report back by this date. The rules work because they are tied to the dollars. This report is the catalog of those rules for the Department of Homeland Security, and it is where you can watch what happens when the dollars move.

The FY2026 DHS spending law, P.L. 119-86, contains no funding for Immigration and Customs Enforcement and none for the Border Patrol. Both are being funded through the FY2025 reconciliation law, P.L. 119-21, instead. Because there was no ICE money in the annual bill, several long-standing rules had nothing to attach to. CRS says plainly that they were written as restrictions on funds provided in the measure, and since neither element received funding, the restrictions would have had no effect as drafted.

Title II of the FY2024 DHS bill carried thirty-one of these rules, attached to the money for ICE, Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard, TSA, and the Secret Service, and they stayed in force through FY2025 under the year-long CR. Nine are not in the FY2026 act. Most of what dropped was written against ICE:

• ICE could not keep a detention contract with a facility that scored below the median on its last two performance reviews.

• ICE had to publish, twice a month, how many people it was holding.

• DHS had to end a delegation of immigration enforcement authority to local police if the inspector general found the agreement materially violated.

• DHS could not use Health and Human Services information to detain or remove the sponsor of an unaccompanied child, or anyone in that household—and had to report to Congress on the 287(g) agreements that deputize local police.

• ICE had to give appropriators a plan for spending its money.

The rest of the nine came out for adjacent reasons: two restricted border barrier construction and border security technology, neither of which got money either, and one capped Coast Guard towing vessel inspection fees and had already been switched off. A general provision sending $5 million to the Blue Campaign, the department’s anti-trafficking program, also came out—that money ran through ICE.

None of these were repealed. Congress did not vote them down. They lapsed because the account they were attached to was not in the bill.

Congress did not go quiet, though. The FY2026 act requires an obligation plan covering all DHS appropriations and the fee revenue DHS keeps under the reconciliation law. It requires quarterly inspector general reports on how the reconciliation money is being spent, plus an annual report with recommendations. It adds $20 million for body-worn cameras for officers working in immigration enforcement, with a spending plan due within thirty days. And the provision barring DHS from blocking congressional oversight visits to immigration detention facilities was kept, as Section 546.

The rest of the report covers the parts of DHS that were funded. FEMA now loses $100,000 a day off its operating account for every day it misses the sixty-day deadline to open grant applications. The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office was dismantled at the Administration’s request, with Congress’s agreement. And the threshold for telling Congress in advance about a contract dropped from $4 million to $2 million.

Title: AI Chatbots as Companions: Overview, Uses, and Considerations for Congress

Report No. R49189 | Type: Report | Date: August 14, 2026, version 1
CRS Author(s): Dominique T. Greene-Sanders, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy | Official Congress.gov copy

This report is about AI chatbots, names Anthropic and OpenAI directly, and cites Anthropic’s: research on how people use its chatbot for support and companionship, crisis-helpline feature, and privacy documentation. WCSBR is drafted primarily with Anthropic’s Claude. LLM usage is disclosed at the bottom of every post, but today it belongs here too, before you read a summary of a report about a company whose product helped write the summary.

Chatbots are about sixty years old. ELIZA, released in 1966, imitated a therapist by matching keywords to scripted replies, and it fell apart the moment you asked it something off-script. What changed in the last decade is that the models got good enough to hold a conversation, remember what you said earlier, and answer in a way that sounds like it understood you.

The report covers two things at once. There are companion chatbots, built specifically for relationships—Character.AI, Replika. And there are general-purpose chatbots, ChatGPT and Gemini and Claude, which were not designed or marketed for companionship but get used that way anyway. CRS covers both, because they raise the same questions.

The numbers give a sense of the scale. A 2026 Pew survey found about half of U.S. adults use AI chatbots at all; one in ten use them for emotional support or advice, and one in twenty-five for companionship. Companion apps had been downloaded 220 million times worldwide as of July 2025, and Character.AI reported more than 20 million monthly active users. Roughly half of Replika’s users had a romantic relationship with the chatbot in 2022. A 2025 survey found 12% of teenagers had used one for emotional or mental health support. On the older end, 43% of Americans over 60 reported feeling lonely in 2020, and New York’s Office for Aging reported a 95% reduction in loneliness in a 2023 pilot of a companion device.

The research does not point one direction. One 2025 study found AI companions produced real reductions in loneliness over a week, strongest on the first day. Another found the relationship runs the other way over time: lonelier people spend more time on the platforms, which leads to more loneliness and more use. Studies have flagged addictive use, sycophancy (the chatbot flattering and agreeing rather than pushing back), and what researchers are calling AI psychosis, where sustained conversation triggers or deepens hallucinations and delusions. One 2025 study found several chatbots used tactics to keep users talking after they had tried to say goodbye. The report also notes that chatbot use has been linked to deaths in the United States, including a lawsuit alleging a company was responsible for a teenager’s suicide.

Privacy is a separate problem. More than 300,000 conversations with one general-purpose chatbot leaked in 2025, some containing names and passwords. The United States has no comprehensive federal privacy law; at least nineteen states have their own, and Utah has one written specifically for mental health chatbots.

Congress has been busy. The FTC opened an inquiry into seven companies in September 2025, and both chambers have held hearings. Bills in the 119th would require age verification, parental controls, limits on using minors’ data to train models, disclosures that the user is talking to a machine, and links to crisis resources. One bill would bar chatbots in finance, health care, and law from implying they hold a professional license. More than ten states already have chatbot laws, most taking effect in 2027. CRS closes by suggesting Congress fund long-term studies, since nearly everything known now comes from short-term research or from what the companies choose to disclose.

Title: Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC)

Report No. IF12352 | Type: In Focus | Date: August 14, 2026, version 5
CRS Author(s): Nora Wells, Analyst in Health Policy | Official Congress.gov copy

ONC is a small office inside the Department of Health and Human Services with an outsized job: making sure the software your doctor uses can talk to the software your specialist uses. It does that in three main ways.

It runs a voluntary certification program, started in 2010, that health IT developers can put their products through. Certification sets standards, and the standards are what make records portable. It runs TEFCA, live since December 2023, which is an attempt to build a network of networks so authorized parties can exchange health data nationwide. And it enforces the ban on information blocking—interfering with the lawful access, exchange, or use of electronic health information—which Congress created in the 21st Century Cures Act. ONC has received 2,279 possible claims of information blocking through its reporting portal since April 2021.

Two things changed recently. In July 2024, HHS reorganized and expanded the office into a broader technology, data, and artificial intelligence policy shop, renaming it ASTP/ONC. That was reversed in April 2026; the office went back to being ONC with its narrower focus, though it still leads coordination on AI use in clinical care.

The larger change is pending. A proposed rule issued in December 2025, called HTI-5, would remove or revise more than half of the current certification criteria, including criteria covering privacy, security, and AI transparency. ONC’s argument is that this reduces burden and cost and makes room for innovation. Stakeholders are broadly in favor of modernization but some say the deregulation is premature, and have asked ONC to run impact assessments on whatever it removes.

Title: African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)

Report No. R49187 | Type: Report | Date: August 14, 2026, version 3 (New)
CRS Author(s): Liana Wong, Analyst in International Trade and Finance | Official Congress.gov copy

AGOA lets goods from eligible sub-Saharan African countries enter the United States without paying the standard tariff. Congress passed it in 2000. It is one-way—the countries receiving the benefit are not required to lower their own tariffs in return. Thirty-three countries qualify for 2026.

It expired on September 30, 2025. Congress reauthorized it retroactively in February 2026, tucked into the annual spending law, and the new authorization runs only through December 31, 2026. The program has roughly four months left, and it already spent four of the last twelve in limbo.

Here is the part that does the most work in this report. AGOA only waives the ordinary tariff. It does nothing about tariffs imposed under other laws, and those have piled up. Passenger vehicles, one of South Africa’s biggest exports here, face a 25% tariff imposed on national security grounds. A temporary 10% tariff applied to nearly everything from February until it expired on July 24. On that same day, Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa were hit with a 12.5% tariff over forced labor enforcement. A separate set of tariffs was struck down by the Supreme Court in February, which is why the temporary one existed at all.

The trade numbers followed. Imports claiming AGOA fell from $7.9 billion in 2024 to $5.0 billion in 2025, a drop of about 36%. Passenger vehicles were down 75%, crude oil down 71%, apparel down 39%. Refined copper went up 400% and is now the largest single category. Five countries account for 89% of the program’s value on average since 2001.

There is also a quieter finding. Since 2015, importers bringing goods in from AGOA countries have been more likely to pay the regular tariff than to claim the AGOA benefit—the paperwork costs more than the savings for a lot of products, and about 12% of AGOA-eligible goods face a 0% standard tariff anyway. And the assistance side of the program is largely gone: the United States obligated roughly $560 million in trade capacity building to AGOA countries in FY2021, run mostly through USAID, which was largely dismantled in 2025.

The Trade Representative says the second Trump Administration supports a multiyear reauthorization but wants what it calls a more reciprocal AGOA, and opened a public comment docket in April 2026. Meanwhile, China granted duty-free treatment to imports from 33 least-developed African countries in 2024 and extended it to 20 more in May 2026.

One law hands these countries a tariff exemption and another hands them a 12.5% tariff on the same goods. The legal authority behind the second is the Section 301 forced labor action WCSBR covered on July 22. Importers already skip this benefit more often than they claim it, so I can’t work out what a longer reauthorization changes for anyone—or which of the two Congress thinks is the actual policy.

Title: U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview

Report No. IF12990 | Type: In Focus | Date: August 14, 2026, version 13
CRS Author(s): Karen M. Sutter, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance | Official Congress.gov copy

Eight years of tariffs between the United States and China, compressed into two pages and one table. The table is the reason to open it: it tracks what each country charges the other, year by year, in one place.

The short version: the U.S. average went from 2.7% in 2017 to 19% by 2019, spiked past 160% in April 2025, and settled near 36.5% by July 2026. China's went from 8% to 21%, peaked at 146%, and has sat at 31% since May 2025. The spike and the retreat both happened inside a single year. In February 2026 the Supreme Court ruled one of the tariff authorities unconstitutional, those tariffs came off, and a temporary 10% went on under a different law.

Underneath the averages sits a list of sector-specific tariffs that do not move with the truce. Steel and aluminum at 50%. Cars and parts at 25%. Cabinets at 50%, upholstered furniture at 30%. Advanced semiconductors at 25%, with most imports exempt. And patented pharmaceuticals and their active ingredients at 100%—while roughly 80% of global drug production relies on ingredients from China. Five more investigations are open, covering drones, wind turbines, medical supplies, robotics, and coal.

China’s counter-moves are worth reading for the asymmetry. It exports more than four times what it imports from the United States, so it has fewer goods to tax. It has leaned instead on export controls, canceled orders, antitrust actions, and market restrictions on individual American firms—and on rare earths, where it restricted exports in 2025.

Talks have been running since 2025 without a deal. Both sides paused some actions for a year in fall 2025 and set up trade and investment boards in May 2026.

Title: Ecuador in Brief: Overview and U.S. Relations

Report No. R49188 | Type: Report | Date: August 14, 2026, version 2 (New)
CRS Author(s): Joshua Klein, Analyst in Foreign Affairs | Official Congress.gov copy

Ecuador has 18.1 million people, a dollarized economy, and a port system that an FBI official said in March 2026 handles about 70% of the world’s cocaine. Violence has climbed since roughly 2021 as gangs tied to larger criminal organizations fight over trafficking routes. From 2023 to 2025 Ecuador had the highest homicide rate in Latin America, after decades of having one of the lowest.

President Daniel Noboa declared an internal armed conflict in January 2024, designated 22 gangs as terrorist organizations, and put the military into policing. U.S. cooperation deepened alongside that. A status of forces agreement took effect in February 2024, letting American military personnel operate in the country. The FBI opened a permanent office in Quito in March 2026, three Ecuadorian gangs have been designated foreign terrorist organizations, and in June 2026 Noboa issued a decree giving foreign personnel in security operations immunity. The FY2026 spending law provided $30 million in narcotics enforcement aid and $10 million in military financing.

Two sets of incidents are why Members of Congress are asking questions. On March 3, 2026, Southern Command announced that U.S. and Ecuadorian forces had conducted an operation against designated terrorist organizations. Ecuador’s defense ministry said the strike destroyed a property used by a Colombian armed group. Press reporting said the target was a dairy farm. Separately, between January and March 2026, U.S. forces allegedly attacked three Ecuadorian fishing vessels in the Pacific. Two crews were reportedly detained and moved to El Salvador before being released in Ecuador without charges; one vessel was still unaccounted for as of August 2026. Southern Command and the Coast Guard reportedly denied involvement or knowledge. On August 13, the Washington Post reported the attacks may be tied to a covert CIA counter-narcotics program.

Congress is pulling in two directions. Twenty Members wrote in May asking that joint military operations be suspended pending an investigation. In August, five Members asked the State Department to designate Ecuador a major non-NATO ally.

The report also tracks democratic backsliding. A 2025 law expanded government control over nonprofits, and Human Rights Watch says officials used it to freeze accounts of Indigenous and environmental groups. An electoral judge suspended the largest opposition party for nine months in March 2026, which keeps it off the ballot. Regional elections were then moved up from February 2027 to November 2026, officially over weather. Two other opposition organizations were dissolved in April; a court reinstated one in June.

On migration, Ecuador agreed in July 2025 to accept third-country nationals from the United States, with officials describing a cap of 300 adult Spanish-speaking asylum seekers a year; 121 people had arrived by July 2026. In the other direction, more than 122,000 Ecuadorians sought asylum abroad in 2025, 93% of them in the United States.

Title: Supreme Court Says Negligence Suits Against Military Contractor Operating in a Combat Zone Are Not Preempted

Report No. LSB11469 | Type: Legal Sidebar | Date: August 14, 2026, version 1
CRS Author(s): Andreas Kuersten, Legislative Attorney | Official Congress.gov copy

In 2016, Winston Tyler Hencely was serving at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan when a man employed by the contractor Fluor carried out a suicide bombing that wounded him. Hencely sued Fluor under South Carolina law, arguing the company had supervised the bomber negligently.

The legal question is narrower than it sounds. Federal law generally allows people to sue the federal government, but carves out harm arising from military combat operations. A 1988 Supreme Court case, Boyle, extended that protection to contractors in some circumstances—the reasoning being that when the government tells a contractor exactly what to do, suing the contractor is effectively suing the government. Fluor argued the same logic should cover it here.

The Court disagreed, 6-3, on April 22, 2026. Boyle covers what the government directed. Fluor’s alleged failure was the opposite: not doing what its contract and military orders required. State tort claims against contractors in combat zones are preempted only when the conduct can reasonably be treated as the government’s own. The Court also rejected the broader argument that the Constitution’s grant of war powers to the federal government wipes out all state lawsuits arising from war zones, noting the long history of people enforcing legal rights during armed conflict. The Fourth Circuit’s test—which asked only whether the military had command authority over the activity—was held to sweep too broadly.

Justice Alito dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh. The dissent’s stated concern is a chilling effect—that exposing contractors to liability will undermine the government’s ability to use them for combat-related work. Getting to a verdict, the dissent argues, will require examining how the government assessed the risk of hiring the bomber, which means discovery into sensitive combat records and depositions of servicemembers.

The decision overrides how the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit had been reading the same exception. CRS lays out what Congress can do: nothing, and let the courts work it out; write preemption into statute, as it has done for atomic weapons testing; or move the other way and exclude contractors from the exception entirely, which it has already done elsewhere in the same law.

Boyle is a 1988 case, not a statute. Congress could have written this rule down at any point in thirty-eight years and has not.

Title: ESA Section 7 Consultation and Cooperative Federalism

Report No. LSB11470 | Type: Legal Sidebar | Date: August 14, 2026, version 1
CRS Author(s): Cassandra J. Barnum, Legislative Attorney | Official Congress.gov copy

Two ideas collide in this sidebar, and both are simple on their own.

The first is cooperative federalism. Congress writes a federal law, then lets a state run the program itself if the state meets certain conditions. Environmental law is full of these arrangements.

The second is Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Before a federal agency does something that could hurt a listed species, it has to consult the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service. The Service writes a biological opinion saying whether the action will jeopardize the species. If some harm is expected anyway, it issues an incidental take statement that sets how much harm is allowed and what has to be done to limit it. Exceed the number, and the agency has to go back and consult again.

The collision: Section 7 applies to federal agencies. Once a state is running the program, the permits it issues are not federal actions. So the only moment for consultation is the handoff—before anyone knows which permits will be applied for, where, or affecting what.

That gap is what both cases in this sidebar are about: whether an agency can satisfy Section 7 by promising to look at the permits later. Florida applied in 2020 to run its own Clean Water Act dredge-and-fill permitting. The Fish and Wildlife Service concluded the transfer would not jeopardize listed species, relying on a technical assistance process under which it could review individual permits as they came in. Its take statement said the amount of harm could not be quantified up front and would be worked out permit by permit.

On March 27, 2026, a divided D.C. Circuit panel affirmed a district court ruling against that arrangement. The judges were unanimous that the take statement failed: no quantified limit, no specific measures to minimize harm, and no trigger for reconsultation. They also agreed EPA erred by not consulting the marine fisheries service. They split on whether the biological opinion itself was defective. Florida’s request for a stay was denied and permitting reverted to the Army Corps of Engineers; the federal government has asked the full court to rehear the case. A second court applied the same reasoning to state-run coal mining programs.

Only Michigan and New Jersey now run their own dredge-and-fill permitting, and only for some waters. Two bills are relevant: one would deem Florida’s biological opinion sufficient by statute; a broader one would narrow what effects the Services can consider at all.

Title: Federal Air Quality and Wildfire Smoke Forecasting

Report No. IF13288 | Type: In Focus | Date: August 14, 2026, version 1
CRS Author(s): Eva Lipiec, Specialist in Natural Resource Policy; Alicyn R. Gitlin, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy; Omar M. Hammad, Analyst in Environmental Policy | Official Congress.gov copy

WCSBR covered the companion Insight on August 14. That one covered what smoke does to people and how the Clean Air Act handles it. This one covers the machinery that produces the number on your phone, and it shares two of the same authors.

The chain works like this. EPA runs a monitoring network—thousands of sites nationwide, nearly 1,500 of them measuring fine particles, most owned and operated by state, local, and tribal agencies. NOAA and NASA watch fires and smoke from satellites. EPA feeds real-time readings to NOAA. NOAA models them and issues national forecast guidance. States turn that guidance into local forecasts and alerts. Forecasts generally run one to three days out. Your local weather office issues an alert when the index hits 151, and the AirNow Fire and Smoke Map ties current readings to active fires.

Nationally, fine particle pollution fell 46% between 2000 and 2024. Canadian wildfire smoke is now driving it back up.

At a 2026 NOAA workshop, state and local forecasters asked for three things: a reliable way to communicate alerts to their local weather offices, a way to distinguish fire smoke from other fine particle sources, and one place to find all the air quality models. A 2023 GAO report reached a similar conclusion about interagency collaboration. Congress directed EPA in the FY2026 spending law to keep improving smoke monitoring and to expand it into under-monitored communities. Ten bills are pending, and several have already passed a chamber.

Title: Adult Protective Services: Background and Funding

Report No. IF12917 | Type: In Focus | Date: August 14, 2026, version 4
CRS Author(s): Kirsten J. Colello, Specialist in Health and Aging Policy | Official Congress.gov copy

Every state, the District of Columbia, and five territories run an Adult Protective Services program. Who those programs serve depends entirely on where you live: 35 states cover adults with a disability at any age, 13 cover younger adults with disabilities plus older adults, and a few cover only older adults. There is no national definition of who qualifies or what services they get.

In FY2023, almost 1.532 million reports of adult maltreatment came in and about 885,000—58%—were accepted for investigation. Roughly a third of investigated cases were substantiated. Services are voluntary, and 46% of confirmed victims received them.

The largest category is self-neglect, and it outnumbers every other type of maltreatment combined. In some states, that case has no alleged perpetrator at all—it is a person no longer able to keep themselves fed, housed, or safe. Financial exploitation and neglect come next.

The money is thin and comes from several directions. States estimated $480 million in total APS spending from all federal, state, and local sources in FY2022, of which $145 million came from a flexible federal block grant not dedicated to this work. The dedicated federal line ran $12 million in FY2020 and has held at $30 million from FY2023 through FY2026. Pandemic legislation added $376 million on top of that, now spent.

The first federal regulations for APS were issued in 2024. States have until May 8, 2028 to comply, and will have to file plans and report performance data.

Title: Constitutional Authority Statements and Repeal Legislation

Report No. IF13287 | Type: In Focus | Date: August 14, 2026, version 1
CRS Author(s): Dave S. Sidhu, Legislative Attorney; Madeline W. Donley, Legislative Attorney | Official Congress.gov copy

Since 2011, House rules have required every bill and joint resolution to arrive with a statement identifying where in the Constitution Congress gets the power to pass it. The statement is not part of the bill. It does not become law. A court may read it as evidence of intent but is not bound by it. The Clerk checks that one exists and is explicitly not required to judge whether it is any good.

CRS reviewed 2,047 bills from the 114th and 115th Congresses. The most common citation, used 654 times, was a general reference to Article I, Section 8—which is nearly the entire list of Congress’s enumerated powers. The next most common, 500 times, was the Necessary and Proper Clause, which is itself an extension of the other powers.

The interesting problem is repeal. The Constitution says nothing about what authority you cite to undo a law, and the question gets stranger when a Member wants to repeal a law precisely because they think Congress lacked the power to pass it. Cite the same authority the original bill used, and you may be citing a power a court said did not exist. CRS walks through four options, including citing the power Congress overstepped, or the Tenth Amendment, or the Necessary and Proper Clause on the theory that undoing an unconstitutional law is incidental to the oath. Of 18 repeal bills in the 118th Congress, 14 cited Article I, Section 8 and nothing more.

Title: Finding Medicare Fee-for-Service (FFS) Payment System Rules: Schedules and Resources

Report No. R46797 | Type: Report | Date: August 14, 2026, version 22
CRS Author(s): Michele L. Malloy, Senior Research Librarian | Official Congress.gov copy

Medicare pays doctors, hospitals, surgery centers, nursing homes, rehab and psychiatric facilities, home health agencies, dialysis providers, and hospices under eleven separate payment systems. Most are updated once a year through the same three steps: a proposed rule, a public comment period, and a final rule. If you want to influence one, you have to catch the comment window—and the windows sit on different calendars.

This report is that calendar. One row per payment system, with the CMS page, the months proposed and final rules typically appear, the deadlines statute or regulation imposes, and the most recent rules with their docket numbers, Federal Register citations, links to the public comments, and any corrections. The deadlines genuinely differ: hospital inpatient rules must be final by August 1 because the statute says so, the physician fee schedule by November 1, and several systems have no statutory timeline at all.

This is a finding aid, maintained by a research librarian, and it is one of those quietly useful products CRS publishes.

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AI Disclosure: This post was produced with Anthropic’s Claude Opus 5. Claude ran prior-coverage checks, proposed triage and tier assignments, drafted the metadata blocks, and wrote all initial drafts. Charlie Amiot provided the source documents, set the tier assignments and running order, directed the plainer register used throughout the coverage, and made the decision to omit Commentary from this post. One further disclosure: R49189, on AI chatbots, discusses Anthropic and OpenAI by name and cites Anthropic’s own research and product documentation. WCSBR is drafted with Anthropic’s Claude. That is noted again at the top of that entry. Charlie Amiot holds final responsibility for all accuracy and editorial judgment in this post. AI use is disclosed in every post.